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Abstract 
 
Why have the major post 9/11 U.S. military interventions turned into quagmires? Despite huge 
power imbalances, major capacity-building efforts, and repeated tactical victories, the wars in 
Afghanistan (2001-present) and Iraq (2003-2011; 2014-present) turned bloody and intractable. 
The inability to design and manage war termination is an important part of the explanation why 
successful military operations to overthrow two third-world regimes failed to achieve favorable 
and durable outcomes.  
This thesis uses the abductive research method to develop three hypotheses to investigate these 
problems. Hypothesis #1: The failure to consider war termination heightens the risk of 
selecting a myopic strategy that has a low probability of success. Hypothesis #2: Cognitive 
obstacles, political frictions, and patron-client problems can impede the ability to recognize 
and abandon an ineffective or losing strategy. Hypothesis #3. When the United States tires of 
the war and decides to withdraw, bargaining asymmetries can undermine the prospects of a 
favorable outcome. These hypotheses are examined in the case studies and used to draw 
conclusions. 
Three main findings emerge. First, the United States government has no organized way to 
consider war termination and thus selected strategies that overestimated the prospects of 
decisive military victory. Second, the United States was slow to recognize and modify or 
abandon losing strategies. In both cases, U.S. officials believed their strategies were working 
even as the situations deteriorated. Third, once the United States decided to withdraw, 
bargaining asymmetries and disconnects in strategy undermined the prospects for a successful 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Why have the major post 9/11 U.S. military interventions turned into quagmires, and what can 
we learn from these conflicts about war termination? Despite huge power imbalances, major 
capacity-building efforts, and repeated tactical victories, the wars in Afghanistan (2001-
present) and Iraq (2003-2011; 2014-present) turned bloody and intractable. Former Joint 
Special Operations Command (JSOC) chief General Stanley A. McChrystal, reflecting on his 
fight against al Qaeda in Iraq, observed that the world’s most elite counterterrorist force 
struggled initially “against a seemingly ragtag band of radical fighters.” Despite the massive 
advantages in technology, resources, education, and training, he recalls, “things were slipping 
away from us.”1 As of January 2017, the United States remains engaged in wars in both 
countries. The inability to succeed against substantially weaker opponents suggests that 
problems could exist in how the United States develops and executes strategies for 
interventions. This thesis will focus on an underappreciated aspect of such strategies: war 
termination. This was a major gap in strategies for both interventions and helps to explain why 
they devolved into quagmires. Chapter 2’s brief examination of the Vietnam conflict suggests 
the problem may be systemic. 
What is War Termination?  
Historian Lawrence Freedman describes strategy as “the best word we have for expressing 
attempts to think about our actions in advance, in light of our goals and capacities.”2 The quality 
of a strategy may be revealed in how well an actor finishes the war, not simply in how well it 
is fought. “If war is simply a ‘grammar’ in which the logic of political purpose is expressed in 
                                                                 
1 McChrystal et al (2016), 6, 18. 
2 Freedman (2013), ix-x. 
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violent terms,” explains historian Bradford Lee, “then it is in war termination that the purpose 
finally achieves its ultimate definition or refinement in political demands.”3 The U.S. 
Department of Defense, however, has no definition or doctrine for this seemingly critical aspect 
of war. Scholars, tending to focus on conventional conflicts, discuss war termination as a phase 
of activity nestled between the end of organized hostilities and the beginning of peace.4 “In the 
time between war and peace,” writes historian Matthew Moten, “it is easy to lose sight of the 
objectives for which one embarked upon war in the first place, and to forfeit the grasp on 
accomplishments bought at great expense to the treasury and the lives and health of the nation’s 
soldiery” [emphasis added].5 This view of war termination as a sort of transition from the 
military to the diplomats seems too narrow. Bradford Lee notes that the United States “has 
failed again and again to translate military success … into the most favorable and durable 
political results.”6 A strategy that stops at the military objectives would be short-sighted.    
This thesis defines war termination as the end of America’s participation in organized 
hostilities. There are different methods by which the United States can do this. For 
interventions, these can include decisive victory, negotiated settlement, transition-withdrawal, 
and decisive loss. As a consideration for strategy and decision-making, an intended war 
termination outcome is how the United States seeks to achieve a favorable and durable result 
that meets policy aims at acceptable cost. A strategy designed to achieve a decisive victory, for 
instance, could look quite different than one that seeks a negotiated outcome. These will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. Bradford Lee found that throughout the wars of the 
                                                                 
3 Lee (2003), 255. 
4 Rose (2010); Iklè (1991); Reiter (2009); Caplan (2012); Lee & Walling (2003); Stanley (2009a, 2009b); 
Moten (2011). 
5 Moten (2011), xi [emphasis added]. 
6 Lee & Walling (2003), 245; See also Caplan (2012), 3-4. 
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twentieth century U.S. political and military leaders rarely, if ever, properly considered war 
termination.7 Lack of forethought about war termination can lead to decisions that undermine 
the ability to achieve a favorable and durable outcome. During the 1991 Gulf War Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin L. Powell waited until the Iraqi Army was in headlong 
retreat before discussing war termination. When he offered to bring a recommendation to 
President George H.W. Bush the next day, the latter responded, “If that is the case … why not 
end it today?”8 Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor discuss how this shortfall undermined 
America’s ability to capitalize on such a stunning battlefield victory.9 This lack of thinking 
through the end-game is part of the reason the United States, in political scientist Gideon Rose’s 
words, tends to “trip across the finish line.”10  
 
Gaps in War Termination Scholarship for U.S. Interventions 
The existing scholarship focuses mainly on the termination of conventional wars. The United 
States is consistently surprised by the complexity of end-game challenges, Gideon Rose argues, 
and often must improvise through uncertain and ambiguous strategic terrain.11 Interventions in 
irregular wars may present very different challenges. The lack of attention to war termination 
in such conflicts creates three significant gaps in scholarship. 
First, the conventional war paradigm may overestimate the military factors and underplay the 
political and diplomatic issues that tend to be more salient for wars against insurgencies. This 
                                                                 
7 Lee and Walling (2003), 21.   
8 Iklè (1991), ix; Powell (1995), 519, 521. 
9 Gordon and Trainor (1995), xiv-xv, 463-478. 
10 Rose (2010), 4. 
11 Rose (2010), 4. 
 7 
could lead scholars to ignore implicit assumptions in intervention strategies that sow the seeds 
for war termination problems.12 For instance, conventional wars tend to be fought between 
military forces until one side wins or a stalemate ensues. Because the clash between fielded 
forces is so central to success, political and military leaders work to “define a military objective 
that, if achieved, can deliver the political objective.”13 Once hostilities conclude, diplomats 
negotiate agreements that seek to maximize the advantage of battlefield results.  
Interventions against insurgencies tend not to hinge upon the clash of opposing forces. There 
might not be a realistic military objective that could deliver the political aims. Ivan Arreguín-
Toft, in fact, argues that stronger powers have been losing to weaker ones increasingly often 
since the nineteenth century.14 As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2, insurgencies seek to 
avoid rather than bring about decisive battles. Several longitudinal studies show that the ability 
of the insurgency to sustain tangible support and of the government to win the battle of political 
legitimacy play more decisive roles in the war’s outcomes than battlefield engagements.15 
Thus, intervention strategies that assume or fixate upon decisive military victory for war 
termination may have a low probability of success against insurgencies. This problem suggests 
hypothesis #1: The failure to consider war termination heightens the risk of selecting a myopic 
strategy that has a low probability of success. 
A second major gap in the existing literature is that it does not help us understand why America 
has been slow to abandon losing or ineffective strategies. Realists such as Kenneth Waltz and 
John J. Mearsheimer argue that a state at war will adopt strategies with the highest likelihood 
                                                                 
12 Toft (2005), 3-4, argues that asymmetries in direct versus indirect strategies account for a significant proportion 
of weak actor wins. 
13 Lee & Walling (2003), 13. 
14 Toft (2005), 3-5. 
15 Paul, et al (2013); Martin C. Libicki (2008); Fearon and Laitin (2003).  
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of success and take advantage of conflict situations when the benefits outweigh the costs.16 If 
this is the case, then states should abandon a losing strategy quickly. As will be discussed in 
this thesis, the United States did not change strategies in Vietnam until 1969, in Iraq until 2007, 
and in Afghanistan until 2009 – five, four, and eight years into the conflicts, respectively.17 By 
each point the American public tired of the war and demanded withdrawal.  
What accounts for the strategic paralysis? Scholars differ on the factors that may impede 
decisions about war termination. Elizabeth Stanley and Fred Iklè describe important political 
and bureaucratic obstacles that can affect decision-making.18 In examining cases from the U.S. 
Civil War to the Korean War, political scientist Dan Reiter asserts that domestic politics has 
been of “curious insignificance…in war-termination decision-making.”19 Stanley, however, 
marshals significant amounts of evidence that suggest a change in domestic coalitions was a 
key driver in bringing about an end to the Korean war.20   
Interventions against insurgencies may have important differences. The amount of ground 
taken or lost is normally a reasonable indicator of progress in conventional war. This is not 
necessarily the case for irregular war. Valid strategic metrics may be more difficult to develop, 
which could increase the risk of poor decision-making.  The presence of bureaucratic silos may 
shape how progress is measured, and could lead to in-silo positive indicators even as the war 
                                                                 
16 See Mearsheimer (2003); Waltz (1979, 2001). 
17 As detailed in the conclusion the United States adopted the graduated response strategy to compel North 
Vietnam to cease its support for the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong). 
18 Stanley and Sawyer (2009), 651-676; Fred Iklè identifies challenges associated with decisions whether to end 
the war, such as uncertain battlefield outcomes, poisonous “patriots versus traitors” domestic politics, and 
bureaucratic politics: Iklè (1991), xv, 2-6. 
19 Reiter (2009), 6-7. 
20 Stanley (2009a), pp. 42-82. Stanley argues that changes in domestic coalitions are often required to end a war. 
Stanley (2009b), Goemans (2000a, 2000b), 15-22, suggests that regime-type is the most salient determinant of 
war termination behavior.  
 9 
is going poorly overall. The interface between interagency silos that are forced to work together 
may leave important but undetected vulnerabilities. The nature of the host nation government 
likely plays a heightened role in counterinsurgency. Governments most likely to need 
assistance from an external power might also be the ones most vulnerable to insurgency, and 
more resistant to changes in strategy that require them to make reforms or compromises. The 
increasingly rich fields of decision theory, organizational management, behavioral economics, 
and agency theory may be of assistance in understanding potential causes of strategic 
paralysis.21 These potential challenges lead to hypothesis #2: Cognitive obstacles, internal 
frictions, and patron-client problems can impede the ability to recognize and abandon an 
ineffective or losing strategy. If present, such problems suggest important limitations to the 
realist perspective. 
A third issue is that bargaining behavior could be very different for interventions against 
insurgencies. Conventional wars that settle into stalemates tend to produce symmetrical 
bargaining opportunities. Thomas Schelling suggests that “most conflict situations are 
essentially bargaining situations.”22 Historian Roger Spiller argues that combatants always 
“converge toward an agreement to stop fighting.”23 This symmetry makes the fallback to 
negotiations possible. “Uncertainty causes war, combat provides information and reduces 
uncertainty,” Reiter argues, “and war ends when enough information has been provided.” 24 I. 
William Zartman refers to this as ripeness: a “mutually hurting stalemate” in which both actors 
                                                                 
21 Kahneman (2003, 2013); Tversky and Kahneman (1986); Etner, Jeleva, and Tallon (2012), 234-270; Dan 
Arielly (2008); Harford (2008); Levitt and Dubner (2009); Laffont and Martimort (2002); Miller (2005), 203-
25; Ladwig (2016), 99–146.  
22 Schelling (1960), 5. 
23 Spiller (2011), 4 
24 Reiter (2009), 2-5, 16. 
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are in “an uncomfortable and costly predicament” which makes parties ripe for negotiation.25 
Thus, if decisive victory does not work out, combatants can fall back to negotiations. 
Are those same opportunities present for intervening powers or could bargaining asymmetries 
affect the prospects of a favorable outcome? Once an intervening power decides the war is 
unwinnable and wants to withdraw, bargaining leverage may shift to the insurgency. This could 
reduce the likelihood of a favorable negotiated end to the conflict. Alternatively, the 
intervening power, as it withdraws, might seek to transition security responsibility to the host 
government as it builds their capacity. Capacity-building efforts, however, might create 
crippling dependencies that impede battlefield performance or give the host government false 
confidence that it can maintain the predatory and exclusionary practices which gave rise to the 
insurgency in the first place. These challenges suggest hypothesis #3: When the United States 
tires of the war and decides to withdraw, bargaining asymmetries can undermine the prospects 
of a favorable outcome.  
 
Methodology and Sources 
This thesis develops a new understanding of war termination challenges facing the United 
States during large scale interventions. The gaps in theory and scholarship noted above meant 
that an abductive research approach was likely to generate the richest insights. Abduction, as a 
research method, combines “deductively derived hypotheses” and “inductively derived 
insights.” It involves “moving back and forth between the two to produce an account that will 
be ‘verisimilar and believable to others looking over the same events’.”26 Rather than 
                                                                 
25 Zartman (2001), 8.  
26 Finnemore (2003), 13; Ruggie (1998), 94; Pierce (1955). 
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proceeding linearly from theory to case research, this approach intertwines theory and 
empirical observation to enhance the understanding of both. This process expands and refines 
an evolving framework that yields unanticipated but related avenues requiring further 
investigation. The result is a pragmatic framework that enables theory to confront the real 
world and empirical observation to challenge theory.27 For this thesis, the hypotheses are 
deduced from existing theories of war termination, strategy, decision-making, organizational 
behavior, agency, and negotiation, among others (discussed in Chapter 2), and are inductively 
derived from the two case studies of Iraq and Afghanistan. Taken together, these hypotheses 
help explain why America’s post-9/11 interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan turned into 
quagmires after overthrowing two third-world regimes. As a check against these challenges 
being unique to a single U.S. administration or context, this thesis applies the three hypotheses 
to a short case study of Vietnam in Chapter 2.   
This methodology is more appropriate than a primarily deductive approach for several reasons. 
First, existing war termination theory focuses mostly on state-on-state conventional war. New 
concepts are needed to understand the complexity of war termination challenges for intervening 
powers in irregular conflicts. Second, there is no appropriate null hypothesis. Since the United 
States emerged from the Second World War as a global power with a new national security 
architecture and powerful bureaucracies, it has not successfully prosecuted a large-scale 
military intervention against an insurgency. This thesis defines large-scale military intervention 
as one in which the United States deploys military forces of division-size or greater (over 
10,000 soldiers) to play a leading role in ground combat operations. Only three conflicts 
qualify: Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. They have all become quagmires. Third, comparing 
American interventions with those of others is beyond the scope of this thesis and presents 
                                                                 
27 Dubois and Gadde (2002), 555; Haig (2005), 376-9. 
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different methodological challenges due to dissimilarities in doctrine, national security 
architecture and decision-making, to say nothing of domestic politics, strategic culture, and 
span of global responsibilities and interests. The extent to which these three hypotheses can be 
generalized beyond the cases in this thesis is an important subject for future research.  
This thesis has benefitted from personal access to key decision-makers in both the Bush and 
Obama administrations. To examine the three hypotheses and draw conclusions, I have 
interviewed over thirty former senior officials who were instrumental in developing policy and 
strategy for Iraq and Afghanistan and were present for discussions in the White House Situation 
Room, in Baghdad, and/or in Kabul. Many of these former senior officials agreed to speak “on 
background” due to the sensitive nature of the issues.28 The interviews are complemented by a 
significant number of published memoirs, which include those of a President, a National 
Security Advisor, three former Secretaries of Defense, and two theater-level commanders. This 
thesis has also made use of a wide range of United States government documents that are 
publicly available. Among these, congressionally-mandated Department of Defense semi-
annual reports beginning in 2006 have provided exceptional detail on policy, strategy, 
operations, and assessments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Reporting cables have offered insights 
into how officials viewed and interpreted issues at the time they occurred. These sources plus 
a wide array of journalist reporting and academic studies have helped to control for first person 
biases or incomplete recollections. My personal experience working at senior levels in 
Washington, D.C. and Kabul has helped me to ask the right questions and derive important 
insights. To guard against personal bias entering the thesis, I have relied on evidence from 
                                                                 
28 “On background” means the interviewee granted me permission to use the information but not to name them 
directly.  
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other sources in developing and defending the arguments and have noted the key efforts in 
which I was involved.   
 
Main Findings 
After applying the three hypotheses in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, three main findings 
emerge. First, the United States has no organized way to consider war termination and thus 
selected strategies for both conflicts that overestimated the prospects of decisive military 
victory. The government lacks an authoritative body of knowledge for how to integrate 
political, diplomatic, military, economic and other elements of national power to achieve a 
successful outcome against insurgencies. The United States has no doctrine or conceptual 
apparatus that enables it to differentiate war termination options and select ones with the 
highest probability of success. Decisive victory was implicitly assumed. Once the spectacular 
military campaigns overthrew the sitting governments, the United States government was at a 
loss for how to achieve a favorable and durable outcome. In both cases, the United States 
ignored or dismissed early opportunities to negotiate with defeated parties and unwittingly 
allowed predatory and exclusionary governments to form. The combination led to insurgencies 
that became sustainable. The stage was set for quagmire. 
Second, the United States was slow to recognize and modify or abandon losing strategies. In 
both cases, U.S. officials believed their strategies were working even as the situations 
deteriorated. Confirmation bias was evident as officials emphasized positive indicators of 
progress and rationalized or, in some cases, even used negative indicators as evidence of 
success. Political frictions combined with confirmation bias and loss aversion led the Bush 
administration to dig in its heels on Iraq, and similar factors led the Obama administration to 
resist changes to drawdown timelines in both conflicts. The tendency in both administrations 
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to operate in bureaucratic silos reinforced the narrative of progress. Many in-silo milestones 
and indicators were positive. The problems were happening at the interface of the silos. Seams 
or gaps between them were ably exploited by the host governments and the insurgencies. Both 
the Iraqi and Afghan governments took advantage of these gaps to manipulate unwitting U.S. 
officials into advancing their predatory and exclusionary agendas. When silos interacted with 
one another fault lines could result in which efforts in one silo damaged progress in others. 
Civilian casualties from military operations, for instance, undermined the legitimacy of both 
governments and international missions. Patron-client problems diluted capacity-building 
efforts, created frictions between the U.S. and the host governments, and, in some cases, 
between Washington and American military and diplomats in Baghdad or Kabul. These toxic 
factors intensified the conflicts, reduced public support in both countries, and impeded U.S. 
decision-making. Although the United States made important strategic changes in both 
conflicts, it had paid penalties in public support along the way. The so-called crossover point, 
in which the host nation government could assume security lead and defeat the insurgency after 
the U.S. troop withdrawal, never occurred. 
Third, once the United States decided to withdraw, bargaining asymmetries and disconnects in 
strategy undermined the prospects for a successful outcome. The weaker parties had more 
effective leverage. In Iraq, Bush was unable to gain Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki’s agreement 
for a “conditions-based” withdrawal and had to settle for a fixed timeline. The very limited 
amount of support Obama was willing to commit for an enduring presence led Maliki to 
calculate that the benefits were not worth the political cost. Just over two years after the last 
American troops withdrew, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) arose and humiliated the Iraqi 
Army that America had spent so much blood and treasure to build. In Afghanistan, efforts to 
bring about negotiations with the Taliban ended in disaster. Although the Taliban were willing 
to discuss the conditions of the U.S. withdrawal, they were uninterested in negotiating an end 
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to the conflict. They could play for time until international forces left. Deep problems in the 
U.S.-Afghan relationship led Afghan President Karzai to refuse to sign a bi-lateral security 
agreement to extend American troop presence beyond 2014. This was later signed by the 
incoming National Unity Government of President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive 
Abdullah Abdullah, but not by one of these elected leaders. Obama’s draw-down timeline, 
meanwhile, had to be modified because of larger than expected gains in territory by the Taliban 
and major problems within the Afghan National Security and Defense Forces.    
Failure to consider war termination left the United States vulnerable to quagmire in both 
interventions. Preventing the formation of a sustainable insurgency and a predatory and 
exclusionary government should have been key elements in the strategies. The United States 
failed to seize or promote bargaining opportunities early, especially when both the defeated 
parties and local governments were highly uncertain about survival. Instead, the United States 
held on to an ineffective strategy and then doubled down. A more fulsome consideration of 
war termination might have led the United States to develop different strategies or to modify 
them more quickly and effectively. The American administrations might have concluded that 
transition strategies would be more likely to succeed by prioritizing government legitimacy 
over kinetic military operations. They might have also been more open to accepting three-
quarters of the loaf in early bargains than suffering the risk of a bloody and intractable war that 
achieves far less at much greater cost. The brief discussion of the Vietnam war in Chapter 2 
suggests that these findings are not unique to the post-9/11 era. 
 
Personal Experiences with War Termination  
This research project originates, in part, from my own frustration at the inability of the U.S. 
government to develop and execute a sensible approach to war termination in Afghanistan. As 
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a battalion task force commander in Kunar and Nuristan in 2007 and 2008, I engaged in what 
may have been the first successful local peace process in Afghanistan.29 The effort resulted in 
the local branch of the insurgent group Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG) to stop fighting and to 
eventually aligning with the Afghan government against the Taliban. This experience led to 
assignment as a senior advisor to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle A. Flournoy 
to support the Obama administration’s development of a new strategy for the war in 
Afghanistan. I was soon directed to deploy back to Afghanistan as a senior advisor to General 
McChrystal and to lead his strategic assessment team.  Months later, McChrystal asked me to 
advise him about war termination. “Reconciliation” was the term of art at that time. 
For the next four years, I was intimately involved in U.S. efforts to bring the conflict to a 
successful conclusion. This included serving as the Secretary of Defense’s representative in 
exploratory talks with the Taliban from 2011-2013. I have witnessed the challenges in getting 
the U.S. government’s internal house in order regarding war termination and in coordinating 
such delicate issues with others. I saw how well-meaning but poorly coordinated efforts can be 
disastrous. I realized very quickly that, despite the obvious talent and experience of those 
engaged in the process, the U.S. government had no idea what it was doing. We had no useful 
doctrine, concepts, or body of knowledge for thinking through war termination and enacting a 
sensible strategy to achieve a realistic outcome. We faced huge cognitive barriers as well as 
political and bureaucratic resistance. We often wasted time negotiating with ourselves while 
alienating our Afghan government partners and leading the Taliban to conclude that we were 
operating in bad faith. None of this was due to malfeasance or lack of effort by U.S. officials. 
I fully accept my own errors in this endeavor, which include, but are not restricted to, failing 
to frame issues with sufficient clarity to promote better policy decisions, and unintentionally 
                                                                 
29 Tapper (2012), 330-336. 
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upsetting my colleagues in Defense, State, and the White House when we talked past each 
other in debating issues and approaches. This dissertation has helped me to understand these 
failings even further. Throughout my personal experiences with war termination, I combed the 
existing literature to determine whether some useful models or analogies existed that could 
guide our decision-making and help us understand and navigate the challenges and resistance. 
What I found was very interesting, but ultimately disappointing. This thesis seeks to address 
this gap in the literature. 
 
Thesis Roadmap 
This thesis will develop an analytic framework for war termination that will be used to explore 
the three hypotheses (Chapter 2). The next six chapters will be devoted to the case studies. The 
examination will begin with Iraq, even though that intervention (2003) occurred after the one 
in Afghanistan (2001). This is because America withdrew earlier from there and the Iraq surge 
played a significant role in the Obama administration’s decision-making for Afghanistan in 
2009. Each case study will consist of three chapters, one exploring each hypothesis in turn. 
Each chapter begins with a brief overview of critical events before proceeding with the detailed 
analysis. The concluding chapter will outline the main findings, compare war termination 
challenges in the Iraq and Afghan conflicts, and close with implications for U.S. foreign policy 
and for scholarship. 
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Chapter 2: Why Interventions Become Quagmires  
Why have major post-9/11 U.S. interventions become quagmires? It seems counterintuitive 
that the world’s richest country with the most capable and technologically advanced military 
supported by highly educated diplomats and development professionals cannot defeat poorly 
educated, trained, and resourced insurgent groups. This has been the case, however, in Iraq and 
Afghanistan (and earlier in Vietnam). Some argue that counterinsurgency simply does not work 
and should be avoided.30 Others suggest democracies are largely incapable of waging wars 
against insurgencies effectively.31 Leaving aside the merits of those arguments, the United 
States cannot always choose the wars it fights. In fact, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan did 
not begin as counterinsurgencies. They developed into them as insurgencies fomented against 
the newly installed U.S.-backed governments. Understanding why the United States has been 
unable to win these conflicts quickly has the potential to advance the scholarship on war and 
strategy.  
This thesis contends that America’s inability to design and manage war termination is an 
important part of the reason for post-9/11 quagmires. Failure to adequately consider the last 
step in war before taking the first has produced observable problems in strategic decision-
making that have heightened the risks of the conflict becoming intractable. Inattention to war 
termination has heightened the risk of selecting intervention strategies that have low 
probabilities of success. The flawed strategies can become entrenched due to cognitive 
obstacles, political frictions, and misalignment of interests and objectives with the host nation. 
As America grows exhausted with the war and wants to withdraw, bargaining asymmetries 
                                                                 
30 Eikenberry (2013); Gentile (2013); Bacevich (2005, 2008).  
31 Jentleson (1992), 49–74; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (2005/06), 7–46; Feaver and Gelpi (2004); Gartner 
(2008), 95–106; For an alternative view see Lyall (2010), 167–92. 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with the insurgency and host nation undermine the prospects of securing a favorable and 
durable outcome.  To advance the argument, this thesis will develop three hypotheses by 
critically analyzing the available literature on war termination, strategy and doctrine, 
counterinsurgency, decision-making, organizational management, agency theory, and 
bargaining, among others.  
Hypothesis #1: The failure to consider war termination heightens the risk of selecting a myopic 
strategy that has a low probability of success. 
Hypothesis #2: Cognitive obstacles, political frictions, and patron-client problems can impede 
the ability to recognize and abandon an ineffective or losing strategy. 
Hypothesis #3. When the United States tires of the war and decides to withdraw, bargaining 
asymmetries can undermine the prospects of a favorable outcome.  
With this analytic framework in place, this thesis will examine the salience of these hypotheses 
using the major post-9/11 military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan as case studies. To 
avoid spurious correlation, this thesis is attentive to external factors that could explain sub-
optimal or seemingly irrational decisions, and will briefly apply the hypotheses at the end of 
this chapter to the Vietnam conflict. At a minimum, this analysis can provide circumstantial 
evidence of how the inattention to war termination has increased the likelihood of U.S. 
interventions against insurgencies becoming intractable. The concluding chapter will compare 
the cases and discuss the implications for U.S. foreign policy and scholarship on war and 
strategy.  Taken together, these three hypotheses provide a unique and compelling addition to 
understanding why post-9/11 interventions turned into quagmires.  
 
Gaps in Theory and Doctrine  
 20 
Modern militaries have produced copious doctrine to cover everything from operational art and 
forms of maneuver to squad tactics and even the construction of field expedient latrines.32 If a 
military commander wants to attack, he or she can find several offensive operations to consider, 
including hasty attack, deliberate attack, movement to contact, exploitation, pursuit, 
envelopment, double envelopment, penetration, airborne assault, and so forth. Commanders 
needing to defend will find an equally impressive array of options.  The commander can select 
the best one based on a variety of considerations such as the correlation of forces and 
capabilities, terrain and weather, and mission and objectives. The statesman is not so lucky.   
The Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz tells us not take the first step in war before 
considering the last. 33 Yet no doctrine or conceptual apparatus exists for war termination. The 
United States government has no authoritative body of expert knowledge on how to integrate 
diplomatic, military, political, economic, and other elements of national power to bring a war 
to a successful conclusion. Military warfighting doctrine is understandably focused on 
defeating the enemy’s forces. The Joint Operations manual states that the general goal of 
military operations “is to prevail against the enemy as quickly as possible, conclude hostilities, 
and establish conditions favorable to the HN [host nation], the United States, and its 
multinational partners.”34 The United States Army calls “decisive action” – defeating enemy 
ground forces – a core competency.35 When it comes to war termination, the Department of 
Defense manual covering doctrinal terms is nearly silent. The lone entry is a definition of war 
termination criteria: “the specified standards approved by the President and/or the Secretary of 
                                                                 
32 See U.S. Department of Defense’s Joint Electronic Library at 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm and the U.S. Army’s list of field manuals at 
http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/misc/doctrine/CDG/fms.html.   
33 Clausewitz (1984), 584. 
34 JP 3-0 (2011), xix 
35 ADP 3-0 (2011), 5-6. 
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Defense that must be met before a joint operation can be concluded.”36 When the enemy is 
defeated, the military must turn to the Department of Defense’s Law of War manual for 
guidance on cease-fires, armistice, and enemy capitulation.37 With no doctrine or taxonomy 
that differentiates war termination outcomes, the default for U.S interventions is probably 
decisive victory.  
While highly desirable, decisive victory is not the only possible outcome. In some cases, it 
might not be realistic or cost effective. Clausewitz, for instance, proposes that “it is possible to 
increase the likelihood of success without defeating the enemy’s forces … many roads lead to 
success [and] they do not all involve the opponent’s outright defeat.”38 This suggests that a 
combatant has multiple options to achieve a favorable and durable outcome, and that decisive 
victory is not necessarily the best one in certain circumstances. What alternatives exist? 
Clausewitz does not offer a taxonomy of war termination methods, either, so it is necessary to 
develop one. In very broad terms, war termination outcomes for interventions against 
insurgencies can include: 
• Decisive victory, in which the insurgency capitulates or ceases to exist. 
• Negotiated settlement or mixed outcome, in which neither side wins outright. Parties 
compromise to end the war and settle remaining differences through peaceful politics.  
• Transition and withdrawal, in which the intervening power degrades the insurgency 
while building the capacity of the host nation government and security forces. As these 
forces become superior to the enemy (the crossover point), the intervening power hands 
                                                                 
36 JP 1-02 (2016), 246 
37 Law of War Manual (May 2016), 813-850. 
38 Clausewitz (1984), 92, 95, 99. 
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over security responsibility to the host nation and withdraws without concluding a peace 
agreement.  
• Decisive loss, in which the intervening power agrees to withdraw after battlefield defeats.39   
If Clausewitz is correct that a combatant can increase the likelihood of success without 
defeating the enemy’s forces, then the choice of war termination method ought to be important. 
This choice should occur during the development of strategy or in its modification as 
circumstances warrant. As discussed in the Introduction, an intended war termination outcome 
(or method) is how a combatant seeks to achieve a favorable and durable result that meets 
policy aims at acceptable cost. A strategy designed to achieve decisive victory over an 
insurgency, for instance, could be substantively different than one that seeks a negotiated 
settlement or transition. If the likely cost of decisive victory is too high, an alternative method 
that achieves the war aims would be appropriate.  
Furthermore, Clausewitz’s statement implies that it is possible in certain conflicts for some war 
termination methods to have a higher probability of success than others. Making the right 
choice (or avoiding a bad one) thus seems to be important. Aiming for an unrealistic outcome 
could prolong a war and its costs. Aiming for an insufficient outcome could undermine the 
achievement of policy aims. Circumstances, of course, may change during a conflict. Knowing 
when to adopt an alternative war termination method seems to be a critical decision, too. For 
instance, a combatant could aim for decisive victory and then fall back, if necessary, to 
negotiations. Alternatively, an intervening power that seeks a favorable and durable outcome 
through transition could meet with unexpected success that opens an opportunity for a decisive 
                                                                 
39 An intervening power could also make an open-ended commitment to the host country and continue fighting 
the war indefinitely. The intervening power’s participation in the war will end at some point in one of these four 
ways.  
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victory. U.S. civilian and military leaders, however, have not had this taxonomy or an 
authoritative language to discuss these choices. This gap in theory and practice could 
potentially lead to strategies that implicitly assume decisive victory, even if that is a low 
probability outcome, and to miscommunication and misunderstanding between policy makers 
in Washington and commanders and diplomats in the field.   
 
Decisive Victory Strategies Can Heighten the Risk of Quagmires  
Can a strategy that aims for or implicitly assumes decisive victory place an intervening power 
at higher risk of quagmire? Clausewitz’s statement above suggests this is possible. The 
presumption of decisive victory affects rational strategic decision-making.40 Michael Handel 
observes that strategy ought to be a rational process, evidenced by identifying political goals, 
analyzing the character of the conflict, developing a strategy to achieve stated aims, and then 
making peace when the goals have been attained or when the costs and risks have come to 
outweigh the value of the political object.41 The process is intentional – the calculated and 
purposeful use of force to achieve desired political outcomes. 
This is not to imply that statesmen are perfectly rational or that they do not make bad decisions. 
Behavioral scientist Daniel Kahneman defines rationality as “logical coherence – reasonable 
or not.” This is a high standard, and, as Kahnmen admits, “impossibly restrictive.”42 That wars 
can escape rational direction is a central point of Clausewitz’s theory of war.43 Military or other 
                                                                 
40 Clausewitz (1984), 75, 80-81, 87. “The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means 
can never be considered in isolation from their purpose” (87).  
41 Lee & Walling (2003), 2-3. See also Handel (2001), 19-32; Clausewitz (1984), 81; Sun Tzu (1980), 77-79. 
42 Kahneman (2013), 411-2. 
43 Clausewitz (1984), 89. 
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considerations can dominate political purposes. Passions, fears, personal and bureaucratic 
interests, entrapment, biases, among other challenges, can affect decision-making and 
undermine rational choice.44 Factors such as these lead theorists Braford Lee and Karl Walling 
to argue that it is the responsibility of the state leadership to make strategy “as rational an 
instrument of policy as the circumstances of a particular war admit.”45  
 
Are Some Conflicts Less Prone to Decisive Victory?  
If the first step to making war a rational instrument is to determine the political goals, the 
second is to understand the character of the conflict.46 This includes estimating the goals of the 
different belligerents; evaluating the importance of those goals to them (the “value of the 
object” for Clausewitz47); assessing the strengths and weaknesses, capabilities and limitations 
of each actor; calculating comparative advantages; and weighing potential risks and 
opportunities.48 This process, political scientist Richard K. Betts argues, has a high risk of error 
as policy-makers struggle to use intelligence reports and assessments that can be vague, 
incomplete, misleading, or contradictory to make strategic decisions.49 At the same time, he 
                                                                 
44 For more on factors affecting rational decision-making, see Clausewitz (1984), 84, 117-8; Kahneman and 
Tversky (1972), 430-451; Kahneman, Slovik, and Tversky (1987); Allison (1969), 689-718; Allison and 
Zelikow (1999). For a critique of Allison and Zelikow see Bendor and Hammond 1992), 301-322.  
45 Lee & Walling (2003), 3. 
46 Clausewitz (1984), 88; Sun-Tzu (1980), 63-71, 96-101; JP-5-0 (2011); ADP 5-0 (May 2012). 
47 Clausewitz (1984), 80-81. 
48 JP 5-0 (2011); ADP 5-0 (May 2012). 
49 Betts (1978) 61-8; Betts (2004); Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor (2010). 
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notes, policy-makers can ignore, discount, or misinterpret accurate intelligence.50 Intelligence 
producers and consumers are imperfect. 
Complexity and interaction contribute to war’s unpredictability. Both Sun-Tzu and Clausewitz, 
arguably the two most durably influential thinkers on war, acknowledged war’s 
unpredictability.51 As a strategist for hire, Sun Tzu focused on the importance of intelligence, 
wisdom, and skill in managing uncertainty and exploiting it for advantage.52 Clausewitz, on 
the other hand, was more focused on the nature of war itself as an unpredictable phenomenon 
due to inherent factors such as fog, friction, interaction, chance, and probability.53 Handel 
argues that after the centrality of politics in war, uncertainty was Clausewitz’s second most 
important group of ideas. Handel noted that “while the majority of those writing on the subject 
of war seek clarity and positive guidance for action, Clausewitz concluded that the best way to 
succeed in war was through comprehension of its uncertain nature.”54 Clausewitz describes 
war as a duel, as countless duels, as wrestling, and as a collision of living forces operating with 
strength of will: “Once again, there is interaction …. he dictates to me as much as I dictate to 
him.”55 Clausewitz’s ideas would be later linked to theories chaos, complexity, and 
                                                                 
50 Betts (2004). 
51 Sun Tzu (1980); Clausewitz (1984).  
52 Handel (2001), 236. Kolenda (2002), 14-18. 
53 See Clausewitz (1984). Fog (117-8): deals with the inability to fully understand what is occurring; friction (119-
121) explains why even the simplest actions in war can be so difficult; interaction (75, 85, 87-9) by opposing 
forces creates unpredictable outcomes. For an in-depth discussion of Clausewitz’s view of uncertainty see 
Kolenda (2002), 18-45. 
54 Handel (1986), 7.  
55 Clausewitz (1984), 75-77. 
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nonlinearity to show how outcomes in human endeavors can be deterministic but 
unpredictable.56 
Clausewitz stressed the unpredictability of Napoleonic-era wars and the inability to reduce 
them to fixed rules and formulas.57 Insurgencies can be even more problematic. A huge 
imbalance in the correlation of military forces could lead an intervening power to place 
excessive faith in military force to achieve decisive victory. Insurgencies recognize the 
imbalances and seek to minimize opponent strengths while exploiting inherent vulnerabilities. 
Thus, insurgent forces tend to wage wars of exhaustion that avoid decisive battles, focus on 
population control and support, and use violence to wear down stronger opponents while 
communicating their own relevance and staying power.58 Interactions are occurring not solely 
between military forces but within and among the potentially more decisive political, 
diplomatic, and economic dimensions of the conflict.59 The mixed record of 
counterinsurgencies, even those with external support from sophisticated western powers, 
suggest that strategies based primarily upon military factors can be highly problematic. 60 
Empirical analysis of similar conflicts could reduce the risk of decision-making errors, or at 
least uncover persistent challenges and probabilities. Fortunately, some good statistical work 
is now available. For interventions against an insurgency, two questions are consistently 
critical: is the insurgency sustainable and is the host nation government able to win the battle 
                                                                 
56 Beyerchen, (1992) 59-90; for more on Chaos, Complexity, and Nonlinearity see Lorenz (2001); Gleick (2008); 
Waldrop (1992); Johnson (2001); Beaumont (1994); Cimbala (2001); Mann (1992); and Stewart (1989). 
57 Clausewitz (1984), 134-139. 
58 Mao (1961); Taber (2002); O’Neill (2005); Betz (2008, 2015).  
59 Kilcullen (2010); Galula (2006); Kolenda (2012); Marston and Malkasian (2010). 
60 It is important to note that this paper does not seek to address the extent to which these problems affect 
democracies more than autocracies.  In his analysis of 286 insurgencies from 1800-2005, Jason Lyall (2010), 
1688, argues that, “democracy appears to exert almost no causal effect on either war outcomes or duration.” 
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of legitimacy? In their analysis of 71 insurgencies since 1944, RAND scholars Chris Paul et al 
examine cases for common themes, approaches, and practices that lead toward success for the 
counterinsurgent. They classify 42 as insurgent wins (a 59% success rate), and tally 29 for the 
counterinsurgent (a 41% success rate).61 Their study led them to examine the salience of 24 
counterinsurgency approaches, and then to arrive at a scorecard of 15 good and 11 bad 
practices.62 That analysis oriented mostly on tactics, but their data can be valuable at the 
strategic level. Their Qualitative Comparative Analysis reveals that two factors are salient.  
Each counterinsurgent win required both tangible support reduction of the insurgency and 
sufficient host nation commitment and motivation to winning the battle of legitimacy. Absence 
of one factor or the other consistently led to a counterinsurgent loss.63   
Tangible support is the ability of the insurgency to recruit manpower, obtain materiel, sustain 
financing, gather critical intelligence, and have access to sanctuary.64 The ability of the 
insurgents to sustain tangible support almost perfectly correlates to the outcome. If the 
counterinsurgents failed to significantly reduce tangible support, the result was a loss in every 
case. In only two cases did the counterinsurgent disrupt tangible support and still lose.65 It is 
                                                                 
61 Paul (2013), 18. Others using statistical analysis include Libicki (2008), 373–396.  Libicki’s 89 insurgencies 
reach back to 1934 and include ongoing ones.  He classifies 28 as government wins, 25 cases as government 
defeat, 20 mixed outcomes, and 16 ongoing.  Paul added four cases that appeared to meet Libicki’s criteria for 
inclusion, eliminated 17 that were ongoing or unresolved, cut out insurgencies prior to WWII, as well as four 
others that Paul et al considered were not insurgencies. Libicki’s original list was drawn from Fearon & Laitin 
(2003). A key difference in the assessment of wins and losses is that Paul assigns a winner to the mixed 
outcome, depending on which side appeared to get the better outcome. For Paul’s assessment criteria see Paul et 
al (2013), 16-20. I will rely primarily upon Paul’s study because it focuses on concluded insurgencies where 
outcomes can be assessed and correlations drawn more precisely. The specificity of Paul’s analytic categories is 
more useful for the purposes of this study.   
62 Paul (2013), xxi – xxvii.  Paul’s 71 cases include 12 that he argues are unfit for comparative purposes because 
the governments in question were “fighting against the tide of history” (end of colonialism, end of apartheid, etc.).  
He uses these 59 in determining the 15 good practices and 11 bad practices. 
63 Paul (2013), 149. 
64 Paul (2013), xxiii-xxiv. 
65 Paul (2013), 130-132. 
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important to note that tangible support is not necessarily the same as popular support. A 
counterinsurgent can have the support of the majority, but still not win if the insurgency 
sustains enough tangible support to materially threaten the government.66 These findings are 
reinforced in Jason Lyall’s analysis of 286 insurgencies: material support was one of the top 
three determinants in the war’s length and outcome.67 These empirical studies show that an 
insurgency with sustainable tangible support consistently wins.   
A second key factor that emerges is the commitment and motivation of the host nation to win 
the battle of legitimacy. A key test for this is whether the government can win over insurgent 
controlled and contested areas. Loss occurred in all 17 cases in which such commitment and 
motivation were lacking.68 In these cases perverse practices such as maximizing personal 
wealth and power at the expense of the state and citizenry, protecting unfair divisions of power 
and support, extending the conflict to bilk external supporters, or avoiding combat 
demonstrated failure of resolve.69 In other words, exclusionary governments that alienate 
significant portions of the population tend to feed into the tangible support of the insurgency. 
This makes them unable to regain and retain control of contested and insurgent controlled 
areas. Unless the government can do so, a decisive victory is unlikely.  
                                                                 
66 Paul (2013), xxii; xxiv. 
67 Lyall (2010), 188-9.  The other two are the status of the external power as an occupier and its degree of 
mechanization (i.e. is the counterinsurgent comfortable in operating among the people or more tied to machines).  
He observes that democracies “do struggle to defeat insurgencies – but not because they are democracies.” 
Libicki’s statistics also show significant correlation between outside support and insurgent success; Libicki 
(2008), 387-8. 
68 Paul (2013), xxiv.  In cases were an external force demonstrated resolve but the host nation government and 
forces failed to do so, the result was a loss. Libicki (2008) also notes the strong outcome correlations with 
government popularity and competence, 388-391.  
69 Paul (2013), 129. 
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This is true even when an external actor intervenes to back the host nation. 28 cases involved 
support to the host nation government from an external actor. Externally supported 
counterinsurgents won no more often than wholly indigenous counterinsurgents.70 No 
intervention prevailed if the host nation government was insufficiently committed to winning 
the battle of legitimacy.71 Unfortunately, governments that become predatory are not 
uncommon. As Akbar Ahmed, Paul Collier, and Sarah Chayes and others note, sectarian, 
ethno-centric, and kleptocratic regimes are at heightened risk of conflict and rebellion.72 
Political scientist Stephen Biddle shows the near-perfect correlation between a state’s score on 
the Transparency International corruption index and its rank on the list of U.S. security force 
assistance recipients.73 External intervention can help a government that is on the right track 
succeed more quickly, but has a poor track record in rescuing a deeply compromised client. 
Can a predatory regime simply wipe out the insurgency? Although complete repression might 
be possible in theory, it is often impractical. Attempts to do so can be counterproductive. 
Political scientist Stathis Kalyvas’ analysis of 45 cases determined that a state’s use of 
indiscriminate violence consistently provoked greater insurgent violence.74 Paul’s data also 
suggests strong evidence against repression for success in counterinsurgency.75 Alexander 
Downes cites the Boer War 1899-1902 as an example in which indiscriminate violence was 
successful against a small, geographically isolated insurgent group.76 The advent of 24-hour 
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media and ubiquitous digital communications means that atrocities are highly likely to become 
public quickly. Mass atrocities could result in highly adverse consequences to the perpetrating 
government. Unless the insurgency fits very specific criteria, the prospects of widespread 
repression being successful seem remote. 
Two critical factors, therefore, appear to be salient as an external power considers intervention 
to support a host government fighting an insurgency: is the insurgency sustainable and is the 
host government unable to win the battle of legitimacy in contested and insurgent controlled 
areas? The 2 x 2 table below illustrates the likely outcomes against those factors. If both 
answers are no, then the probability of an intervention achieving decisive victory is highly 
unlikely unless both factors are reversed.  
 
Figure 1: Critical Factors Framework 
On the other hand, if the insurgency is not sustainable (i.e. tangible support is effectively 
disrupted or non-existent) and the government can take and retain contested and insurgent 




















could speed the government’s victory. In 26 of 28 wins, the host nation government usually 
met the critical test of commitment and motivation in the early phases of the conflict.77 A mixed 
answer makes the decision more difficult. To have a chance for a clear win, the intervention 
must change the unfavorable variable. The insurgent’s tangible support was sufficiently 
disrupted in Sierra Leone (1991-2002), Uganda (1986-2000), and Turkey against the PKK 
(1984-1999).78 The governments of Senegal (1982-2002), Peru (1980-1992), and Angola 
(1975-2002) made enough reforms to succeed.79 That external support or intervention does not 
guarantee success is seen in the cases of Vietnam (1960-1975), Afghanistan (1978-1992; 2001-
2016), Liberia (1989-1997), Rwanda (1990-1994), and Iraq (2003-2016).80 
Decisive victory is not the only potential result. Insurgencies can end in a negotiated settlement 
or “mixed” outcome in which neither side wins decisively but one does relatively better in 
attaining its aims than the other. Of the 71 cases analyzed by Paul and his colleagues, nineteen 
of them were mixed outcomes. Thirteen of the nineteen were scored for the insurgents.81 A 
host nation government loss does not necessarily mean it is overthrown, but that it gives more 
major concessions to the insurgency than it gains. The data suggests that insurgencies which 
become sustainable are likely to do well in negotiations. An intervening power that fails to 
                                                                 
77 Paul (2013), 156. 
78 Paul, Clarke, and Grill (2010), 158-167 (Sierra Leone), 108-116 (Uganda), 87-97 (Turkey against PKK); Paul 
et al (2013), 54-55, 58. For further reading on the Turkey case see Marcus (2007); Mango (2006). For Uganda, 
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(2013), 177-197 (Vietnam). For Iraq see Gordon and Trainor (2012).  
81 Paul et al (2013), 18-20; Libicki (2008) shows 20 mixed outcomes of 73 concluded cases but does not assign a 
winner for the mixed outcomes. For Paul’s scoring methodology, see Paul et al (2013), 16-20. 
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achieve a decisive victory could theoretically modify its strategy to seek a negotiated outcome, 
but probably will need to accept significant compromises that the host nation government 
might oppose. Conversely, a strategy that seeks a negotiated outcome but rejects any 
concessions might be acceptable with the host nation but is likely to be rejected by the 
insurgency. Theoretically, a host nation loss in a negotiated settlement could still be a win for 
an intervening power. An external power may intervene to protect its own interests, not simply 
to ensure its client does not lose. Provided those aims are achieved in the outcome, the 
intervening power succeeds.  
An intervening power could also transition security responsibility for an ongoing conflict to 
the host nation and withdraw. This is premised on what some call the “crossover” point: as the 
foreign counterinsurgent degrades the insurgency and builds the capacity of the host nation 
security forces, the latter will become capable of defeating the insurgency. Reaching this point 
allows the foreign force to withdraw knowing that the host nation partner can succeed largely 
on its own. Paul et al identify six cases in which an intervening power adopted the transition 
method. The government won only twice.82 This is too small a sample size to draw inference, 
as the authors note, but it is possible to make some conclusions from the larger data. The 
importance of the host nation government’s ability to win the battle of legitimacy suggests that 
a transition strategy should probably place a higher priority on factors that improve or prevent 
damage to legitimacy than on fighting the insurgency. Otherwise, the theoretical cross-over 
point might never occur. As discussed in more detail below, a strategy that begins seeking a 
decisive victory but changes to transition may require the intervening force to make a major 
shift in strategic and operational priorities.  
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Although every conflict is unique, the two factors in the table above have been salient over 
time. This makes them critical elements in the character of the conflict and in weighing the 
prospects for decisive victory. Policy makers and strategists should have compelling reasons 
for believing the two can be favorable before selecting that war termination outcome. 
Otherwise, aiming for a different outcome or declining intervention altogether are probably the 
better choices. For interventions that seek to replace an existing regime with a new, friendlier 
one, the intervening power needs to ensure that the two negative factors do not materialize in 
the aftermath. If they do, the likelihood of decisive victory is low. While weighing the 
likelihood of success, the external power should also consider the element of time. The average 
(mean) duration of the 71 insurgencies since 1944 was 128 months (10.7 years), while the 
median duration was 118 months or 9.8 years. Counterinsurgent wins tend to take longer than 
losses (132 months versus 72 months).83 The potential costs in blood, treasure, and time should 
factor in strategic decision-making.  
 
Managing Risk and Uncertainty – Why External Support might not be the Game Changer 
To further complicate matters, external powers may be limited in their ability to maximize the 
prospects for decisive victory. In fact, they can make decisions that curtail the likelihood of 
such an outcome. This statement seems counterintuitive – shouldn’t states make decisions in 
wartime that maximize the chances for success?  If the stakes are high enough, such as a fight 
for national existence, leaders are more likely to make decisions that maximize chances for 
success.  If the stakes are much lower, leaders tend to make decisions that maximize the value 
of higher priorities.   
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Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky have been among the world’s most prominent scholars 
on decision-making in risk and uncertainty. In their research, Kahneman and Tversky noticed 
a consistent set of biases that tend to lead decision-makers astray when managing risk and 
uncertainty. Risk deals with decisions in which the probabilities associated with possible 
outcomes are known. In uncertainty, such probabilities are not known.84 Kahnemen and 
Tversky took issue with the standard rational model of economics in which people take risks 
when odds are favorable and avoid risk when they are not. They discovered that problems such 
as cognitive bias, availability heuristics, and intuitive decision-making consistently lead to 
decisions that select lower-probability outcomes or fail to achieve value-maximization.85 The 
individual tests they perform can be criticized for involving math more complicated than most 
individuals perform on a daily basis, basing conclusions on answers involving trivial sums of 
money, and observing decisions made in isolation.86 Nonetheless, the aggregate results reveal 
that decisions can violate the rational economic assumption of value maximization.87 
The tendency for plans and forecasts to be unrealistically close to best-case scenarios are what 
Kahneman and Tversky call the planning fallacy. Kahneman notes that executives too easily 
fall victim to this problem, overestimating benefits and underestimating costs. Thus, they take 
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on risky projects because they are overly optimistic about the odds of success.88 Their decisions 
could be improved by consulting the statistics of similar cases.89 To be sure, war is 
unpredictable and prospects for success can defy precise modeling and probabilities.90 But 
knowledge of such probabilities can be useful in checking for overly optimistic assumptions 
and forecasts that can lead to exceedingly ambitious goals. If a power intends to intervene on 
behalf of a sectarian government to achieve a quick, decisive victory against a sustainable 
insurgency, for instance, the historically low probability of success should force policy makers 
and strategists to explain why they believe this situation is sufficiently different. Failure to 
critically examine these assumptions and forecasts can result in misplaced expectations about 
achieving decisive victory.  
External powers may also face the problem of competing risks. Interventions do not occur in 
isolation of world events and other national interests. When interests clash, external powers 
generally prioritize the more important ones. This can be to the detriment of ongoing war 
efforts. This risk calculus helps to explain why the Soviet Union did not invade Western Europe 
or start a nuclear war with the United States over tangible support to Afghan insurgents in the 
1980s. Likewise, the United States did not invade Iran over their support to Shi’a militants in 
Iraq and has not conducted a ground invasion of Pakistan to eliminate Taliban sanctuary. Such 
actions could have increased the costs of supporting an insurgency. But their consequences to 
broader national security interests were far too high. The planning fallacy heightens the risk of 
intervention strategies based on rosy forecasts. Thoughtful management of risk and uncertainty 
                                                                 
88 Kahneman (2013), 253. Slantchev and Tarar (2011), 135-148. 
89 Kahneman (2013), 250-252.   
90 Clausewitz (1984), 75-123; Handel (2001), xxiii, 26-32; Beyerchen (1992), 59-90.  
 36 
by the intervening power across an array of national security concerns may result in choices 
that reduce the prospects of decisive victory even further.  
The analysis above suggests that interventions against insurgencies that are based on the 
presumption of decisive victory could have low probabilities of success, and are likely to force 
the intervening power to seek alternative war termination outcomes. This leads to hypothesis 
#1: The failure to consider war termination heightens the risk of selecting a myopic strategy 
that has a low probability of success.  
 
Cognitive Obstacles, Political Frictions, and Patron-Client Problems May Entrench 
Strategies  
Intervening powers may implicitly assume that a fallback to negotiations or transition will be 
available if decisive victory is unattainable or infeasible. As discussed in the Introduction, the 
realist perspective suggests that decision-makers should immediately change strategies that are 
not working. Once enacted, however, strategies could become entrenched. This can result from 
three interrelated problems. Cognitive obstacles may lead decision-makers to believe the 
strategy is not failing or to assess that staying the course is preferable to the available 
alternatives. Second, decision-makers can face internal political and bureaucratic frictions that 
impair decision-making. Finally, patron-client problems with the host nation government can 
entrap an intervening power and undermine capacity-building efforts.  
 
Cognitive Obstacles Tend to Reinforce the Status Quo 
Cognitive obstacles such as flawed information, bias, and loss aversion can impede the ability 
of policy makers to assess the viability of the strategy, develop alternatives, and make 
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necessary changes. Stanley and Sawyer argue that losing or ineffective strategies can become 
“sticky” when decision makers have insufficient or faulty information, or when bureaucratic 
or organizational filters and biases prevent leaders from accessing or using available 
information.91 Information overload can magnify the problem.92 Policy makers can get 
bombarded with information of varying reliability and contradictory assessments and forecasts. 
Making sense of it can be overwhelming. Confirmation bias can result.  
Confirmation bias is the tendency to seek data that are compatible with and to interpret 
information in ways that conform to currently held beliefs.93 Our theories, Albert Einstein 
reportedly observed, are what we measure.94 This can result in decision makers placing higher 
credibility on confirmatory information or assessments while discounting the credibility or 
value of contradictory ones. More facts or better information might not correct the error. 
Decision-makers can dig in their heels when challenged. “Arguing the facts doesn’t help [when 
confronting confirmation bias],” cautions behavioral scientist Christopher Graves, “in fact, it 
makes the situation worse.”95 Confirmation bias may thus entrench the status quo.96  
Confirmation bias, if present, should result in officials giving confirmatory information 
disproportionate weight, while discounting the value of contradictory information or 
interpreting such data to support pre-existing beliefs. The effect would be a tendency to favor 
arguments supporting the status quo over arguments to change.  
                                                                 
91 Stanley and Sawyer (2009), 657. 
92 Silver (2012), 12-13; McChrystal (2015), 233.  
93 Kahneman (2011), 81. 
94 Senge (2006), 164. 
95 Graves (2015). 
96 Iklè (1991), 17-37; Stanley (2009a), 53-55. 
 38 
Loss aversion is a related problem. Most people, Kahneman contends, feel losses more 
intensely than gains.97  Of course some are far more tolerant of loss – such as professional risk 
takers in the financial markets – but, within certain bounds, most seek to avoid certain losses 
and to hedge against uncertain ones. People even tend to prefer a sure thing that is of reasonably 
less expected value than a gamble that could have a little higher payoff.98 This is part of the 
reason people buy insurance – they are paying a premium against uncertainty.  
This tendency, however, is not absolute. Kahneman argues the following: 
• In a mixed gamble, where both a gain and a loss are possible, loss aversion causes 
extremely risk averse choices. 
• In bad choices, where a sure loss is compared to a larger loss that is merely probable, 
diminishing sensitivity causes risk seeking.99 
These are the main insights of prospect theory for which Kahneman and Tversky won a Nobel 
Prize in economics. An individual’s reference point plays a critical role in decision-making.   
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FIGURE 2 :PROSPECT THEORY 
100  
People tend to be risk averse when they are in a gain frame of reference. They do not want to 
forfeit their gains, and future gains tend to be less important to them than previous ones. They 
also tend to place much higher value on what they have, merely because they have it (also 
known as the endowment effect).101 The perception of military gains made during the 
intervention, and the reluctance to forfeit them and other achievements, can amplify loss 
aversion.102 To demonstrate that their strategy is working, leaders can get trapped in the rhetoric 
of progress.  
In a loss frame of reference, however, people tend to be risk seeking. They prefer to take risks 
to avoid loss or to recover losses.103 This, in part, accounts for why leaders could gamble for 
                                                                 
100 See Kahneman (2013), 283.  This picture was accessed from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Endowment_effect 
on 24 June 2014. 
101 Kahneman (2013), 292-299; Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990), 1325–1348; Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979). For criticism of the endowment effect, see Hanemann (1991), 635–647. 
102 Iklè (1991), 83; Reiter notes that belligerents will raise demands after successes and lower then after defeats 
(2009, p. 15-16). Reiter, however, does not account for prospect theory’s notion that potential future gains tend 
to be less important than previous ones. 
103 Kahneman (2013), 278-288. Kahneman & Tversky (1979) 
 40 
resurrection rather than accept losing, even if a lost gamble could be irrecoverable.104 Stanley 
and Sawyer suggest that leaders may not want to seek a negotiated outcome due to personal 
stakes such as power, prestige, and physical or financial security.105 They may also have less 
prosaic motives. Policy-makers may prefer fighting to negotiating if they doubt the sincerity 
of the adversary. Dan Reiter analyzes examples from the U.S. Civil War to the Korean War in 
which uncertainties about the adversary’s credibility led decision makers to want to continue 
fighting until the uncertainties were satisfactorily addressed.106 An adversary that offers to 
capitulate, for instance, removes much uncertainty about their willingness to stop fighting. This 
is another form of a decisive victory outcome. Alternatively, an adversary can seek cease-fires 
and negotiations as a ploy to consolidate control of key areas, buy time to prepare for future 
military operations, or undermine their opponent’s legitimacy. These kinds of credible 
commitment concerns can be amplified when dealing with insurgencies or armed non-state 
actors who may not feel bound by international law and the Geneva conventions.  
In short, confirmation bias and loss aversion can create situations in which leaders believe a 
strategy is working even when there are compelling indications it is not. Even if leaders 
recognize a strategy is not succeeding, they may prefer to stick with it if they think the available 
alternatives could forfeit gains or undermine more important interests.107 Finally, leaders may 
double-down or escalate a conflict in hopes of reversing a probable loss, even if the odds of 
succeeding are low and the likely costs are much higher.  
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Internal Political and Bureaucratic Frictions Can Create Strategic Paralysis 
Internal politics and bureaucratic frictions may contribute to strategic paralysis. States are not 
unitary actors that operate in lock-step or see issues from a single, shared, and objective 
perspective.108 Differing assessments among decision-makers may entrench the status quo. The 
existing situation or strategy, the status quo, defines the reference points of discussion. 
Proposed changes can be viewed as gains or losses of influence, prestige, or power.109 Prospect 
theory suggests that those deeply invested in a current strategy will fight hard to prevent change 
– likely harder than those advocating for a new direction. More disconcertingly, such 
stakeholders could manipulate information asymmetries in cynical efforts to block changes or 
undermine alternatives.110  
Fred Iklè offers examples of the intense and potentially divisive nature of war termination 
discussions between patriots and “traitors.”111 Stakeholders are likely to frame information in 
ways that support their conclusions and the interests of their constituents or departments.112 
“Those who want their country to pursue ambitious war aims will seek out the favorable 
military estimates and find reasons why negotiations ought to be avoided,” Iklè argues. “Those 
who want negotiations to move ahead will select the unfavorable military estimates to argue 
that war aims should be scaled down.”113 Political leaders may want to avoid creating winners 
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and losers in their national security teams. If so, lack of consensus for change tends to keep the 
status quo intact. At one point in time, the status quo was probably the agreed way forward.  
Leaders could be reluctant to change a strategy over fears about constituent reactions. Audience 
costs is a political science term that refers to the public support penalties a leader suffers for 
escalating a foreign policy crisis and backing down.114 Michael Tomz conducted a wide range 
of experiments to determine whether and to what extent audience costs are real and affect 
national security choices. Tomz found that constituents tend to disapprove of leaders who make 
threats and then back down, and that leaders regard disapproval as a liability.115 To be sure, 
situations exist in which publics approve of backing down after making threats, as Stephen 
Walt observes of French and British publics during the 1936 Rhineland crisis and the Munich 
agreement in 1938.116 With the end of the Great War scarcely twenty years before, public 
sentiment remained rooted in keeping the peace. Tomz’s experiments also suggest that the 
actual use of force increases the intensity of audience costs.117 These rose even further when 
U.S. casualties were involved.118 Political leaders are sensitive to audience costs because high 
approval ratings are considered an important source of Presidential power.119 Leaders may thus 
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avoid changes that have high potential audience costs – such as seeking negotiations rather 
than decisive victory if the leader has painted the adversary in good versus evil terms.120 
Bureaucratic frictions may add paralysis. To manage national security affairs, the United States 
government has developed very powerful institutions. The National Security Council consists 
of the President of the United States, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the 
Secretary of Defense. They are supported by a national security staff at the White House, and 
by departmental staffs. The Department of Defense manages the military, the Department of 
State runs diplomatic efforts, the U.S. Agency for International Development (technically part 
of the State Department) coordinates international aid and development, and various agencies 
provide intelligence (Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Defense 
Intelligence Agency, among others). A national security council meeting normally includes 
around 20 officials; fewer than half of whom have a voice. This national security structure, 
largely constructed in 1947, is also organized to address the major phases in conventional war. 
Diplomats aim to avoid war or build a coalition to fight it.121 Once war is declared, military 
forces fight to win, lose, or draw. Diplomats return to the fore to negotiate peace. Then aid 
agencies move out to repair the damage.  
The United States has amassed greater global reach and obligations since 1947, stretching this 
structure. The same small group of people manage nearly every national security crisis across 
the globe, in addition to persistent matters such as space, cyber, climate change, nuclear 
weapons and materials, the rise of China, among many others. They also have domestic policy 
to manage and departments and agencies to run. The load is crushing. Even such incredibly 
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capable people lack the bandwidth to attain expert knowledge on every issue and their agencies 
may lack procedures for non-standard crises. In their landmark study of the 1962 Cuban Missile 
Crisis, Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow explain how organizational processes and 
bureaucratic politics can result in frictions that impede decision-making and execution.122 The 
organizational process model explains how bureaucratic procedures can place limits on a 
decision-maker’s freedom of action.123 Instead of examining a crisis holistically, governments 
tend to break-down the problem along organizational lines. Each bureaucracy addresses its 
own portion of the issue. A result of this process is “satisficing” – approaches or solutions that 
are not optimal but are perceived to adequately address the issue and limit near-term 
uncertainties and risks. Government agencies use their existing procedures to execute assigned 
tasks. Such procedures are used to master normal, peacetime routines. When applied during a 
crisis, they can result in delays, major oversights, or rigidity. 
The bureaucratic politics model, on the other hand, explains decision-making as a product of 
politicking and negotiations among the government’s top leaders. These leaders have varying 
levels of power based upon their charisma, relationship to the president, and their interpersonal 
and persuasive skills. The intense discussions, often filled with miscommunication and 
misunderstandings, can result in decisions derived from consensus that differ significantly from 
what any individual leader would prefer. Conversely, individuals may take actions that the 
group would not condone.124   
The organizational process and bureaucratic politics models provide powerful explanations for 
why the United States government may develop sub-optimal intervention strategies that over-
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emphasize the military instrument and conform to implicit assumptions about decisive victory. 
They also illustrate reasons why losing or ineffective strategies could be difficult to change – 
the same decision-makers that agreed on the strategy have a vested interest in trying to make 
it work. This could lead the United States to tinker on the margins to shore up perceived weak 
points in the war effort rather than to overturn the existing strategy in favor of a new one. This 
is one of the reasons why, as Stanley argues above, changes in governing coalitions are often 
necessary for a change in strategy.     
These explanations require supplements to address some unique challenges of irregular war. 
Allison and Zelikow were examining a crisis involving impossibly high stakes, but that entailed 
no large-scale deployments of military and civilian capabilities into a foreign country, no 
ground combat, no state-building requirements, and no host country patron-client challenges. 
Their models, for instance, can illuminate but not address adequately how bureaucratic 
agencies deployed to a foreign country interact with one another and with the host country’s 
officials. Can such interactions lead to something worse than satisficing? Instead of sub-
optimal outcomes, can these interactions damage the ability of the United States to achieve its 
aims? Likewise, neither model can fully account for cognitive problems such as confirmation 
bias that impede accurate assessments and changes to strategy. Finally, the models are not 
intended to account for agency problems with a host-nation government, particularly the 
consequences of misalignment of interests and moral hazard.  
Case research and organizational theory can enrich the understanding of these challenges for 
interventions against insurgencies.125 The U.S. national security architecture, as noted above, 
is organized to manage a large-scale conventional war in which the major phases are arranged 
in sequence: diplomacy-military-diplomacy-aid and development. For irregular war 
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interventions, these agencies must operate concurrently – success may require the simultaneous 
work of building government and security force capacity, fighting the insurgency, developing 
an economy, and organizing regional and international support. The powerful nature of 
American bureaucracies, however, can undermine their ability to operate together effectively 
in conflict zones. Moreover, the United States tends not to invest an individual on the ground 
with the authority and responsibility to coordinate and manage the full range of American 
efforts. President Kennedy was in charge during the Cuban Missile Crisis – an event that 
captured his full attention and that of his cabinet. During irregular wars in far-off places, U.S. 
Presidents might have much higher priorities and other factors that compete for their time and 
energy. This can result in no one having the responsibility and authority to manage full-time 
the full-range of American efforts deployed to the conflict. U.S. government agencies thus tend 
to operate in bureaucratic silos, with a senior representative (commander, ambassador, etc.) 
deployed to the host country to manage individual agency efforts. Examining the interactions 
among these silos and their consequences can be important to understanding the war’s 
trajectory and why decision-makers in Washington might be slow to recognize major problems. 
Difficulties, for instance, can arise at the interface of these silos. Seams or gaps in authority 
and responsibility offer opportunities that host nation actors or adversaries can exploit (see next 
section). Fault lines, instances where silos affect one another, can create frictions.126 Actions 
by one agency may damage the efforts of others and undermine overall national objectives. 
These problems are often missed in the assessments, because each agency measures progress 
within their respective silos. The tendency to aggregate in-silo metrics and milestones to assess 
overall progress can create a misleading strategic picture. The result of these challenges is that 
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the whole can be less than the sum of its parts.127 Robert W. Komer’s classic study Bureaucracy 
Does Its Thing outlines how on-the-ground turf battles, bureaucratic infighting, institutional 
inertia, and bureaucratic silos undermined U.S. efforts in Vietnam.128 This thesis will illustrate 
how these factors damaged American efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and impeded the ability 
of the Bush and Obama administrations to recognize when a strategy was failing and to make 
needed changes. Overall, the case research and insights leading to Hypothesis #2 supplement 
the Allison’s models for interventions against insurgencies.  
 
Patron-Client Problems Can Impede Efforts to Modify the Strategy 
An insurgency battles a host nation government for the right to rule all or part of the country.129 
An intervening power generally aims to help the host nation government defeat the insurgency. 
U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine presumes implicitly that the aims and interest of the host 
nation government and the external counterinsurgent are aligned.130 This seems more the 
exception than the rule. Political scientist Thomas Grant argues that good allies are rare among 
host nation governments, because effectively governed countries tend not to provide 
“inspiration or excuse for guerilla war.”131 This problem is known in political science jargon 
as adverse selection. “The same governmental shortcomings that facilitate the emergence of an 
insurgency,” notes Walter Ladwig, “also undercut the effectiveness of the counterinsurgent 
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response.”132 These kinds of conflicts, Steven Biddle argues, are “strongly associated with 
weak states and corrupt, unrepresentative, clientelist regimes.”133 A counterinsurgency is thus 
unlikely to succeed without reforms by the host government, Daniel Byman contends, “but 
these regimes are likely to subvert the reforms that threaten the existing power structure.”134  
Adverse selection is part of a larger phenomenon known by political scientists as principal-
agent theory. This theory, developed by economists to explain interactions by parties to a 
contract, has been used to explain challenges in which one actor (the principal) delegates 
authority to another actor (the agent) to carry our actions on its behalf.135 The matter is 
complicated for interventions by the fact that host nation governments are sovereign and of 
equal status to their external supporters in international law. To acknowledge this difference, I 
will use Ladwig’s term, patron-client relationship.136 The patron, in this case the United States, 
supports a host nation government (the client) with the primary aim of advancing American 
strategic interests. The faster a host nation can govern and secure itself, the faster the United 
States can withdraw its troops and reduce capacity-building, aid, and assistance expenditures.  
This has proven difficult in practice. Three of the major challenges in patron-client 
relationships are interest misalignment, information asymmetry, and moral hazard. These 
problems can impede the intervening power’s ability to change a losing or ineffective strategy, 
damage capacity-building efforts, and undermine the prospects of a successful outcome. 
Interest misalignment occurs because the primary objectives of the intervening power 
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(defeating the insurgency, enable the host nation to secure and govern itself) competes with 
powerful incentives for the client (maintaining power and international largesse). This 
difference results in the host government promoting political, economic, sectarian, ethnic, or 
other arrangements that benefit its core supporters – even if these same measures are inspiring 
the insurgency.137 Many of the common prescriptions for counterinsurgency, such as political 
and economic reform, a professional military, greater political inclusion and reconciliation, can 
be more threatening to the regime than the insurgency itself.138 “The regime’s interests are thus 
typically focused less on external enemies than on internal threats from rival elites,” observes 
Stephen Biddle, “and especially the state military itself, which is often seen as a threat at least 
equal to that of foreign enemies.”139 This complicates efforts to develop host nation security 
forces. Because armed elites can pose a much greater threat than the insurgency does, regimes 
tend to undertake various forms of appeasement, cooptation or enfeeblement.140 In Samuel 
Huntington’s framework, they opt for a form of subjective control to prevent a coup.141  
United States military advisors raised on the principle of objective control, in which the 
military agrees to be apolitical in return for substantial professional autonomy, can have 
difficulty recognizing the difference in their host nation partner. “The kind of powerful, 
politically independent, technically proficient, non-corrupt military the United States seeks,” 
notes Biddle, “is often seen by the partner state as a far greater threat to their self-interest than 
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foreign invasion or terrorist infiltration.”142 This is part of a second major problem, information 
asymmetry. The host nation is unlikely to be forthcoming in divulging interests and intentions 
that drive kleptocratic, sectarian, ethno-centric, or clientelist practices. The client is likely to 
manipulate the patron to maintain military and economic support while maximizing autonomy. 
Hiding information, disguising intentions and interests, and paying lip-service to the patron’s 
demands are typical parts of the playbook. “In reality,” Ladwig suggests, the patron “has, at 
best, only indirect control over its client’s economic, political, and military policies.”143  
This set of problems creates moral hazard. Because the patron is committed to the client’s 
survival, the client does not bear the full consequences of its actions. This may create incentives 
for the client or rival elites to engage in high risk behaviors, knowing that the patron will not 
allow things to go too far.144 To encourage reform, patrons may reassure clients that the aid 
and support will be forthcoming if the regime undertakes actions the patron deems necessary. 
To maintain domestic support for the ongoing assistance and troop presence, the patron may 
paint the client’s survival as a vital interest. This combination could raise doubts in the client’s 
mind that the patron will halt the intervention or support if the client does not comply with the 
reforms. Why risk internal instability by enacting painful and potentially destabilizing reforms 
if the insurgency threat will be met by the intervening power anyway?145 Conversely, greater 
publicity of the client’s problems may reduce the patron’s public support for the intervention. 
This could lead the client to avoid the clear and present danger that enacting reforms may pose 
and take risk against the more distant threat (the insurgency) if the intervening power is going 
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to leave anyway or not make good on its promises.146 In short, a client has incentive to resist 
changes that may heighten the risk of domestic instability even if such reforms would create a 
greater chance to defeat the insurgency or bring it into a peace process. This set of problems 
could help explain why transition strategies, as explained above, may have limited prospects 
for success.  
How can patrons sway clients? Walter Ladwig examines two types of influence strategies 
patrons normally use: inducements and conditionality.147 Inducement seeks to persuade a client 
to change behavior with promises of aid and support. This approach, Ladwig notes, tends to be 
preferred by U.S. policymakers. Conditionality, on the other hand, uses rewards and 
punishments to affect a client’s behavior and reduce moral hazards. To know if the client is 
enacting the reforms or shirking, the patron must use intrusive monitoring.148 This can be very 
resource intensive and unpopular with the host nation. Conditionality increases the likelihood 
of frictions in the patron-client relationship. The client may highlight or amplify these 
challenges to reduce the willingness of the patron to enact such measures. Inducements is the 
path of least resistance for the patron, but Ladwig and Biddle show that conditionality is more 
likely to be effective. 
The presence of these cognitive obstacles, political frictions, and patron-client problems can 
impede the intervening power’s ability to modify a losing or ineffective strategy. These 
obstacles may become so powerful, Stanley and Sawyer argue, that a shift in the domestic 
governing coalition for the intervening power may be necessary for policy and strategy to 
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change.149 Fully eighty-four percent of the time since World War Two, they show, war 
termination came about as new domestic coalitions determined that the prospects for decisive 
military victory were too low. Nearly forty-one percent of the time, the change in governing 
coalition was determined to be the causal factor for the bid to end the war.150 This analysis 
leads to hypothesis #2: Cognitive obstacles, political frictions, and patron-client problems can 
impede the ability to recognize and abandon an ineffective or losing strategy. 
 
Asymmetric Bargaining May Undermine a Fall back to Transition or Negotiations 
The notion of falling back from decisive victory to transition can be appealing because it avoids 
the need to negotiate with the insurgency or its sponsor. As discussed above, transition is based 
on the crossover point premise: that the intervening power can alter the relative balance of 
power in the conflict by degrading or defeating the insurgency while building the capacity of 
the host nation’s government and security forces. “It all adds up to diminishing the strength of 
the insurgency, increasing the capabilities of the government and its forces,” said 
counterinsurgency expert John Nagl, “and reaching a crossover point where the host nation 
forces can carry on with minimal outside assistance” [emphasis added].151 As U.S. President 
George W. Bush put it for Iraq, “As the Iraqis stand up, we can stand down.”152 The patron-
client problems discussed above, however, can prevent that point from being reached.  
The host nation security forces might increase in size, but corruption and poor leadership may 
degrade readiness and battlefield performance. Predatory behavior can undermine the 
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government’s ability to win the battle of legitimacy and inspire disaffected groups to support 
the insurgency. Conversely, too slow a capacity-building effort and insufficient action against 
the insurgency could enable the latter to grow so strong that the host nation can never catch up. 
As the intervening power withdraws from the conflict, the incentives for reform may decrease 
if internal rivals remain a more immediate threat than the insurgency. If political leaders believe 
that the payoff is not worth the political cost, they may be unwilling to accept a small presence 
of foreign forces as trainers or advisors. The result of these patron-client problems are larger 
losses of influence for the intervening power than might be expected.153 Transition might not 
be a low-risk alternative if decisive victory fails.154 If the so-called crossover point remains 
elusive, the intervening power could be left with an unappealing choice between withdrawal 
(and hope the client survives) or an open-ended and potentially expensive presence.  
An intervening power might consider falling back to negotiations, instead. Donald Wittman, 
writing in 1979 in the wake of the end of the Vietnam conflict, developed a rational bargaining 
model to explain how a settlement to end a war can be achieved.155 In a nutshell, he argues, 
states tend to begin a war with high expected-utility. The greater the expectations of each party, 
the less likelihood for bargaining.156 As the war progresses, combatants exchange information 
about relative strengths and weaknesses and the likelihood of achieving desired outcomes.157 
Political scientist Harrison Wagner argues that war is not simply a contest to disarm one 
another, but a bargaining process in which states use force or the threat of force to influence 
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other states.158 This is part of the reason wars generally stop short of complete destruction of 
one side or the other.159  
Demands from external actors for cease-fires and negotiations, however, may go unheeded 
until the war settles into a stalemate. I. William Zartman argues that even if the substance of 
proposed solutions to the conflict might be mutually acceptable, the right timing is equally 
necessary. A so-called “mutually hurting stalemate” occurs when the parties are locked into a 
conflict that they cannot escalate to victory, the deadlock is painful to both parties (though not 
necessarily equally hurtful), and they both decide to seek a way out.160 Provided a way out is 
perceived to be available and acceptable, the conflict is “ripe” for a negotiated outcome.161  
How does this apply to interventions against insurgencies? The scholarship tends to focus on 
conventional wars with unformed military forces that fight to win, lose, or draw. Irregular war 
that includes an intervening power has a different dynamic. Early bargaining opportunities may 
exist, but are likely limited.162 If the insurgency seeks to bargain but is rejected, it must 
surrender or fight for survival. The military contest is asymmetrical. The insurgent, being the 
militarily weaker party, generally avoids decisive battle. Guerilla warfare is designed to wear 
out the stronger party in a strategy of exhaustion.163 The insurgency may lose every pitched 
battle, but that is not necessarily relevant to the outcome. An insurgent’s strength grows with 
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increased tangible support from the population and external actors. The insurgency’s political 
and social efforts seek to increase local control and support. Military actions keep the 
insurgency relevant and undermine the government’s ability to maintain security and hold a 
monopoly of violence. A sustainable insurgency has the potential to get stronger over time, 
especially if the government is predatory and exclusionary. 
The intervening power and host nation may escalate the conflict, but the insurgency has a 
chance of succeeding if it survives with tangible support intact. Once the intervening power 
tires of the war and begins to withdrawal, the insurgency can play for time. The intervening 
power might be more open to negotiations at this point, but these could be less appealing to the 
insurgency. The latter will probably seek to maximize their leverage before exploring 
negotiations. They are likely better off waiting until after the withdrawal to test the host nation 
government fighting on its own. The insurgency could be willing to negotiate concessions over 
the external power’s withdrawal, but not to end the conflict.164 This occurred as the United 
States negotiated with North Vietnam to withdraw from South Vietnam and the Soviets 
negotiated with the United States and Pakistan to withdraw from Afghanistan.165  
What if the external power elects to stay indefinitely, but just at a much lower level? The 
models offered by Wittman, Wagner, and Zartman can become helpful again.166 As the 
intervening force reaches its sustainable level, the insurgency will likely seek to maximize 
battlefield gains. Once the cost of further gains by each side are perceived to outweigh the 
benefits, a mutually hurting stalemate may set in. In such cases, negotiations could begin when 
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the situation is ripe. Negotiations with an insurgency, however, are likely to include greater 
credible commitment challenges than negotiations with a state. The Northern Ireland conflict 
is a good case in point. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) was not going to be 
strong enough to win an outright victory or push the British military and police off the island. 
Similarly, the sustainability of the PIRA’s local and external tangible support made decisive 
victory over them highly unlikely, too.167 Credible commitment challenges, major differences 
in leader opinion, and audience costs on all sides made the move to negotiations difficult and 
time consuming. Nonetheless, clandestine talks persisted and eventually produced the Good 
Friday Agreement that put a durable and credible peace process in place.168 
The intended path towards a negotiated outcome may also play an important role. The very 
deliberate process in Northern Ireland stands in contrast to more hasty efforts to broker peace 
deals in other cases. Insurgencies and civil wars damage the fabric and cohesion of a society. 
Peace deals in a low-trust environment, even if struck, are likely to be short-lived and de-
stabilizing.169 The Peshawar (1992) and Islamabad (1993) Accords were efforts to create 
power-sharing deals among major Afghan mujahideen factions. They failed and set the stage 
for the Afghan civil war that would bring al Qaeda to Afghanistan and the Taliban to power.170 
In Sierra Leone, the Abidjan (1996) and Lome (1999) Accords were short-lived efforts power-
sharing deals with the RUF.171 Host nation governments, fearing that an intervening power is 
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seeking a separate peace with the insurgency or a potential de-stabilizing peace deal, has 
incentive to scuttle talks.  
These kinds of bargaining asymmetries and challenges suggest that the ability to fall back from 
decisive victory to the transition or negotiated settlement war termination methods could be 
less available for intervening powers in irregular conflicts than for classic conventional wars.  
These challenges result in hypothesis #3: When the United States tires of the war and decides 
to withdraw, bargaining asymmetries can undermine the prospects of a favorable outcome.  
 
Foreshadowing the Problems: A Brief Examination of Vietnam 
The war termination problems the United States encountered during the major post-9/11 
interventions may not be an aberration. The Vietnam conflict suffered from the same factors, 
albeit in subtly different ways. Explanations of the poor outcome in Vietnam include three 
schools of thought. The counterinsurgency school argues that Westmoreland and the U.S. 
Army were fixated on conventional war and unable to adapt their tactics to meet the demands 
of fighting an insurgency.172 An alternative, suggested by Westmoreland in his memoirs, is that 
the nature of the conflict required the U.S. military to focus on fighting the primary threat from 
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong main force units, while the South Vietnamese military not 
committed to the conventional fight would need to take on the guerillas.173 This school suggests 
that the campaign design and tactics were right but the war was largely unwinnable due to 
factors beyond Westmoreland’s control. A third school examines some of these factors from a 
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civil-military lens including civilian micromanagement of military operations, the failure of 
military officials to provide candid advice, and how political decision not to mobilize the 
country may have undercut public support for the war.174  
Examination of war termination challenges enriches these perspectives. An important 
difference from the Iraq and Afghanistan case studies is that a negotiated outcome – in the form 
of North Vietnamese capitulation – was discussed from 1964-66 during deliberations over 
whether to escalate the Vietnam war.175 President Johnson wanted to limit the costs of 
supporting South Vietnam and had no intention of conducting a large-scale ground invasion of 
North Vietnam or using nuclear weapons to force them to sue for peace. The successful use of 
graduated pressure during the Cuban Missile Crisis became an important reference point for a 
lower-cost alternative in Vietnam.176 Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and other civilian 
leaders believed the United States could use a similar model to carefully raise the pressure on 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) to compel them to stop supporting the National 
Liberation Front (Viet Cong) insurgency against the South Vietnam government.177 This 
approach, they believed, would limit the costs to the United States and avoid the risk of Chinese 
or Russian intervention. The uniformed military, however, wanted to either sharply escalate 
                                                                 
174 Summers Jr. (1982); Caverley (Winter 2009/10), 119-157; McMaster (1997), location 1791 of 10792 [kindle 
edition]; Karnow (1997), 511-525; Schandler (2009), 3.  
175 For the evolution of U.S. strategy see the following documents: Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 
1961–1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963: Document 331 (26 November 1963), 637-40; 
Document 374 (December 21, 1963), 732-3; Document 380 (31 December 1963), 745-6; The Joint Chiefs of Staff 
and the War in Vietnam, Part 1, p. 199-239; McMaster (1997), 1440-1559 of 10792; FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume 
I, Vietnam, 1964: Document 84 (March 16, 1964), 154, 160; Document (March 17, 1964), 172-3; Document 201 
(June 5, 1964), 462-5; Document 420 (November 23, 1964), 932-5; Document 424 (November 24, 1964), 943-5; 
Document 428 (November 27, 1964), 958-60; Document 433 (December 2, 1964), 969-74; Document 435 
(December 3, 1964), 974-8; FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965: Document 93 (July 
27, 1965), 262-3. A negotiated outcome was discussed as early as 1962. See Goodman (1986), 1-2. 
 
176 McNamara used graduated pressure to convince the Soviet Union to abandon plans to put nuclear ballistic 
missiles in Cuba, while avoiding the risk of a wider war. He over-rode highly aggressive military advice that 
might have escalated the conflict out of control. Cyrus Vance (9 March 1970), 11; McMaster (1997), 643, 1549 
of 10792. 
177 FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964, Document 201 (June 5, 1964), 462-5; Document 304 (August 
8, 1964), 651-3. 
 
 59 
the conflict to compel the DRV to give up its proxies (which meant widespread bombing of 
North Vietnam and perhaps a ground force invasion) or get out.178  
The odds against success in Vietnam may have been greater than for post 9/11 Afghanistan or 
Iraq. In the latter two, the United States overthrew existing regimes. These were replaced by 
new governments before the insurgencies fomented (although resistance began immediately in 
Iraq, and within a year in Afghanistan). In Vietnam, the United States needed to rescue a deeply 
troubled client.179 By 1964 the NLF had significant internal support as well as external support 
and sanctuary from North Vietnam – controlling roughly 40 percent of the country.180 The 
South Vietnamese government was deeply kleptocratic and losing popular legitimacy.181 Either 
situation, unless reversed, normally results in a loss for the government. South Vietnam had 
both from the start of the U.S. intervention.182  
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The United States was in a difficult position. As the discussions over strategy continued into 
1965, the civilian leadership understood the prospects of success to be low.183 The Johnson 
administration began to test the graduated pressure concept by escalating the conflict while 
attempting to start negotiations.184 They discussed unilateral suspension of military actions, 
which prompted significant resistance from the military.185 Johnson believed he needed to 
show the American people and the world that he was as serious about peace as it was about 
fighting.186 “The weakest chink in our armor,” he surmised, “is public opinion.”187 When 
Johnson said that he was very reluctant to go against the views of the Joint Chiefs, McNamara 
advised, “We decide what we want and impose it on them. They see this as a total military 
problem—nothing will change their views.”188  
Johnson eventually approved a 37-day bombing pause beginning 24 December and a 30-hour 
Christmas cease-fire.189 Washington wanted to make clear that the halt was a serious move 
toward peace which required a suitable concession from North Vietnam to keep the process 
moving forward. The United States engaged in efforts with 34 countries to communicate to the 
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North Vietnamese and the world America’s desire for a peaceful resolution.190 As Rusk put it, 
“We have put everything into the basket of peace except the surrender of South Viet-Nam.”191  
The graduated pressure concept overestimated the effects of strategic bombing and 
underestimated the strength of DRV’s resolve and the consequences of GVN’s political 
dysfunction.192 The Americans expected the bombing pause to signal a willingness to bargain. 
The DRV dangled the faint hope of negotiations to reduce military pressure. By linking 
bombing to peace talks, the Johnson administration unwittingly fell into this trap. “Hanoi used 
negotiations as a tactic of warfare to buy time to strengthen its military capabilities in South 
Vietnam and weaken the will of those on the side of Saigon,” Goodman summarizes. “Rather 
than serving as an alternative to warfare, consequently, the Vietnam negotiations were an 
extension of it.”193 This pattern, he argues, protracted the war and played to the DRV’s 
advantage.194 
The result of the civil-military frictions over strategy was a thinly camouflaged bureaucratic 
struggle. Unable to convince the uniformed military of their logic, the Johnson administration 
micromanaged military operations and authorities in the hope of using graduated pressure to 
bring about peace talks. The uniformed military, on other hand, played bureaucratic games to 
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prod McNamara and Johnson into escalating the war toward the troop levels and authorities 
they believed were necessary to force DRV capitulation.195 U.S. troop levels surged from 
approximately 200,000 in 1965 to over 500,000 by 1968.196 The United States adopted several 
different operational approaches to defeating the insurgency, to include taking over the war 
effort in 1965, but was never able to reduce the insurgency’s sustainable support or pressure 
the South Vietnamese government to govern effectively enough to win the battle of legitimacy 
in the insurgent heartlands.197 As a South Vietnamese official explained to journalist Stanley 
Karnow in late 1964, “Our big advantage over the Americans is that they want to win the war 
more than we do.”198  
This losing strategy became intractable. Assessments were made within bureaucratic silos and 
then aggregated to convey an overall picture. Doing so painted a misleading picture of the 
situation. Officials remained upbeat despite the worsening security situation.199 Such 
assurances impeded strategic adaptation, as debates between advocates and skeptics grew 
poisonous.200 The Johnson administration and the military command began losing credibility. 
Even though Defense Secretary Robert McNamara in May 1967 counseled President Johnson 
to “negotiate an unfavorable peace,” he could not overcome the status quo bias.201 The 1968 
Tet Offensive was a psychological shock to the United States, irrevocably damaged public 
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support for the war, and was a key factor in Johnson declining to run for re-election.202 
Although the insurgency suffered heavy losses and never fully recovered, their residual 
strength combined with that of the North Vietnamese Regular Army sustained the conflict. The 
Soviet Union reportedly agreed in 1968 to facilitate talks between the Johnson administration 
and Hanoi. Biographer John A. Farrell argues that Nixon sabotaged the effort by convincing 
South Vietnamese President Thieu to object.203 
A change in the administration was necessary to alter the strategy. Richard Nixon won the 1968 
election in part by promising to end the Vietnam War. By 1969 he began troop withdrawals 
and the process of “Vietnamization” to turn the war back over to the South Vietnamese.204 
Transition efforts, however, were undermined by severe patron-client problems. The South 
Vietnamese government remained unable to win the battle of legitimacy in insurgent controlled 
areas. Meanwhile, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger began secret talks with North 
Vietnam in August 1969.205 The clear U.S. intention to withdraw from the war limited 
American bargaining leverage.206 The United States and DRV concluded an initial agreement 
in October 1972, but South Vietnam rejected the accord and talks deadlocked.207 To break the 
impasse, Nixon authorized Operation Linebacker II which unleashed a massive bombing 
campaign against the DRV from 18-29 December, while pressuring South Vietnamese 
President Thieu to accept the agreement. The Paris Peace Accords were signed a month later, 
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27 January 1973.208 The Accords called for national elections, while allowing the North 
Vietnamese Army to remain in the South but only receive reinforcements sufficient to replace 
losses. The U.S. had sixty days to withdraw all forces from South Vietnam. That last article, 
explained historian Peter Church, “proved… to be the only one of the Paris Agreements which 
was fully carried out.”209  
This short examination of the Vietnam conflict suggests that the war termination problems the 
United States has experienced in post-9/11 interventions is probably not a new phenomenon. 
The Johnson administration assumed a decisive victory outcome was possible at low-cost by 
using graduated pressure to compel North Vietnam to cut off support to the NLF. The costs, 
however, were insufficiently compelling to force the DRV to capitulate to American demands. 
The Joint Chiefs were never persuaded of the logic. Instead of recommending the exploration 
of alternative strategies that met Johnson’s intentions to limit the costs of the war, the 
uniformed military went all-in for decisive victory. They manipulated McNamara and Johnson 
into escalating troop levels to the amount they felt was necessary to win, even though they 
were unable to gain approval for greater actions against North Vietnam. American public 
opinion turned against the war. The Nixon administration attempted negotiations while 
withdrawing American forces. Predictably, the North Vietnamese were willing to agree to 
some concessions to ease the U.S. withdrawal, but not to end the conflict. By 1975, the U.S. 
Congress slashed funding on military aid to South Vietnam from $2.8 billion in 1973 to $300 
million. North Vietnamese and NLF forces took Saigon on April 30, 1975.  
The United States experienced problems in Vietnam along each of the three hypotheses. Sadly, 
the United States never critically examined its war termination policies or strategic 
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performance in Vietnam. Post-war criticisms, as discussed above, focused mainly on the 
tactical and operational decisions and the problems of civil-military relations. The Department 
of Defense decided to shun counterinsurgency missions, focusing instead on conventional war 
against the Soviets on the plains of Central Europe. The rebuilding of the American military in 
the 1980s included vast improvements in integrating the joint services (Army, Navy, Air Force, 
Marines) on the battlefield and an intellectual focus on the operational level of war.210 These 
changes produced a well-trained and integrated military that shocked the world in defeating 
Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi Army in just 100 hours during the Gulf War. These innovations, 
however, did not extend to re-examining the policy and strategy levels of war. Among the key 
criticisms of the Gulf War outcomes was inattention to war termination.211 
 
Conclusion   
This thesis will use the post 9/11 interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan to examine the salience 
of the three hypotheses. Each case study is covered in three chapters, one for each hypothesis. 
Information from U.S. government documents, interviews, official statements, and published 
memoirs and articles will help determine the extent to which war termination figured in 
decision-making and how well American strategies addressed the requirements for a favorable 
and durable outcome. These sources plus journal articles and media reporting will provide 
insight on cognitive obstacles, political and bureaucratic frictions, and patron-client problems 
that may have impeded the ability of both administrations to assess the state of the conflict and 
make necessary modifications to the strategy. Finally, these sources provide ways to examine 
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the bargaining behavior of the United States, the Iraqi and Afghan governments, and the 
Taliban, and to analyze why favorable outcomes were elusive. The problems addressed in the 
three hypotheses do not occur in isolation. Imbedded in the second and third chapters of each 
case are insights on how these problems interacted in unique ways to shape the conflict’s 
trajectory. This complexity is further examined in the concluding chapter, to include a 
comparison of the two cases and overall implications for U.S. foreign policy and scholarship. 
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Chapter 3: Pursuit of Decisive Victory in Iraq 
The United States ended negotiations with Saddam Hussein over Iraq’s suspected Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD) program and on 20 March 2003 launched Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.212 The Hussein regime fell on 9 April 2003.213 Failing to prepare adequately for the 
occupation, the United States military and civilian authorities faced an increasingly chaotic 
situation as the Iraqi military collapse turned into insurgency.214 Policies such as de-
Baathification and disbanding the Iraqi Army combined with heavy-handed military operations 
in the Sunni Triangle stoked Sunni Arab fears of marginalization and repression by dominant 
Shi’a parties.215 Senior Iraqi leaders often manipulated unwitting American forces to advance 
personal and sectarian agendas.216 Sunni-Shi’a violence spiraled with the February 2005 
bombing of the Shi’a mosque in Samarra.217 Senior U.S. officials stayed focused on drawing 
down U.S. presence and handing over security responsibilities to the fledgling and sectarian 
Iraqi Security Forces.218 Recommendations by junior American officials to reach out to Sunni 
leaders were rebuffed repeatedly.219  
This intervention was to replace an existing regime with one more amicable to US interests. 
Failure to adequately consider war termination resulted in a strategy that fixated on the use of 
military force, wished away post-Saddam risks, and underappreciated the requirements for a 
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favorable and durable outcome. Returning to the critical factors model outlined in Chapter 2, 
success hinged upon first, the establishment of a government that earned legitimacy across the 
political, ethnic, and sectarian spectra; and second, preventing armed resistance from becoming 
a sustainable insurgency. Decisive victory could have been possible had those two conditions 
been achieved. However, by 2006 the United States was backing a predatory sectarian Iraqi 
government that was fighting against a sustainable Sunni Arab insurgency. To make matters 
worse, Iran-supported Sadrist militias battled coalition forces while participating in the 
burgeoning civil war. 
 
What Went Wrong? 
The existing scholarship is broadly in agreement about why the Iraq war spiraled quickly from 
an overwhelming military success into a grinding civil war. The Bush Administration failed to 
deploy enough troops to secure the country after the fall of the regime.220 Compounding this 
error was the Department of Defense’s failure to plan for so-called Phase IV – post-war 
reconstruction.221 The administration then stubbornly refused to deploy more troops as the 
situation grew worse. The United States military, meanwhile, had deliberately unlearned 
counterinsurgency after Vietnam and employed counterproductive tactics that exacerbated 
rather than diminished the insurgency.222 Within this broader explanation, some view Coalition 
Provisional Authority Chief L. Paul Bremer’s de-Baathification and disbanding of the Iraqi 
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army decisions as key factors that made a bad situation unrecoverable.223 A RAND study notes, 
however, that de-Baathification affected far fewer Iraqis than de-Nazification affected 
Germans after the second world war and that the Iraqi Army had already disbanded itself.224 
These decisions, moreover, were briefed to the Bush administration and approved by Secretary 
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.  
Ambassador James Dobbins, perhaps the most prominent American scholar and practitioner 
on post-war reconstruction, largely exonerates the CPA from responsibility for the descent into 
civil war. After all, he notes, the CPA made exceptional progress along its plan and ranks quite 
high in comparison to more than 20 other post-conflict missions.225 The CPA succeeded in 
areas in which it had the lead. It did not, however, have the lead for security.226  Dobbins lays 
principal blame with the Department of Defense for mismanagement. “Experience in these and 
many other cases,” Dobbins argues, “has dictated a prioritization of postwar tasks: beginning 
with security, then restoring basic public services, stabilizing the economy, and finally 
reforming the political system.”227 Secondarily, he criticizes the White House for giving the 
post-conflict mission to Defense and failing to supervise adequately the planning and 
execution. “By doing so, the President took himself and his staff out of the daily decision 
loop.”228 Had Defense done the appropriate planning, anticipated the scale effort required for 
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the occupation, and allocated enough forces for security after Saddam’s fall, these arguments 
suggest, the insurgency might have been prevented or countered and defeated. 
These issues are important but assume that better planning, additional resources, and more 
efficient execution would have prevented disaster. Examining the conflict from the war 
termination framework developed in Chapter 2 illustrates ways to build upon the existing 
scholarship. The Bush administration assumed decisive military victory, but failed to develop 
a strategy to gain the most favorable and durable outcome possible at the least cost in blood, 
treasure, and time. A significant consequence of this assumption was the failure to evaluate the 
risks of inadequate government legitimacy and a sustainable insurgency. As this chapter will 
show, having better plans and more American boots-on-the-ground was not sufficient for 
success. The Bush administration’s decisions and U.S. actions in country amplified rather than 
reduced the key risks in at least three inter-related ways. First, U.S. officials in Washington 
D.C. and Baghdad failed to identify and take steps to manage the intense and often violent 
scrimmage for political power. Instead, senior American civilian and military officials super-
empowered favored Iraqi elites, who used such backing for narrow personal and political 
advantage. In many cases, they managed to dupe U.S. officials into enriching their cronies and 
targeting their rivals. This problem damaged the foundations of legitimacy and gave Sunni 
Arabs cause to fight. Second, U.S. officials envisioned post-war security and reconstruction as 
an engineering task: break the problems down into their component parts, arrange them into 
linear milestones over fixed timelines, and apply the necessary resources to achieve them. 
American officials did not appreciate how Iraqi elites could manipulate these milestones in 
ways damaging to government legitimacy. Third, civilian and military efforts worked in silos 
that were ably exploited by the adaptive Iraqi networks on both pro- and anti-government sides. 
As the United States focused on the efficient execution of its plans and congratulated itself on 
achieving bureaucratic milestones, the government was losing legitimacy and the insurgency 
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was becoming sustainable. The Bush administration and its officials in Baghdad had plenty of 
detailed plans but no strategy adequate to address the dynamic complexity of the emerging 
conflict. 
Plans without a Strategy  
President George W. Bush outlined his core goals in Iraq during a 26 February 2003 speech at 
the Hilton Hotel in Washington, D.C. The United States, by force if necessary, would defend 
the American people and allies by removing the dual threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s alleged 
weapons of mass destruction and sponsorship of international terrorism.229 The invasion 
commenced after the Iraqi leader failed to comply with the U.S. ultimatum. U.S. Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld outlined eight supporting objectives: 
• end the regime of Saddam Hussein by striking with force on a scope and scale that 
makes clear to Iraqis that he and his regime are finished. 
• to identify, isolate and eventually eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, their 
delivery systems, production capabilities, and distribution networks,  
• search for, capture, drive out terrorists who have found safe harbor in Iraq, 
• collect such intelligence as we can find related to terrorist networks in Iraq and beyond. 
• collect such intelligence as we can find related to the global network of illicit weapons 
of mass destruction activity. 
• to end sanctions and to immediately deliver humanitarian relief, food and medicine to 
the displaced and to the many needy Iraqi citizens, 
• secure Iraq's oil fields and resources, which belong to the Iraqi people, and which they 
will need to develop their country after decades of neglect by the Iraqi regime, 
• to help the Iraqi people create the conditions for a rapid transition to a representative 
self-government that is not a threat to its neighbors and is committed to ensuring the 
territorial integrity of that country.230 
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Colonel Kevin Benson, the CJ5 (Policy, Plans) for the U.S. Third Army (also known as CFLCC 
(Combined Forces Land Component Command) and architect of Operation Cobra II (the name 
of the military campaign), recalled the military objectives as follows:  
Destabilize, isolate, and overthrow the Iraqi regime and provide support to a new, 
broad-based government; destroy Iraqi WMD capability and infrastructure; protect 
allies and supporters from Iraqi threats and attacks; destroy terrorist networks in Iraq; 
gather intelligence on global terrorism; detain terrorists and war criminals and free 
individuals unjustly detained under the Iraqi regime; and support international efforts 
to set conditions for long-term stability in Iraq and the region.231  
War planning had been ongoing well before the public articulation of goals. On November 27, 
2001, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed General Tommy Franks, the 
Commander of United States Central Command (CENTCOM), to begin operational planning 
for the removal of Saddam Hussein from power.232 Franks was no stranger to military planning 
for conflict in Iraq and was well versed in the governing contingency operation, code-named 
1003-98.233 As former Third Army Commander, he would have been responsible for ground 
operations in the event of war in the Middle East. Franks gave his first brief to Rumsfeld on 
December 7. Three weeks later, on December 28, Franks delivered his concept to President 
Bush.234 The plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), later called OPLAN 1003V, envisioned 
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four major phases: 1) establishing international support and preparing for deployment; 2) 
shaping the battlespace; 3) major combat operations; and 4) post-combat operations.235  
The concept aimed for decisive victory. Phase III identified two primary goals: “regime forces 
defeated or capitulated” and “regime leaders dead, apprehended, or marginalized.”236 Franks 
and Rumsfeld had a series of meetings with Bush to discuss Phase III.237 By 5 August 2002 the 
full campaign plan was briefed to the President. The five-pronged attack included a ground 
assault from bases in Kuwait and Turkey to defeat Saddam’s fielded forces, Special Operations 
Forces in Western Iraq to neutralize SCUD missiles, operational fires in and around Baghdad 
to disrupt command and control and attrite the Republican Guard formations, and 
psychological operations to erode Iraqi will.238 Franks continued refining his plan, reducing 
troop numbers, and comparing force generation models (Generated Start and Running Start).239 
Benson notes that the goals and objectives never changed. The means, however, were under 
constant revision.240 In the final version, Phase III was to take only 90 days and use a fraction 
of the forces originally planned.  
Phase IV would probably unfold over years, Franks argued, but likely be executed in a peaceful 
environment. The objectives for Phase IV were “the establishment of a representative form of 
government, a country capable of defending its territorial borders and maintaining its internal 
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security, without any weapons of mass destruction.”241 The plan envisaged that forces would 
continue to flow into Iraq, until roughly 250,000 were supporting the occupation.242 Franks 
was adamant that security and “civic action” were inextricably linked – a nod to the importance 
of Phase IV.243 The plan assumed that the Iraqi military would remain relatively intact and be 
available to provide stability and support to reconstruction efforts.244 Iraqi leaders, meanwhile, 
would work together with U.S. and international officials to establish a new government. This 
model, he believed, had worked recently in Afghanistan and could succeed in Iraq.245  
U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair tried to shape U.S. decision-making regarding the decision to 
go to war. He aimed to convince Bush on the need for the inspectors to have sufficient time do 
their jobs investigating whether Saddam Hussein was fully complaint with U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 1441.246 The Chilcot report details the points Blair made to Bush during 
their 31 January 2003 meeting. 247  Blair wanted time to build public support in the U.K. and 
argued that a broad international coalition should be assembled to add legitimacy if war became 
necessary. He was aware of Bush’s views that military victory would be easily achieved. The 
report shows no evidence that Blair challenged this view or raised the question of war 
termination.248 French President Jacques Chirac told Blair that France opposed going to war in 
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Iraq, unless Saddam Hussein did something unacceptable. U.K. Foreign Minister Jack Straw 
told Dominque de Villepin on 29 January 2003 that it was in neither country’s interest for the 
United States to act unilaterally. “That would mean the international community losing 
influence over US actions.” 249 The U.K.’s Joint Intelligence Council assessed that the Iraqi 
people would acquiesce in Coalition military action to topple the regime, as long as civilian 
casualties are limited.”250 Blair did consistently raise to Bush the importance of post-war 
planning but was reportedly assured by the latter that such planning was progressing well.251 
The documents contained in the Chilcot Report suggest that the U.K.’s concerns about the 
prospects of post-Saddam instability did not become deal-breakers in their willingness to 
support the invasion. Instead, the U.K. seemed to focus on getting their portion of the 
reconstruction effort right.252 
Phase III captured the attention of the Department of Defense and the United States 
government. CENTCOM Commander General Tommy Franks recalls, “While we at 
CENTCOM were executing the war plan, Washington should focus on policy-level issues . . . 
I knew the President and Don Rumsfeld would back me up, so I felt free to pass the message 
along to the bureaucracy beneath them: You pay attention to the day after and I’ll pay attention 
to the day of.”253 A RAND study that examined planning for post-Saddam Iraq argues that 
Franks’ mindset “reinforced an understandable tendency at CENTCOM to focus planning on 
major combat as an end in itself rather than as a component part of a broader effort to create a 
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stable, reasonably democratic Iraq. The result, arguably, was a military operation that made the 
latter, larger goal more difficult to achieve.”254  
As part of the normal military planning process, Franks and his staff, as well his subordinate 
commands, would conduct myriad war-games and rehearsals. Such efforts are designed to test 
the feasibility of the military campaign against a competitive and uncooperative enemy. They 
would expose flaws or identify major contingencies to be addressed. If necessary, the military 
adds “branches” (deviations from the base plan to address key risks and opportunities) and 
“sequels” (follow-on efforts) to the operation.255 In November 2002, the Third Army conducted 
an exercise called Lucky Warrior that exposed some problems in the CENTCOM plan. 
Lieutenant General David McKiernan, the commander, was not impressed by the likelihood of 
an early regime collapse and believed that he would likely need to fight his way to Baghdad. 
He was concerned about the small size of the invasion force and the efficacy of the Running 
Start force generation concept. He outlined his concerns to Franks and drew up an alternative 
concept called Cobra II.256  
As the invasion grew closer, CENTCOM commenced a “Rock Drill” on December 7-8, 2002, 
to rehearse the campaign with the subordinate commands.257 The rehearsal would set 
conditions for Internal Look, which was to take place a few days later. Internal Look was a 
fully computerized war-game designed to test the plan and command and control systems 
against an adversary playing Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi military.258 It identified issues like 
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the ones McKiernan flagged earlier. This opened the opportunity for McKiernan to brief 
Rumsfeld on Cobra II. The Secretary approved Cobra II at the end of December, but would 
retain tight control over troop levels.259 The military commands continued rehearsing and 
refining the plans until the start of the war. Senators Joseph Biden and Chuck Hagel, who were 
on a fact-finding trip to the region, visited the Internal Look. Biden noted his concerns about 
the lack of clarity on the post-war plan. “Phase IV worries America,” he reportedly told the 
participants.260  
Phase IV, however, received only a fraction of Pentagon attention. No analog of the deliberate 
planning and preparation process occurred for post-combat operations.261 “The majority of 
activities required for Phase IV were perceived by the Department of Defense to be the 
responsibility of civilian agencies and departments,” summarized a RAND report.262 Phase IV 
rehearsals and war-games would have required participation by other Departments and 
agencies within the U.S. Government, and perhaps some international and non-governmental 
organizations. Nonetheless, RAND notes that “military planners believed such collaboration 
would not be necessary for stability, reconstruction, and transition activities to succeed.”263 
Defense even neglected to assess the troop levels needed. As Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 
D. Wolfowitz explained to Congress, it was “hard to conceive that it would take more forces 
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to provide stability in a post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to 
secure the surrender of Saddam’s security forces and his army—hard to imagine.”264  
The U.S. government never articulated a clear theory of success for the war, but it is possible 
to piece one together.265 The presumed theory of success was that the military would defeat the 
Iraqi military forces and depose Saddam Hussein. The vanquished Iraqi military would remain 
intact, and, with local police, would support the security and stability of Iraq backed-up by 
remaining international military forces. International civilian efforts would support Iraqi exiles 
and internal non-Baathist leaders in establishing a new democratic government that would 
become a partner in the war on terror. Reconstruction assistance would allow the Iraqi economy 
to recover. Iraq’s oil wealth would enable the country to become self-sustainable. International 
efforts would be taken over by Iraqis as quickly as possible, permitting U.S. and international 
civilians and military to withdraw. The exit strategy, Franks emphasized to Bush, must be 
based on effective Iraqi governance, not a fixed timeline.266 
The campaign plan relied upon three critical but implicit assumptions.267 First, that the Iraqi 
military and police would remain intact and be willing and able to provide security with limited 
assistance from international forces.268 Second, that the Sunni Arabs would accept a far more 
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limited share of power, acquiesce in the new government, and not fight back.269 Third, and 
most importantly, that a political leadership based mostly around former exiled elites could 
quickly earn the legitimacy to rule Iraq.270 All three would have to be true for the U.S. plan to 
succeed. All three turned out to be terribly wrong, and the United States had no strategy to 
address them.  
General Franks relied on the Afghanistan example – an availability heuristic – to justify his 
belief that Phase IV would be relatively peaceful and focused on achieving political and 
economic milestones.271 This begs two key questions: did Rumsfeld and Franks have reason to 
believe the Afghanistan experience was largely representative of other post-conflict situations, 
and, if not, did they have reason to believe that the Afghanistan and Iraq situations shared 
unique characteristics amenable to low-footprint, short duration approaches? 
For the first question, the Pentagon and the Bush Administration had the benefit of four recent 
examples: Somalia (1992-1994), Haiti (1994-1996), Bosnia (1995-present), and Kosovo 
(1999-present). Peacekeeping missions were a lightning rod with the new Bush Administration. 
They believed that the U.S. military was too valuable to be wasted on such missions that other 
militaries could do perfectly well.272 Rumsfeld and other military senior leaders favored small 
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footprint, short duration post-conflict missions that could be handed off quickly to local or 
other international forces.273  
A 2003 RAND study led by Ambassador James Dobbins examined force levels associated with 
other U.S. nation-building efforts.274 This study emerged from a conference in May 2003, so 
would not have been available to Rumsfeld, Franks, and their staffs during the invasion 
planning. The information, however, was readily accessible. Bosnia and Kosovo, both 
relatively successful peacekeeping missions, had force to population ratios of 18.6 and 20 
soldiers per 1000 people, respectively. In other successful examples, force ratios of roughly 20 
per one thousand were used by the British in Malaya and Northern Ireland.275 These were large 
footprint, long duration missions not favored by Rumsfeld. For an Iraqi population of roughly 
26 million people, 20 per 1000 ratio amounted to 520,000 troops. 
How did small footprint, short duration missions fare? Not well is the short answer. Somalia 
had 5 peacekeepers per 1000 inhabitants. Started in 1992, the mission ended in failure three 
years later.276 Similarly, Haiti had 3.5 American troops per 1000 inhabitants. The United States 
managed to restore the elected leadership but left before durable political institutions could 
form. The country has been politically unstable ever since.277  
The force to population ratio in Afghanistan, perceived to be going successfully as of 2003, 
was 5 per 1000 in Kabul (mostly non-U.S. forces), but only 0.46 countrywide.278 Iraq was to 
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have 6.6 ratio overall with 2.4 per 1000 in Baghdad. U.S. Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki 
was famously chastised by Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz for expressing his estimate 
that 400,000 troops would be required for stability operations in Iraq.279 In Shinseki’s defense, 
the examples with roughly 20:1000 ratios were consistently successful. The low ratio 
examples, Somalia and Haiti, showed poor results. In short, plenty of empirical evidence 
suggested that low footprint, short duration post conflict missions experienced significant 
problems and far lower rates of success than large footprint, long duration missions. As to the 
validity of Afghanistan as a successful template, troubles were brewing there (as will be seen 
in Chapter 6) that should have raised doubts that powerful Iraqi elites would set aside deep-
seated rivalries and personal aspirations to work together harmoniously. 
The actual invasion force for Operation Iraqi Freedom totaled just over 200,000 troops, with 
roughly 140,000 on the ground in Iraq by April 2003.280 The RAND study about Phase IV 
planning notes a CENTCOM and Third Army belief that follow-on forces would continue to 
flow into Iraq, based on the 1003V projection of a 250,000-troop requirement.281 Whether 
Rumsfeld approved that force number or Franks believed such a force was necessary is 
doubtful. Franks, in fact, canceled the deployment of 1st Cavalry Division as U.S. forces 
entered Baghdad.282  
Perhaps Rumsfeld and Franks had other reasons to believe that Iraq would be fundamentally 
different than Somalia and Haiti. After all, like Afghanistan and unlike the other two examples, 
the Iraqi forces were to be defeated militarily, the regime overthrown, and a combination of 
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exiles and internal opposition figures were to form a new government. Should they have had 
any reason to doubt their prospects for success? In June 1999, then CENTCOM Commander 
Anthony Zinni conducted a classified exercise called Desert Crossing to examine potential 
courses of action if the Saddam Hussein regime collapsed and CENTCOM was directed to 
occupy and stabilize the country. The experts compared two approaches: “inside-out” 
envisioned an internal group of Iraqis seizing power. “Outside-in” imagined a U.S.-imposed 
administration. The exercise determined that issues such as internal looting, sectarian strife, 
regional interference, and violent struggles for power were likely. “A change in regime does 
not guarantee stability,” noted the after-action report.283 As war with Iraq became likely by 
2002, Zinni attempted to meet with Franks and discuss the potential challenges of dealing with 
a failed state. The Pentagon reportedly blocked the trip. The Bush Administration never studied 
Desert Crossing.284  
During the lead-up to the Iraq war, the State Department developed the Future of Iraq project, 
which would identify many of the post invasion problems the United States encountered.285 
The effort had no authority to develop a postwar plan.  286 It consisted of 17 working groups 
that amassed over 2,000 pages of paper organized into 13 volumes.287 It was more appropriately 
organized as a process that got Iraqi exiles, various American officials, and representatives 
from international and non-government organizations to discuss the future of the country.288  
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Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith reportedly dismissed the project as a “bunch of 
concept papers.”289 It was ignored by the Pentagon due to bureaucratic turf-battles and 
interagency suspicion that State was not on board with the war.290  
Warnings about the potential for post-conflict violence surfaced from a wide variety of sources. 
Early in the planning Rumsfeld identified a 29-point “Parade of Horribles” that were risks to 
success with the military operation.291 Most of these concerned weapons of mass destruction 
and international reactions. Only one identified the likelihood of ethnic or sectarian strife. None 
mentioned the legitimacy of an interim Iraqi government. Other agencies pointed out the risks 
of post-invasion instability. The National Intelligence Council issued a January 2003 report 
that forewarned, “a post-Saddam authority would face a deeply divided society with a 
significant chance that domestic groups wound engage in violent conflict with each other 
unless an occupying force prevented them from doing so…. Score-settling,” it noted, “would 
occur throughout Iraq.”292 A persistent debate within the Bush Administration centered on 
whether “internals” (Iraqis from Iraq) or “externals” (Iraqi expatiates) should lead the interim 
Iraqi government.293 The Office of the Secretary of Defense preferred externals because they 
could be pre-vetted. This would enable the interim government to stand up more quickly and 
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speed the pace of transition and withdrawal. State and the Central Intelligence Agency, 
however, worried that externals would have no domestic legitimacy.294  
Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor to Presidents Gerald R. Ford and George 
H.W. Bush, was so troubled by the notion of war with Iraq that he penned an op-ed in the Wall 
Street Journal. “An attack on Iraq at this time would seriously jeopardize, if not destroy, the 
global counterterrorist campaign we have undertaken.” Moreover, he wrote, “if we are to 
achieve our strategic objectives in Iraq, a military campaign very likely would have to be 
followed by a large-scale, long-term military occupation.”295 Iraqi exiles also offered 
cautionary notes. “On many occasions, I told the Americans that from the very moment the 
regime fell, if an alternative government was not ready there would be a power vacuum and 
there would be chaos and looting,” claimed Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP) and a longtime ally of the United States, “Given our history, it is very 
obvious this would occur.”296  
After Internal Look in December 2002, barely four months before the invasion, the Joint Staff 
directed US Joint Forces Command to create Task Force IV to work on phase IV planning. The 
task force began to assemble in January 2003, however the effort was disbanded in March 
2003, and supplanted by the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) 
led by Retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner.297 ORHA was created under the authority of 
NSPD-24 on January 20, 2002, scarcely two months before the invasion. NSPD-24 gave 
Defense the responsibility for post-war planning and directed the formation of an office to 
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execute it. OHRA planning focused mainly on potential humanitarian crises – most of which 
never materialized. “The problem,” RAND’s Nora Bensahel summarizes, “was not that no one 
in the U.S. government thought about the challenges of post-Saddam Iraq. Rather, it was the 
failure to coordinate and integrate these various thoughts into a coherent, actionable plan.”298 
 
Static Milestones Face Dynamic Interaction 
OHRA arrived in Iraq on April 21, 2002. Three days later, Rumsfeld informed Garner that 
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer would be coming to Iraq as the head of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA). The Bush Administration had not settled in advance on whether to turn 
administration over to Iraqis immediately or to govern as an occupying authority and transition 
more slowly to Iraqi control.299 There is no indication that the options were thoroughly debated, 
but the Administration seems to have aimed for a rapid hand-off to Iraqi authorities. “The 
President’s goal,” Rumsfeld recorded in a 14 October memo to himself, “is to stabilize Iraq 
and then turn it over to the Iraqis.”300 Indeed this is what the military believed was the 
Administration’s intention and was the advice of empowered exiles such as Chalabi.301 As the 
Saddam regime disintegrated and Iraqi exiles began to bicker, the Administration changed 
course.302 The CPA would govern Iraq under United Nations authority with the support of an 
Iraqi Governing Council (ICG) until handing over to an Iraqi Government.303 Bremer arrived 
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in Baghdad on 12 May to begin forming the CPA. He made two key decisions that would 
heighten the risk to success: de-Baathifaction and disbanding the Iraqi Army.  
Bremer issued CPA Order Number 1, known as de-Baathification, on May 16, 2003. It was his 
first official act. Since Sunnis held most of the power in the Baath party, the order 
disproportionately affected that community and its leaders.304 Later that day, Bremer informed 
Iraqi exiles and elites of the decision to delay transfer of authority to Iraqi officials.305 Hamid 
Bayati, from the Shi’a party SCIRI (Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution on Iraq), 
reportedly warned CPA leaders, “the longer Iraqis are not in control of their political life, the 
more problems would arise.” Chalabi and others registered concerns about a U.S. broken 
promise to turn over power to Iraqis within weeks.306 Bremer nonetheless appointed the twenty-
five member Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), consisting of 13 exiles and 12 local Iraqis.307 
Twelve of the 25 were Shi’a, and five were Kurds. Five Sunni Arabs were included in the body 
(20%), three of whom were local.308 Most Iraqis were reportedly unfamiliar with the ICG and 
its members.309  
Perhaps to ameliorate their anger over the delay in transferring power, Bremer gave the IGC 
the responsibility for implementing de-Baathification. This decision gave those wanting to 
consolidate their own power a very potent tool to eliminate the competition. The ICG wasted 
no time in pressing for expansion of the program while preventing former Baathists who had 
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committed no crimes from returning to government.310 Ahmed Chalabi, for instance, used these 
aggressive de-Baathification authorities to undercut support for his political rival Ayad Alawi 
– a secular Shi’a who aimed for greater Sunni inclusion.311  
The decision to disband the Army, CPA Order Number 2, was issued on 23 May 2003. Since 
Saddam’s Army was led mostly by Sunni Arabs, the order had a disproportionate effect on 
Sunni leaders and risked alienating some 385,000 armed and trained men.312 It prompted angry 
reactions.313 Demonstrations occurred for weeks in Baghdad. Violent protests in Mosul, where 
Major General David Petraeus was trying to gain local support, wounded sixteen American 
soldiers. One senior military officer noted that “the insurgency went crazy … One Iraqi who 
saved my life in an ambush said to me, ‘I can’t be your friend anymore’.”314 On June 18, an 
estimated 2000 former Iraqi soldiers protested outside the Green Zone. “We will not let the 
Americans rule us in such a humiliating way,” declared one speaker.315 American soldiers 
reportedly fired into the crowd, killing two.316  
To make problems worse, the military plan relied on the vanquished Iraqi Army to provide 
manpower for security and reconstruction assistance.317 Disbanding the Army meant there was 
no local Iraqi force and far too few international soldiers to fill the security vacuum. Chaos and 
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looting were rampant in Iraqi cities. Meanwhile, efforts by U.S. military and intelligence 
officials to reach out to Sunni military leaders were disapproved at senior levels in the military 
command and CPA. One Sunni leader reportedly told his American counterpart, “All right my 
friend, this is the last time we will speak, and I wish you luck in the hard times to come.”318   
The CPA’s first two official orders, de-Baathification and disbanding the Army set important 
conditions for Sunni Arab resistance.319 Dobbins notes that de-Baathification and the order to 
disband the Iraqi Army – both orders which were cleared by the Department of Defense and 
White House – could have benefitted from further review. But he downplays their significance. 
After all, de-Baathification was only intended to affect 0.1 percent of the Iraqi population – 25 
times less than the de-Nazification policy in post-war Germany.320 The Iraqi Army had already 
dissolved itself, he argues, so there was little reason to issue the order. Bremer instead could 
have put them on an inactive status, sustained their pay, and recalled individuals and units 
selectively.321 These orders did, as Dobbins observes, antagonize the Sunni community from 
which the insurgency grew.322 As the first two administrative acts by the occupation authority 
de-Baathification and disbanding the Army sent a clear statement, whether intended or not, 
about who was welcome and who was not. Each order taken individually might not have been 
as problematic as some critics suggest, but together with other actions they suggest that locally 
respected Sunni leaders had no place in the new order.323 Washington Post columnist David 
Ignatius recalls, “I remember one prominent U.S. National Security Council official telling me 
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more than once that the answer for Iraq was the ‘80-percent solution’—in other words, Kurds 
and Shiites would build the new state regardless of opposition from the 20 percent of the 
population that was Sunni. This view was recklessness dressed up as realpolitik.”324 “The 
resistance developed,” reflected a Sunni Arab political leader, “once it became clear to the 
Sunni community that they were being excluded from the political process.”325 
Military actions fed the political resentment. In April 2003 soldiers from the 82nd Airborne 
Division in Fallujah fired into a protesting crowd after allegedly taking fire from some 
militants, killing seventeen and wounding move than seventy.326 That unit was soon replaced 
by a Brigade of the Third Infantry Division (3rd ID). Concerned that the 82nd Airborne was 
going to return to the area, the 3rd ID command offered to extend his unit in in Fallujah. CJTF-
7 Commander Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez denied the request, and the 82nd Airborne 
returned to the restive city. Within weeks they reportedly shot and killed some of the local 
policemen trained by 3rd ID after mistaking them for insurgents.327 Similar problems were 
occurring in the area around Tikrit, another part of the Sunni triangle. The 4th Infantry Division 
was using tactics like the ones seen in Anbar: large scale sweeps, liberal use of firepower in 
populated areas, frequent and indiscriminate night raids that hauled in high volumes of 
detainees, many of whom were innocent, who then languished in overcrowded detention 
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facilities for weeks.328 Insurgent attacks increased nearly four-fold countrywide from roughly 
fifteen per day in June 2003 to sixty by November.329 
These orders and military actions took place as a new communications revolution was getting 
underway. Without the benefit of mobile phones and digital technology information traveled 
slower in previous postwar environments. Individuals and groups had fewer opportunities to 
share ideas and communicate problems. Officials had more reaction time. In Afghanistan, civil 
war followed by years of Taliban misrule left a devastated infrastructure. A few elites had 
satellite phones. The broader population relied on radio and word of mouth. Iraq 2003 was 
vastly different. Mobile phones and internet were far more diffused, allowing rapid and 
frequent interconnections among families, leaders, and social networks. Outrage echoed across 
aggrieved Sunni Arab communities, amplifying indignation into resistance at a pace that far 
exceeded the ability of U.S. official to understand and react effectively. The prime beneficiary 
was a Jordanian named Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his group, al Qaeda in Iraq.330 
In addition to Sunni insurgent and terrorist groups, Muqtada al-Sadr’s Iran-backed Shi’a 
militia, Jaish al Mahdi (Mahdi Army), began agitating in Baghdad and Najaf.331 Sadr was 
challenging Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the senior Shi’a cleric in Iraq, for influence and took the 
competition into the streets. His militia was accused of murdering Ayatollah Abd al-Majid al-
Khoei in April 2003. They also began a series of sectarian murders designed to purge Sunni 
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Arabs from areas of Baghdad.332 This led to a serious debate between the CPA who wanted 
Sadr arrested and CJTF-7, the Pentagon, and the CIA who did not.333 The U.S. decided not to 
arrest him. Sadr continued operating with a degree of impunity, taking over the Samir Hotel in 
Najar on October 15, 2003, and naming it his Ministry of Defense.334  
Despite the start-up challenges and increasingly difficult security situation, the CPA did 
manage to put together an actionable plan soon after Bremer’s arrival in Baghdad. By July 
2003 Bremer had issued a vision and set of milestones for Iraq. The goal was to achieve:   
A durable peace for a unified and stable, democratic Iraq that provides effective and 
representative government for the Iraqi people; is underpinned by new and protected 
freedoms and a growing market economy; is able to defend itself but no longer poses a 
threat to its neighbors or international security.335  
The vision would be realized by focusing on four core foundations: security, governance, 
economy, and essential services. The CPA later added strategic communications to this list.336 
The plan listed benchmarks and timelines for each foundation.337 The ones for security, 
economy, and essential services were concrete. The governance timelines were less precisely 
organized into short, medium, and long term.338  
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Meanwhile, key Shi’a and Kurdish leaders were working the CPA process to press their 
advantage. A re-distribution of power among the major groups in Iraq toward proportional 
representation was bound to work against the Sunnis, but did not have to alienate them so 
aggressively. The ICG selected a twenty-five-member cabinet, with only three positions going 
to Sunni Arabs (plus an Interior Minister from April to June 2004).339 Their appointed status 
did not sit well with key Iraqi leaders. Sistani issued a fatwa on June 28, 2003, calling for a 
new constitution to be written by a group that was elected by the Iraqi people.340 Sistani and 
other Iraqi leaders (including some Sunnis) would persist in their demands for elections to be 
held as soon as possible.341 With the Sunni political community fragmented and many leaders 
joining the insurgency, elections would heavily favor organized Shi’a political parties and 
movements.342 To press their advantage, Shi’a leaders in the ICG called for more expansive 
de-Baathification.343 Militants registered their protests by targeting ICG members as well as 
international forces.344 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s network Tawhid wal-Jihad (the precursor to 
al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)) bombed the United Nations compound on August 19, 2003, killing 
Special Envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello and prompting the UN to pull out of the country.345 
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Some ICG leaders advocated the use of militias such as Peshmerga and the Badr Corps to help 
stem the violence, but were rebuffed by the CPA.346  
Internationally, the efforts to gain international legitimacy were running into problems. The 
Arab League announced in July 2003 that it would not recognize the ICG.347 They relented 
after heavy lobbying by the Bush Administration and the United Nations.348 On September 23, 
2003, the ICG banned the Qatar-based Al Jazeera news station along with Al Arabiya, the 
Saudi-owned, Dubai-based station, on suspicion of encouraging violence and provoking 
sectarian strife.349 Both are stations sponsored by Sunni Arab states. 
Bremer refined his plan. In an 8 September 2003 op-ed in the Washington Post, reportedly 
without clearance from the Pentagon, he outlined his seven-step plan to Iraqi sovereignty. 
These steps included 1) creation of a broadly representative Iraqi Governing Council, 2) ICG 
to name a constitutional preparatory committee (CPC) to develop a way forward in developing 
a new Iraqi Constitution, 3) appointment by the IGC of 25 ministers to run the Iraqi 
government, 4) writing a new Iraqi constitution, 5) popular ratification of the constitution, 6) 
election of a new government, 7) dissolving the CPA.350 The CPA recognized the need for a 
detailed plan and came up with one within weeks. The CPA estimated this seven-step process 
would require 540 days to complete.351 Leaders in Washington and Iraq were reportedly 
stunned. 
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The Bush Administration and the Pentagon were aiming for a near-term handover to Iraqi 
authorities. Bremer’s plan would take far longer than the Administration desired. National 
Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice grew increasingly concerned and asked Robert Blackwill, a 
former Ambassador to India, to assess the situation. Blackwill characterized Bremer’s plan as 
unrealistic, schoolbook, and done without Iraqi support.352 The plan, which included an 
appointed constitutional assembly, was issued three months after Sistani’s fatwa calling for the 
body to be elected. This agitated the IGC and key Shi’a leaders.353 Ultimately, a compromise 
was reached in which the Americans would hand over authority to an Interim Iraqi Government 
(IIG) in mid-2004 with Iyad Allawi as Prime Minister. National elections would be held six 
months later in January 2005.354  
While the Shi’a dominated IGC showed little interest in winning over Sunni Arab support, U.S. 
actions continued exacerbating the latter’s sense of alienation. Derek Harvey, the chief 
intelligence analyst for the military command in Iraq, wrote a classified assessment in February 
2004 of the burgeoning insurgency called “Sunni Arab Resistance: Politics of the Gun.”355 The 
report detailed how Saddam Hussein had expanded the Special Republican Guards, Fedayeen 
Saddam, Iraqi Intelligence, and Baath Party militia as a hedge against internal rebellion. These 
forces had placed arms caches and explosive materials in safe houses throughout the country. 
Harvey estimated 65,000 to 95,000 of these men, a ready-made insurgent cadre, went to ground 
in and around Baghdad after the fall of the regime. Saddam also built special relationships with 
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various Sunni tribes as an additional source of manpower.356 While the political process worked 
to exclude them, Sunni Arabs perceived that U.S. military operations aimed to repress them. 
This created a mutually reinforcing cycle that inflamed the insurgency. The detentions system 
became a fertile recruiting ground.357 Most detainees were Sunni Arabs. Military officials 
reportedly estimated that 70 to 90 percent of them were innocent. The Abu Ghraib torture and 
prisoner abuse scandal, combined with widespread perceptions of injustice, added fuel to the 
insurgency.  
This meant to Harvey and others that outreach to Sunni Arabs tribes was essential if the United 
States hoped to reduce the levels of violence against the coalition military. When American 
and British intelligence officials developed a plan to reach out to Sunni tribes, however, they 
were rebuffed. CPA official Meghan O’Sullivan reportedly stated that the CPA had no 
intention of making the tribes a formal part of the security or political structure.”358 “I was 
struck by the desperation of Iraq’s Sunni sheikhs, who feared and in many cases despised the 
brutal Zarqawi,” writes David Ignatius, “But couldn’t get tone-deaf U.S. officials in the 
international Green Zone to take their problems seriously.”359  
In Anbar, the 1st Marine Division took over from the 82nd Airborne in March 2004. Their 
Commander, Major General Jim Mattis, issued instructions to limit civilian casualties: Marines 
would not fire artillery into populated areas merely based on radar acquisitions of enemy mortar 
projectiles, use excessive airstrikes, or rely heavily on firepower from M1A1 tanks.360 This 
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corrective action suggests what tactics the previous American unit there had been using. 
Nonetheless, the Marines found patrolling into Fallujah tough going. Abu Musab al- Zarqawi, 
who arrived in Iraq in August 2002 expecting a U.S. invasion, was growing Tawhid wal-Jihad 
into a formidable terrorist network and angling to inflame a nascent sectarian civil war.361 Large 
numbers of Anbaris as well as foreign jihadis flocked to join his ranks.362 On March 31, a small 
patrol of Blackwater security guards was ambushed and one of the vehicles set on fire. The 
charred bodies were beaten with shovels by a frenzied mob and then hung on the city’s main 
bridge. The city had become violently anti-coalition.363 Sanchez ordered an immediate 
offensive. Mattis argued that the timing was wrong and the mission was ill-advised until they 
could improve popular support, but Sanchez insisted on moving forward.364 On April 6, the 
Marines commenced Operation Vigilant Resolve to deal with the growing threat in Fallujah. 
Most Iraqi security forces who were to participate deserted immediately.365 The offensive, the 
first large scale assault on a major city since the end of Saddam, amplified outrage in Iraq and 
played into Zarqawi’s hands. A heated exchange between Sanchez and Bremer took place as 
the latter demanded the operation be called off.366 Sanchez relented.  
He and Bremer decided instead to shift priority to the Sadr threat. Sanchez designed the plan 
and briefed Bremer, who sought White House permission. Arresting Sadr was refused in the 
belief that such an operation could enrage Shi’as and disrupt the June transfer of power.367 
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Washington, D.C. failed to appreciate the internal Shi’a rivalry. The coalition had increased 
military pressure on JAM. This created a backlash in some Shi’a communities but bloodied the 
Mahdi Army. Sadr ordered his forces to stand down in the face of heavy losses.368 He remained 
at large and his popularity grew, however, while Sunni Arabs seethed.369  
 
From Decisive Victory to Transition  
With decisive victory clearly out of reach, the United States’ approach to war termination 
defaulted toward transition-and-withdraw. This was not a change of strategy. The Bush 
administration was lowering the bar of success as they sought a way out.370 Bremer passed 
control to the IIG Prime Minister Iyad Allawi on June 28, 2004. The CPA disbanded. CJTF-7 
also stood down. A new civil-military country team provided an opportunity to look at the 
situation with a fresh set of eyes. An American Embassy was established in Baghdad, with 
John Negroponte as the Chief of Mission. General George Casey took command of Multi-
National Forces Iraq on 1 July 2004. They signed the Joint Mission Statement on August 17, 
2004, to reduce the civil-military chasm that existed under Bremer and Sanchez. They also 
established a “Red Cell” to assess the nature of the conflict and suggest a coordinated civil-
military way forward.371 The pre-eminent threat, the new plan stated, was Sunni insurgents and 
members of the former regime – “Sunni Arab Rejectionists” and “Former Regime Elements.” 
The goal for the coalition was not to defeat the insurgents, but to “reduce the insurgency to 
levels that can be contained by ISF [Iraqi Security Forces], and that progressively allow Iraqis 
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to take charge of their own security.”372 President Bush described it succinctly in a 28 June 
2005 speech at Fort Bragg, “As they stand up, we stand down.”373 The essence of the plan was 
to build and train Iraqi security forces, hand-over control of battle-space to them while 
achieving the political milestones set out by Bremer, and draw-down U.S. presence.374  
The rules for the upcoming 30 January 2005 national election, however, entrenched Sunni 
disadvantage and resistance. A key decision was whether to divide Iraq into multiple voting 
districts or to treat it as a single national district. If seats were allocated by dividing Iraq into 
local voting districts, Sunni Arab candidates would logically win seats in predominantly Sunni 
Arab areas such as Anbar province.375 If Iraq was treated as a single voting district, the 
advantage would go to the Shi’a and Kurdish parties due to insecurity and insurgency in Sunni 
Arab areas. The decision to treat Iraq as a single national district was part of a U.N. brokered 
compromise to appease Sistani’s demands for elections in 2004. This poll was to elect an Iraqi 
National Assembly from which the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) would be formed. 
The ITG was to draft an Iraqi constitution that would be put to an up-or-down national vote. 
Former CPA official Meghan O’Sullivan argues that treating Iraq as a single voting district 
was the only realistic way to pull off elections within this timeline.376 This may be true, but the 
decision reinforced Sunni Arab concerns about political marginalization. Many Sunni Arab 
leaders called for a boycott of the election; other Sunni Arabs were probably too scared to vote 
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due to threats made by Zarqawi and other insurgent leaders.377 In Anbar, the turnout was only 
two percent.378 Violence on polling day was high, but 58% of eligible voters reportedly 
participated.379 Allegations of rigging included ballot stuffing, voter intimidation, fraudulent 
voter registration, vote buying, and importation of non-Iraqi Kurds to cast votes for Kurdish 
parties.380 The United Iraqi Alliance, a coalition of non-Sadrist Shi’a religious parties, came in 
first. The Kurdish parties were second; Allawi’s Shi’a-Sunni coalition secured only 25 seats. 
For the 275-member parliament, Sunnis tallied only 8% representation.381  
After post-election jockeying by the parties to form a government, Ibrahim al-Jaafari finally 
secured the prime minister post on April 7. Jaafari was not a strong national figure backed by 
a militia. Iraq’s Shi’a strongmen settled on a non-threatening figure who posed little risk to 
their power and authority. Bayan Jabr from SCIRI was awarded the powerful Interior Ministry. 
He acted swiftly to intensify de-Baathification and remove Sunnis from leadership positions.382 
Sectarian violence, to include atrocities, rose.383 Iran, meanwhile, continued its influence 
campaign with the new Iraqi government (they reportedly gave millions of dollars to Jaafari in 
advance of the election), while enhancing their lethal support to Shi’a militias that were 
fighting the coalition and engaging in sectarian cleansing.384    
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Major Shi’a and Kurdish advantages in parliament gave them significant influence in drafting 
the constitution. This would be approved or rejected in an October 2005 referendum. In 
advance of the vote Sistani explained to U.S. officials his preference for a provincial-based 
over single district concept as the former would prevent Kurdish fraud from inflating their 
number of seats in parliament, and could increase Sunni representation.385 A new electoral law 
created 18 electoral districts (based on the 18 Iraqi provinces) instead of treating Iraq as a single 
national district.386 This time, the Sunni Arab leader encouraged participation. The October 
referendum also included a provision that the draft constitution would be disapproved if two-
thirds of voters in three provinces rejected it.387 This risk to this system was election rigging to 
repress Sunni turn out and inflate Shi’a or Kurdish votes in mixed provinces such as Diyala, 
Salah ad-Din, and Ninewa. In the event, the constitution was approved, albeit with significant 
Sunni Arab concerns of fraud in those provinces.388   
The final milestone was the parliamentary elections set for December 2005 to form a permanent 
Iraqi government. Concerns about electoral fraud, however, increased as the polling 
approached, including allegations of ballot stuffing, intimidation, fraudulent registration and 
vote buying.389 The de-Baathification commission removed 90 Sunni Arab candidates from 
eligibility.390 After the polling, Sunni Arab and secular party leaders protested massive fraud 
by the government and Shi’a and Kurdish parties.391 Sunni Arab leaders complained to 
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Khalilzad that their constituency was “under siege” from the terrorists, the government, and 
the coalition.392 Violence reportedly increased, particularly around Baghdad.393 Reflecting on 
the historic 2005 elections series, Allawi complained that they undercut rather than advanced 
democracy in Iraq.394  
A relatively low-profile figure with a deep sectarian past, Nouri Kamal al-Maliki, finally 
emerged as the Prime Minister and was sworn in with a new cabinet on May 20, 2006.395 Maliki 
continued aggressive sectarian violence using both Iraqi forces and the Sadrist party-cum-
militia Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM).396 A Sunni Arab leader told U.S. officials that “The extrajudicial 
practices of Shia police in Anbar province fueled the insurgency.”397 When U.S. officials 
presented Maliki with evidence of sectarian atrocities at the hands of these forces, he reportedly 
replied that things were worse under Saddam.398 Saudi King Abdullah complained to U.S. 
Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad that the United States had given Iraq to Iran as a “gift 
on a golden platter.”399 
Polling data collected by the Defense Intelligence Agency showed confidence in Iraqi security 
forces dwindling among Sunni Arabs while support for armed resistance was increasing.400 
Attacks rose from 200 per week in January 2004 to over 1000 per week in July 2006. They 
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would nearly double again to 1800 per week in July 2007.401 A sectarian civil war was well 
underway, with atrocities on both sides of the Sunni-Shi’a divide.402 The Sunni insurgency had 
become sustainable, enjoying local popular and external support. The Maliki government 
exploited American forces and Jaish al-Mahdi to consolidate Shi’a power and exact retribution 
for decades of abuse at the hands of Saddam. Despite these shocking levels of violence, Casey 
and Rumsfeld began canceling deployment orders for units scheduled to go to Iraq, and 
remained convinced that the United States had to draw-down to win.403 The conditions were 
well-established for a counterinsurgency loss. 
Conclusion 
Why did this toxic combination arise? Existing explanations focus on the lack of Phase IV 
planning, inadequate troop presence to maintain security, and poor political – military 
integration.404 These problems contributed greatly, but are parts of a larger cause: a failure to 
develop a strategy resilient to the competitive, interactive, and often violent nature of politics 
in post-conflict societies. America deployed a well-trained and sophisticated military force, 
highly experienced diplomats, and extensive civilian expertise. By 2006, US forces were losing 
to a poorly trained, badly equipped, and badly resourced insurgency, while being ably 
manipulated by Iraqi elites who had less education, resources, and expertise. This was a failure 
in American leadership and management.  
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The Bush administration failed to consider war termination in its policy and strategy. They 
fixated on the military campaign, ignored warnings about probable post-Saddam risks, and thus 
heightened the likelihood of quagmire. The Administration failed to develop a strategy that 
integrated all elements of national power toward a favorable and durable outcome and was 
resilient enough to adapt to emerging risks. The military campaign plan was sufficient to defeat 
a poorly trained and incompetently led Iraqi Army, but too rigid to adapt to the dynamic 
aftermath. Despite ample warnings from the Intelligence Community and a wide array of 
experts about the risks of post-regime instability, the Bush administration clung to the 
optimistic assumptions underpinning the campaign plan.405 Wolfowitz’s testimony on 27 
February 2003, just weeks before the invasion, that he could not imagine more troops being 
required for stabilization than were needed to defeat the Iraqi armed forces suggests such risks 
were never seriously contemplated.406 The Department of Defense and the Bush 
Administration fell victim to the planning fallacy discussed in Chapter 2. They were not alone. 
If State had grave concerns about the prospects for success, Powell could have recommended 
to Bush an interagency war-game. As a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, he was aware of 
the utility of this tool to expose problems. The failure to understand the difference between 
strategy and plans had significant consequences.  
The CPA developed on the fly and implemented a milestone-centric plan that viewed post-war 
security and reconstruction as an engineering task. It took an approach suitable for a 
complicated task (one with many important, sequential steps) and tried to make it work in a 
complex, dynamic and interactive environment. This approach was so deeply ingrained in U.S. 
civilian and military officials that no one thought to question it. Each milestone was exploited 
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by those with the most to gain. The Sunni Arab sense of alienation grew as the coalition military 
and Iraqi government were perceived to be adding repression to political exclusion. As more 
Sunnis Arabs fought back, Shi’a leaders pressed their advantage. Higher troop levels in 2003 
might have delayed the onset of insurgency, but could not ensure government legitimacy or 
convince Sunni Arabs to accept what they perceived to be a state of oppression.  
To be sure, a re-balancing of political power to reflect Iraqi demographics was bound to reduce 
Sunni Arab and enhance Shi’a and Kurdish influence. This was even more reason the Bush 
Administration, CPA, and military should have taken extra care to ameliorate the effects of 
political change on the Sunni Arabs. Plenty of indictors, warnings, and expert assessments 
before the war pointed toward the risks. The United States, however, was unprepared for the 
intense scrimmage for power among Iraqi elites.407 De-Baathification and disbanding the 
Army, both decisions taken after deliberation within the Bush Administration, had a 
disproportionately large effect on Sunni Arabs. Excessive military efforts in the Sunni Triangle, 
torture, and abuse fueled resentment. Together, they stoked armed resistance and a belief that 
there was no place in the new Iraq for Sunni Arabs.408 These policies and actions were 
encouraged and amplified by Shi’a leaders eager to consolidate power and avenge years of 
humiliation and abuse. A proper strategy that was adaptable to the likely scrimmage for power, 
score-settling, and potential for sectarianism would have put the United States in a much better 
position to prevent or mitigate the worst outcomes, and would likely have limited self-
sabotaging policies and actions. As Gordon and Trainor put it, “Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and 
Tommy Franks spent most of their time and energy on the least demanding task – defeating 
                                                                 
407 Interview with Lieutenant General Terry A. Wolff. 
408 Eisenstadt and White (December 2005), 2-3. 
 105 
Saddam’s weakened conventional forces – and the least amount of time on the most demanding 
– rehabilitation and security for the new Iraq.”409 
The Administration’s governing strategy document, however, blithely asserted that the 
political, military, and economic elements of its strategy were “integrated and mutually 
reinforcing.”410 This was true, but not in the way the Administration intended. The efforts 
worked together in a downward spiral. The political and military objectives were never 
prioritized and integrated. Each track operated largely on its own logic and trajectory. Military 
and civilian officials were working extraordinarily hard in their own silos of responsibility, 
doing their best to adapt their individual efforts to a dynamic environment. The main problems 
were occurring at the fault-lines between civilian and military actions – at the interface of the 
silos. Security is interconnected with effective governance and political inclusion, not simply 
the first step in a sequence of tasks.411 
No one in Iraq had the authority, responsibility, and accountability, however, to ensure these 
efforts worked in concert toward achieving a successful outcome and adapted to constantly 
emerging risks along the seams. The fact of the matter is that the White House and National 
Security Council were in no position to run a limited war full-time when they had 
responsibilities across the globe, domestic policy to manage, and departments to run. In the 
absence of full-time governance of American and coalition efforts on the ground, political and 
military activities unwittingly self-synchronized in ways that empowered a highly sectarian 
Iraqi government and amplified Sunni resistance. The result by 2006 was a sustainable 
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insurgency fighting against the coalition and an increasingly sectarian and predatory Iraqi 





Chapter 4: Staying the Course  
From 2003 to the end of 2006, American military and political leaders were slow to recognize 
the character of the conflict: a Sunni Arab insurgency fighting a predatory sectarian Iraqi 
government and its coalition backers. Shi’a militias contributed to the sectarian violence and 
attacks against international forces. Despite a clearly declining security and political situation, 
confirmation bias became evident as U.S. leaders extolled examples of progress while 
remaining wedded to transition-and-withdrawal plans. Alternative views were suppressed or 
dismissed by the military command and Administration officials.412 By late 2006, a ground-
swell of alternative viewpoints were being discussed in Washington D.C. Supported by retired 
General Jack Keane, critics such as intelligence official Derek Harvey and scholar Frederick 
Kagan convinced the Bush Administration that the situation in Iraq was nearing disaster and 
that a surge of military forces and capabilities under a new strategy was needed.413  President 
Bush approved the surge in January 2007 as General David H. Petraeus and U.S. Ambassador 
Ryan Crocker, the new Commander and U.S. Ambassador, respectively, developed a new U.S.-
led approach to the conflict. This included reconciliation efforts with disaffected Sunni 
tribes.414 By late-2008, the security situation in Iraq had stabilized. Al Qaeda in Iraq was 
decimated.415 But the American public had tired of the conflict. They elected Barack Obama 
for president in 2008, who made ending the war in Iraq a major part of his campaign. 
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Why did the United States cling to a losing approach for three years? The existing scholarship 
focuses mainly on the reasons why the war went poorly and then on the relative merits of the 
2007 surge. A few works discuss the strategic paralysis before the surge. Bob Woodward’s, 
State of Denial, illustrates how the persistent narrative of optimism within the Bush 
administration and officials in Baghdad impeded objective assessments and strategic decision-
making.416 Gordon and Trainor’s authoritative volume The Endgame describes the 
interconnected problems of an expanding insurgency and growing sectarianism in the Iraqi 
government and security forces, civilian and military persistence with the campaign plan, and 
the process that led to the surge decision. This chapter will examine why the paralysis occurred 
and how the Bush administration overcame it.417  
The Administration experienced three mutually reinforcing problems. First, they fell victim to 
confirmation bias in which even strikingly unfavorable information was described as evidence 
of success. This resulted in large part from implicit assumptions about the war, the tendency to 
operate in bureaucratic silos, and how the Administration measured progress. Second, were 
severe patron-client problems that trapped the United States in a downward spiral. Third, was 
a powerful sense of loss aversion. In comparing the status quo with the prevailing Democrat 
alternative to cut losses and withdraw, the Administration was unwilling to pay the penalty of 
admitting defeat. Change become possible when an alternative approach provided the 
Administration a chance to reverse a probable loss. Clinging stubbornly to a losing approach, 
however, cost public support. Even though a more effective campaign plan was showing 
promise, the American people had had enough.  
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Achieving Milestones while Losing the War 
Confirmation bias was a major impediment for the Bush administration. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, those with confirmation bias tend to place undue emphasis on information that 
supports their theories and beliefs, while discounting or rationalizing disconfirming 
information. This problem impedes sound assessments and decision-making. The Bush 
administration and its civilian and military leaders in Iraq worked hard to understand the 
situation and make smart decisions. They were hindered by the tendency to divide the war into 
component parts within bureaucratic silos. This resulted in assessments of progress by 
aggregating tangible achievements within each silo. U.S. Lieutenant General James Dubik 
offered an illustrative example of this mentality occurring as late as 2007. One of the general 
officers in change of individual training told Dubik that he had trained the requisite numbers 
of Iraqi soldiers “so his task was complete.”418  Officials in Washington D.C. and Iraq assumed 
all the individualized progress was leading toward a successful outcome – reinforcing a belief 
that the war was on track. This process masked how efforts in those silos were being 
manipulated and self-synchronizing in damaging ways. The strategic damage, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, was occurring in the seams and fault lines between the silos.419 This was a problem 
that senior officials, many conditioned by decades of working in bureaucracies, failed to 
understand. The narrative of progress, which strained credulity, reinforced a stubborn refusal 
to change. 
The Administration had plenty of data to support its narrative. Iraq was hitting all the major 
benchmarks. Politically, the elections were taking place, a new Constitution was drafted and 
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voted upon, successive governments were established, major legislation was drafted and 
enacted. In fact, the Iraqi government achieved every single benchmark set forth in the 
transitional political process outlined in U.N. Resolutions 1546 (2004) and 1723 (2006).420 On 
the security front Iraqi Security Forces were being trained, equipped, and fielded largely on 
time.421 Saddam Hussein was captured and put on trial. AQI leader Abu Musab al Zarqawi was 
killed. The Sunni Arab and Sadrist insurgencies were suffering tremendous casualties. 
Economically, major developmental contracts were awarded and the oil industry was beginning 
to recover. 422 In short, the Administration was meeting its standards for success in its political, 
military, and economic lines of effort. 
By October 2004, the Bush Administration had differentiated the enemy in Iraq into three tiers: 
Sunni Arab Rejectionists, Former Regime Elements (FRE), and international terrorists.423 This 
characterization was maintained in the “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq” published in 
November 2005.424 Sunni Arab Rejectionists were described as those “who have not embraced 
the shift from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq to a democratically governed state,” while Saddamists 
and Former Regime Elements, “harbor dreams of establishing a Ba’athist dictatorship.”425 
American officials estimated that the first two tiers had some 3,500 fighters and 12,000 – 
20,000 supporters. Foreign terrorists totaled roughly 1000.426 Nonetheless, the intelligence 
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community, even in late 2005, had a tough time understanding the nature of the enemy, its 
relationship to the population, and the implications for U.S. strategy.427 The practical 
differentiation between Sunni Arab Rejectionists (deemed reconcilable) and Former Regime 
Elements (deemed irreconcilable), for example, could be difficult to determine without 
substantial engagement with various leaders of each. Moreover, such distinction treated the 
insurgency as a collection of individuals, rather than groups operating to achieve certain goals 
and objectives. 
The Department of Defense graph below charts enemy initiated attacks (EIAs).428 EIAs were 
an imprecise but consistent estimate of insurgent strength. Weekly attacks increased roughly 
three-fold to 600 per week from January to July 2004. The upward trend continued to 800 per 
week when Maliki came to power in May 2006. Sectarian violence, as noted in the previous 
chapter, intensified. Curiously, the Bush administration did not include violence levels in the 
security assessment.429 
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FIGURE 3: ANNOTATED ENEMY INITIATED ATTACKS, IRAQ 
 
Polling data revealed a more complicated picture. Surveys can be problematic in combat zones, 
particularly if people believe they might be at risk of harm based on how they answer.430 
Nonetheless, a significant percentage of Iraqis polled across ethnic and sectarian lines in 
March/April 2004 supported the idea of a parliamentary democracy (54%), believed they 
would be better off five years from now (63%), and supported laws guaranteeing freedom of 
speech (94%), assembly (77%), and religion (73%).  Most surveyed believed U.S. forces 
behaved badly (58%) and viewed them as occupiers (71%). The same poll showed widespread 
support for Iraqi police and the new Iraqi Army.431 A September 2004 poll conducted by the 
State Department, however, showed that Iraqi perceptions of security continued to decline.432 
A significant percentage of Sunni Arabs (88% by January 2006) supported the insurgency or 
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believed attacks on coalition and government forces were justified.433 “The Sunni Arab 
insurgency is gaining strength and increasing capacity,” a 24 May 2006 intelligence assessment 
surmised, “despite political progress and security forces development.”434  
The interpretations of the data reveal the dominant mental model within the Bush 
administration and U.S. officials in Baghdad. This model was largely based on the reductionist, 
milestone-centric approach to building the Iraqi state and defeating the insurgency. Based on 
the progress in meeting political, military and economic benchmarks, Vice President Cheney 
concluded on May 30, 2005, that the insurgency was “in its last throes.”435 In June 2005 
CENTCOM Commander General John Abizaid explained that the number of Iraqis in the 
insurgency was only 0.1 percent of the population.436 U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld, even as late as August 2005, described the opposition as “dead-enders” and 
remnants of the former regime, while downplaying the risk of civil war.437 The October 2005 
Department of Defense report to Congress boasted, “One noteworthy strategic indicator of 
progress in the security environment is the continued inability of insurgents to derail the 
political process and timelines.”438 When questioned about the number of attacks rising, 
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Rumsfeld explained that the military’s data collection was improving and “we’re categorizing 
more things as attacks.”439  
The increasing violence remained an acute cause for concern, but accepted explanations for it 
conformed to the Administration’s assumptions and way forward. Foreign occupation, the 
military command assessed, was a core motivator of violence. American officials believed that 
most Sunnis Arabs supported the government, but were prevented from showing it due to 
coercion and intimidation.440 General Abizaid explained that coalition troops generated “anti-
bodies” within Iraqi society, determined to throw out the foreigners.441 Once foreign troops 
withdrew the insurgency would die out.  
Notably, the Administration resisted describing the armed resistance as an insurgency. Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who had been using the term, decided in November 2005 to reject 
“insurgency” as an accurate description of those fighting the coalition and Iraqi government. 
“I think that you can have a legitimate insurgency in a country that has popular support and has 
a cohesiveness and has a legitimate gripe,” he noted. “These people don’t have a legitimate 
gripe.” He preferred the label, “Enemies of the legitimate Iraqi government.”442 Imbedded in 
this odd terminology dispute is Rumsfeld’s belief that Sunni Arabs had no legitimate reasons 
for fighting.  
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The Administration was convinced that as political, military, and economic milestones were 
achieved the Iraqi people would realize they had a voice and a stake in their country’s affairs. 
Those efforts, Rumsfeld believed, would reduce the insurgency.443 This assumption was 
evidenced in General Casey’s view that the January 2005 election was a success, despite the 
Sunni Arab boycott. The inability of al Qaeda to block the vote, as he saw it, was an indicator 
that the insurgency had little popular support.444 The focus on progress made along the political, 
economic, and security benchmarks would continue to dominate the quarterly reports 
submitted by the Department of Defense through August 2006.445 The Bush administration 
interpreted the relevant data and concluded that the war was on track. In this view, the best 
course of action was to follow the Casey operational plan. 
Our theories, Albert Einstein reportedly observed, are what we measure.446 They also inform 
how officials make sense of the mountains of data bombarding them in a dynamic, 
interconnected world. This is part of the reason confirmation bias can be so powerful. The data 
points above – to include the massive increases in violence – were interpreted by smart and 
experienced people to confirm the policy and military campaign plans were the right ones. In 
hindsight, the data above could be interpreted that Sunni Arabs were fighting against the new 
Shi’a-dominated order as well as foreign forces. If this interpretation were true, the civil war 
would continue even if American forces departed. This, however, was not the view of the 
Administration. The Administration’s stubborn insistence that its strategy was working, 
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prompted Senator Chuck Hagel to conclude, “The White House is completely disconnected 
from reality.”447  
The American political left’s relentless calls for immediate disengagement – an approach 
which would have probably led to defeat – may have unwittingly reinforced the 
administration’s views. Bush resisted these calls, countering that withdrawal should be 
“conditions-based” along the standards outlined in the strategy.448 As will be discussed below, 
Rumsfeld and Casey dug in their heels until the very end against a proposed troop increase and 
change in strategy because they did not see the situation or their strategy as failing.  
 
Trapped by Partners in a Losing Strategy 
Confirmation bias was reinforced by patron-client problems that were trapping the United 
States in a losing approach. As discussed in Chapter 2, patron-client problems can be caused 
by interest misalignment, information asymmetries, and inadequate conditionality. They result 
in behaviors by the client (the Iraqi government) that are detrimental to the interests and 
objectives of the patron (the United States). As successive Iraqi governments grew more 
predatory and sectarian, misalignment of interests and objectives with the United States 
increased. American officials were slow to recognize the growing divergence due to significant 
information asymmetries that played into their pre-existing beliefs about political and military 
progress. Even when U.S. officials recognized problems, their unwillingness to apply 
conditionality resulted in Iraqi officials telling their American counterparts what the latter 
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wanted to hear instead of changing behavior. These factors reinforced the status quo that was 
carrying the American effort perilously close to defeat.449 
United States and Iraqi governments never developed a common strategy for the war.450 This 
resulted in significant interest misalignment. Subtle divergences and outright conflicts over 
objectives such as political inclusion, Iraqi security forces development, and U.S. military 
operations and troop dispositions were undermining the prospects of success. These problems, 
which often occurred along the seams of U.S. diplomatic and military silos, were masked by 
information asymmetries that Iraqi officials repeatedly used to their advantage. U.S. officials 
found themselves unable to hold Iraqi officials accountable for actions that were intensifying 
the conflict. Manipulation by Iraqi officials reinforced Bush administration perceptions that the 
Casey transition-and-withdraw plan was the right one.  
The problem of Sunni Arab marginalization was not unknown to U.S. officials. Sunni Arab 
acceptance of the new government was essential to achieve the stability conditions that would 
enable America to withdraw. Cables from Baghdad show U.S. officials encouraging political 
inclusion and Iraqi officials responding in agreement.451 As early as September 2005, the U.S. 
Embassy in Baghdad formulated an action plan to address “deep-seated anxieties among the 
Sunni Arab population.452 The Americans aimed to assist the Iraqi government in reaching out 
to Sunni Arab Rejectionists, who were considered reconcilable, and in defeating the Former 
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Regime Elements (Ba’athists), who were not.453 In 2006, the Bush administration listed 
“security and national reconciliation” the first of their so-called three track approach with the 
Maliki government.454  
Such backing must have seemed successful. Because the Sunni Arab boycott of the January 
2005 elections left them little representation in the Iraqi Transitional Government that was to 
write the constitution, Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja’afri expanded the constitutional committee 
to include their representation.455 Maliki developed a plan for reconciliation soon after taking 
office in 2006.456 The U.S. government does not appear to have devoted any resources or 
conditionality to addressing the “deep-seated anxieties” of the Sunni Arab community or 
measuring whether reconciliation efforts were having any effect. Political reconciliation, U.S. 
civilian and military leaders viewed, was a matter for the Iraqi government. When some 
commanders in Anbar experimented successfully with outreach to Sunni tribes in 2005, Casey 
applauded the efforts but denied requests for additional American forces to build on the early 
successes.457 When confronted with media reports about such efforts, Casey assured Iraqi 
officials that U.S. commanders were not “negotiating with insurgents.”458 A 1 October 2005 
U.S. “civ-mil action plan” focused solely on capacity-building.459 It did not address issues such 
                                                                 
453 National Security Council, “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq,” (2005), p. 6-7.  
454 U.S. Embassy Baghdad Cable, 5 June 2006. 
455 U.S. Embassy Baghdad Cable, 1 June 2005b. 
456 U.S. Embassy Baghdad Cables, 5 June 2006; 22 June 2006b and 25 June 2006. 
457 Gordon & Trainor (2012), 173. For other examples, see Gordon & Trainor (2012), 26, 35-37, 82-84, 96-97, 
131-133, 135-139, 141, 168-175, 216-219, 228-229, 239, 241-263. 
458 U.S. Embassy Baghdad Cables 11 July 2005b; 15 July 2005; 30 August 2005.  
459 U.S. Embassy Baghdad Cable, 1 October 2005. 
 119 
as sectarianism or corruption. U.S. officials would often encourage Iraqi officials to “do more,” 
but stopped short of assertive action or conditionality.460  
The Ja’afri and Maliki governments, however, maintained a dual-track policy of convincing 
the Americans of their politically inclusive bona fides while relentlessly pursuing the 
consolidation of Shi’a power. Iraqi security forces had been engaging in systematic human 
rights abuses, mainly targeted at Sunni Arabs. In contrast to American efforts to differentiate 
reconcilable from irreconcilable groups, both Ja’afri and Maliki and members of their 
administrations defined Sunni Arab insurgents as Ba’athists.461 This promoted repression. 
Within its first ninety days in Iraq in 2005, the U.S. Third Infantry Division reported 57 
allegations of detainee abuse by Iraqi officials.462  U.S. officials received many reports about 
these and other problems, conveyed their concerns to Iraqi officials, but took little to no action 
to address them (other than creating more capacity-building efforts).463  
For their part, Iraqi officials were adept at assuaging U.S. concerns. Ja’afri’s notoriously 
sectarian Minister of Interior Bayan Jabr repeatedly assured American officials that human 
rights reform was at the top of his reform agenda.464 He dismissed reports that one of his units, 
the so-called Wolf brigade, was engaged in human rights abuses, noting that they were his 
“most effective” special police forces.465 Iraqi investigations into reports of torture and abuse 
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of 168 detainees at the so-called Bunker facility (a Ministry of Interior prison) were slow-rolled 
and largely forgotten.466 Despite such extensive reports, U.S. officials visiting from 
Washington, D.C. would take efforts to support their Iraqi counterparts. One senior Pentagon 
delegation, after visiting police training sites, told Jabr that they had been “impressed by what 
they had seen.”467 Human rights does not appear to have been a subject of discussion. 
The American plan to stand-up Iraqi security forces, turn-over battlespace, and withdraw away 
from the cities nested perfectly with the Iraqi government’s sectarian strategy. Ja’afri told the 
Washington Post on June 24, 2005, “We strongly prefer an increase in quality of Iraqi forces, 
increase in number, increase in efficiency, increase in the effectiveness of tactics they use, as 
well as increase in equipment ... anything that will raise efficiency of Iraqi forces is something 
that will be very welcomed because it will allow other forces, especially American forces, to 
withdraw.”468 U.S. military officials poured money into police training. General Casey 
declared 2006 to be the “Year of the Police,” The American general officer in charge of Iraqi 
police development told the New York Times, “We're trying to develop the police capability to 
the point where by the end of 2006 we can begin the transfer to civil security.”469 With Sunni 
Arabs increasingly marginalized in the security ministries, the ISF provided the Iraqi 
government with powerful muscle for the struggle against their sectarian rivals.470 In the 
absence of conditionality, capacity-building efforts improved the ability of the ISF to engage 
in predation.  
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As reported extensively in Chapter 3, U.S. military operations unwittingly played into Sunni 
Arab fears. 471 For instance, Iraqi Islamic Party leader Dr. Muhsin Abdal Hamid was 
“incorrectly targeted” and detained on a 30 May 2005 operation. Placards in Sunni Arab parts 
of Baghdad denounced the operation as “terrorism American-style” and vowed to throw out 
the occupier. U.S. officials expressed their apologies after learning of the incident, and then 
congratulated themselves on their “damage control” efforts.472 Despite major U.S. military 
operations against Sadrist militia Jaish al-Mahdi, perceptions of bias persisted. Ja’afri’s 
Minister of Defense Dulaimi, a Sunni Arab, warned U.S. officials that Sunni Arabs believe that 
Iraqi and American forces are “blatantly anti-Sunni Arab.”473 Sectarian reprisals soared. In 
Baghdad alone, one eyewitness reported in early 2006, roughly fifty bodies were found daily. 
“The Sunnis usually beheaded their victims, while the Shiites drilled holes in their heads.” 474  
Sunni Arab participation in the December 2005 election did not reduce the violence. It got 
worse. Even before becoming prime minister, Maliki’s sectarianism was well-known.475 He 
was a compromise candidate put forward by U.S. Ambassador Khalilzad when neither Ja’afri 
nor Alawi could form a government.476 Maliki’s position was fragile. He faced an internal Shi’a 
threat from the Sadrists, who had opposed him in favor of Ja’afri. Any move to accommodate 
Sunni Arabs risked fracturing his governing coalition and ousting him from power.477 
Eliminating Ba’athists, however, was a unifying theme. A Dawa party official (Maliki’s party) 
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confided that “the Shia's deep-seated fear of the Baathists' return to power drives all Shia 
political decisions.”478 Maliki told U.S. officials that Ba’athists were the “primary threat” to 
Iraq’s security.479 The divergent views between U.S. and Iraqi officials of the Sunni Arab 
insurgency had consequences. An assessment of sectarian violence in Baghdad concluded that 
American operations unwittingly trapped Sunnis in their neighborhoods so Shi’a militias could 
go after and eliminate them. The Shi’a dominated National Police “were using us to cleanse 
areas of Sunni presence,” reported an American battalion commander serving in Baghdad, “and 
we essentially have no option because we’re supposed to partner with these guys.”480  
Although most reporting focused on the police, the Iraqi Army had sectarian challenges as 
well. Ja’afri’s Minister of Defense Saadoun al-Dulaimi complained of pressures to put more 
Shi’a officials into key positions within the Ministry.481 Frictions between the Ministries of 
Interior and Defense sometimes resulted in violence.482 Maliki’s Minister of Defense Abdul 
Qader Obeidi assured U.S. officials that the Iraqi Army was non-sectarian and loyal to the Iraqi 
state.483 Iraqi officers, however, reported Shi’a militia influence was growing in the ranks.484 
Maliki and his officials largely dismissed mounting evidence of sectarian atrocities given to 
them by American officials, with few consequences.485 Jawad al-Bolani, Maliki’s Interior 
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Minister, assured U.S. officials that promoting human rights was among his top priorities.486 
When more allegations of police abuse were brought to their attention, U.S. officials issued a 
demarche.487 In response to a congressional query regarding what actions they had taken 
regarding widespread human rights violations, U.S. officials emphasized “vetting 
arrangements” with the Ministry of Interior, human rights and rule of law training for Iraqi 
police, their efforts to “press Iraqi senior officials” on the matter, and demarches.488 A U.S. 
congressional delegation urged Bolani to “purge” sectarian elements from the police.489 It 
seems that at no time prior to 2007 did U.S. military officials, diplomats, or Congress 
meaningfully penalize Iraqi officials or the government for perpetrating such abuses. The 
American general in charge of the police training mission insisted that reports of corruption, 
infiltration by sectarian militias, and dysfunction within the Ministry of Interior were 
inaccurate and unfair.490 One cable, while criticizing him for lackluster reform efforts, gave 
Bolani “good marks” for positive changes in human rights.491  
Assurances from the Iraqi government that they would take the lead on Sunni Arab political 
inclusion and conflict resolution would be proven cynical by such rampant sectarianism..492 
These promises kept the Americans out of the reconciliation business until 2007. For Ja’afri 
and Maliki especially, Sunni Arab political inclusion threatened their consolidation of power 
and their ability to prevent a return of an authoritarian Sunni Arab regime that could once again 
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persecute Shi’a Iraqis.493 Even Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, a Kurdish leader, rejected the 
Iraq Study Group’s recommendation that the government reconcile with former Ba’athists.494 
SCIRI leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim flatly stated that Iraq already had a government of national 
unity, so there was no need for a reconciliation program. “We will never reconcile with the 
Saddamists. They were killing us for the last thirty-five years, and now we are paying them 
back.”495  
The flaccid response by U.S. officials towards the systematic sectarianism of the Ja’afri and 
Maliki governments is puzzling. These actions were alienating Sunni Arabs and creating 
support for insurgent groups that were killing American soldiers. Inducements – 
encouragement and better training – seemed to be the preferred approach. Sovereignty 
concerns probably provided some rationale– U.S. officials wanted to avoid the appearance of 
meddling in Iraqi political affairs (despite Khalilzad’s activist approach in promoting Maliki 
for prime minister). The consequences to American credibility of acquiescing in such 
sectarianism does not appear to have been evaluated. An implicit assumption about civil-
military relations was also at work. The notion of objective control of the military is so deeply 
ingrained in American political culture that U.S. military and civilian officials never questioned 
if the Iraqi government operated on the same principle.496 They did not. Maliki wanted 
subjective control because he feared a coup.497 Much of the Iraqi security forces were under 
the effective control of the U.S. military. Although American officials in Iraq would not 
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contemplate encouraging a coup, the United States had a history of supporting them during the 
Cold War.498 A much stronger fear for Maliki was the growing influence of Sadrist and 
Ba’athist militias within the Army and Police.499 “I am afraid to clash with militias and tribes,” 
Maliki confided in late October 2006 to Khalilzad, “because I am afraid the army or police 
might commit treason” [emphasis added].500  
The most effective way for Maliki to reduce his vulnerability to an American sponsored coup 
was to weaken the U.S. military’s grip on the ISF. Maliki repeatedly expressed concerns about 
the weaknesses of the ISF, need for better weapons and equipment, and his desire to accelerate 
the transition and withdrawal of American troops.501 Maliki told a visiting congressional 
delegation in October 2006 that significant numbers of American forces could be withdrawn 
within a year.502 He badgered Casey that coalition military operations were damaging his 
political reconciliation efforts.503 In early November Maliki told Bush’s National Security 
Advisor Stephen Hadley that he wanted greater control over Iraq’s security. Hadley replied 
that President Bush supported the objective.504 Maliki pressed the issue with Casey in early 
February 2007, demanding full control of Iraqi Special Operations Forces.505 To address the 
threat of internal coup, Maliki told Casey and Khalilzad that “reliability” should be a key 
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consideration for ISF senior leaders.506 He would purge key officials and retain those who 
advanced his political agenda.507 Maliki’s March 2008 “Charge of the Knights” operation in 
Basra and subsequent operations in Sadr City served as key tests of loyalty as the prime 
minister took on the Sadrist threat to his regime.508 
For Bush, Iraq was too important to fail, and Iraqi leaders used that leverage to their advantage 
to maintain the status quo – sustaining lucrative capacity-building efforts, easing international 
forces out of the cities and the country, while resisting suggestions about reconciliation or troop 
surges. Even though the Americans would insist on outreach to the Sunnis, the Bush 
Administration believed until late 2006 that preventing failure overall meant uncritically 
supporting Maliki despite his sectarianism and the risks this posed to success. For his part, 
Maliki had far greater incentive to keep the Shi’a coalition on-side and to consolidate his grip 
on power than to risk fracturing his base by addressing Sunni Arab inclusion – especially while 
he had Americans fighting them. Iraqi government incentives aligned with those of American 
leaders who advocated staying the course. The result was perpetuation of a status quo damaging 
to U.S. interests. 
 
A Possible Win Beats a Certain Loss  
Loss aversion further entrenched the campaign plan. As explained in Chapter 2, this cognitive 
bias seeks to preserve perceived gains and resist changes in strategy that could put such gains 
at risk – even if the cost of the current strategy is high and the prospects of success are low. 
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Conformation bias, progress along political and security milestones, and encouragement by 
Iraqi officials to maintain the transition-and-withdraw plan reinforced the virtues of the status 
quo against Democratic party calls to end the war.  Trapped between an approach that they 
believed might work and an alternative that assured a loss, the Bush administration dug in. 
Major strategic change came about once the Bush administration reframed its reference point 
from winning to losing and found a new approach that promised to reverse a failing situation. 
The removal of the Saddam Hussein regime and eventual replacement with an elected 
government was a clear gain for the Bush administration. Iraq’s success in meeting key 
benchmarks reinforced perceptions of progress. The risks of forfeiting these gains was 
described in stark terms by the Bush administration in their 2005 National Strategy for Victory 
in Iraq, which was made public. The war on terror was the “defining challenge of our 
generation,” like struggles against communism and fascism before. “The terrorists regard Iraq 
as the central front in their war against humanity,” the administration explained, “And we must 
recognize Iraq as the central front in our war on terror.” Failure in Iraq would create a new 
terrorist safe-haven from which al Qaeda could launch more September 11 – style attacks. 
“Ceding ground to terrorists in one of the world’s most strategic regions will threaten the 
world’s economy and America’s security, growth, and prosperity, for decades to come.” The 
current strategy “will help Iraqis overcome remaining challenges, but defeating the multi-
headed enemy in Iraq – and ensuring that it cannot threaten Iraq’s democratic gains once we 
leave – requires persistent effort across many fronts” [emphasis added]. 509  
Reports from the Department of Defense echoed the gains. Each quarterly report submitted to 
Congress by the Department of Defense from July 2005 (when the reporting requirement 
began) to August 2006 marshaled evidence of achievements along political, economic, and 
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security lines of effort to show the strategy was working. Despite alarming increases in 
violence, the growth of sectarian atrocities, and the Iraqi government’s clear efforts to 
marginalize Sunnis, not a single report during that period raised serious questions about risks 
to the strategy’s viability.510     
In a fall 2005 article in Foreign Affairs, Andrew Krepinevich argued for a revised strategy he 
called the “oil spot” approach – a bottom-up that focused on creating and expanding secure 
enclaves.511 These kinds of suggestions were opposed consistently by the military command 
and U.S. embassy and gained no traction with the Bush Administration.512 The only significant 
alternative to the Democratic party’s demands to end the war on a specified timeline was 
offered by Senator Joseph Biden, who called for a soft partition of Iraq into Shi’a, Sunni Arab, 
and Kurdish enclaves and a troop withdrawal by 2008.513 The White House was not yet 
prepared to take such radical steps.  
While projecting confidence, doubts reportedly crept into President Bush’s mind by mid-2006, 
but the lack of alternatives for success reinforced the need to stay the course.514 Bush wanted 
to protect gains in Iraq, which he believed would be forfeited under the Democrats’ “cut and 
run” concept and would be put at risk in Casey’s “conditions-based” transition-and-withdrawal 
plan. He did not seem to question the underlying logic of a strategy that was leading toward 
disaster.515 The nature of the problem eluded the Baker-Hamilton commission – the so-called 
Iraq Study Group – that was directed by the United States Congress in 2006 to review the 
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situation in Iraq and recommend a more productive way forward. The conclusions reached by 
the group largely confirmed the status quo – a gradual handover of security to the Iraqis and 
drawdown of American troops.516 During a June 2006 National Security Council discussion on 
Iraq at Camp David, Casey reportedly pressed the logic of his plan. “This strategy is shaped by 
a central tenet: Enduring, strategic success in Iraq will be achieved by Iraqis,” he argued. 
“Completion of political process [the recent formation of Maliki’s government] and recent 
operations [to include killing Zarqawi] have positioned us for a decisive action over the next 
year.”517  
Retired General Jack Keane, the former Vice Chief of the Army Staff, began to challenge that 
logic. Championing ideas proposed by defense intellectual Frederick Kagan, intelligence 
official Derek Harvey, and others, Keane argued that the American effort in Iraq was failing 
and would lose under the current strategy.518 He and others noted that the Sunni Arab 
insurgency was directed both at coalition forces and the Iraqi government. Turning over 
security responsibility to Iraqi forces and withdrawing would play into the hands of those on 
both sides of the Sunni-Shi’a divide who were bent on civil war. Immediate withdrawal, as 
Democrats proposed, would have the same effect. Keane argued that the war could still be won 
with a five-brigade troop surge using a classic counterinsurgency approach that emphasized 
working with and protecting the people on the ground in local communities. Outreach to and 
relationships with Sunni Arab leaders was critical. So was reducing the sectarian violence in 
mixed neighborhoods, particularly in Baghdad.519 This approach was not dissimilar to the one 
Krepinevich advocated in 2005, but Keane’s ability to show that the current approach would 
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guarantee a loss and a new approach could result in a win at acceptable cost was critical. When 
the questioned about whether surging five American Brigade Combat Teams risked breaking 
the Army, Keane reportedly replied that such risk existed, but “the stress and strain that would 
come from having to live with a humiliating defeat would be quite staggering.”520    
Having heard the assessments and recommendations from Casey, the Iraq Study Group, the 
Democrats, and Keane, National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley decided to make his own 
personal assessment of the situation. Arriving in Baghdad on October 29, 2006, Hadley became 
convinced that Keane was right. His memo to President Bush questioned whether the United 
States and Maliki shared the same vision and if the latter could rise above sectarianism. He 
noted that the actions of the government suggested a clear campaign to consolidate Shi’a power 
at the expense of the Sunni Arabs.521  
After the 2006 mid-term elections, which were a major set-back for the Bush administration, 
the National Security Council began to review their options in Iraq. Bush fired Rumsfeld – a 
clear signal that he wanted an overhaul to the strategy – and replaced him with former CIA 
Director Robert Gates.522 Secretary of State Condolezza Rice was reportedly skeptical that 
adding more troops would make any sustainable difference.523 General Casey pushed back on 
the surge idea vigorously, arguing that any tactical gains made by the surge could damage the 
progress made in Iraqi ownership of security and governance.524 In its December 2006 report 
to Congress, the Department of Defense finally accepted that the conditions were present for a 
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civil war and that more effective reconciliation efforts by the Iraqi government were needed to 
arrest this trend.525 The subtle change in sentiment neatly aligned with the Hadley memo. Still, 
the December 2006 report did not articulate at what point such risks required a change in 
strategy. Maliki was reticent, too, about a surge of American forces.526  
 
A New Plan on Shaky Foundations 
Bush announced the surge in a 10 January 2007 speech.527 To execute the new approach Bush 
changed his command team in Iraq, kicking Casey upstairs to be Army Chief of Staff and 
selecting General David Petraeus to replace him. Middle East expert Ambassador Ryan 
Crocker took over from Khalilzad as Chief of Mission in Baghdad. The mandate for change 
was clear. The new team wasted no time implementing the new strategy. Several close to the 
changes noted that the new approach “reversed virtually all of the previous concepts.”528 Bush 
began to hold weekly video teleconferences with that country-team and with Maliki. “Iraq 
consumed 80 percent of the NSC’s bandwidth in 2007 and 2008,” Bush’s former Deputy 
National Security Advisor Lute recalled, to the neglect of other issues.529 
The March 2007 DoD report to Congress, largely authored by Petraeus, was a radical departure 
from the earlier themes of optimism and progress.  
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The strategic goal of the United States for Iraq remains a unified, democratic, federal 
Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself, and that is an ally in the war 
on terror.… To regain the initiative, the GOI is working with the United States and its 
Coalition partners, embarking on a new approach to restore the confidence of the Iraqi 
people in their government; to build strong security institutions capable of securing 
domestic peace and defending Iraq from outside aggression; and to gain support for 
Iraq among its neighbors, the region, and the international community.  
The report noted that its assessment of the situation should be “read as a baseline from which 
to measure future progress, and indications of success must be heavily caveated given the 
dynamic situation in Iraq.”530 In other words, the claims from previous reports should be 
discarded.  
The new approach was tactically successful. Weekly attacks spiked in the summer 2007 as the 
surge brigades arrived and began operations. Sunni Arab leaders had been frustratingly trapped 
in an AQI-inspired civil war they could not win. With American forces now responding 
positively to outreach efforts, the surge and the so-called Anbar Awakening became mutually 
reinforcing.531 Sunni Arab leaders began turning to the American military for protection against 
AQI reprisals and from the Iraqi government and its supportive militias. Violence levels fell 
dramatically in late 2007 as the Awakening spread throughout Sunni Arab communities.532  
Maliki’s “Charge of the Knights,” a surprise Iraqi military offensive in Basra, ended an 
ulcerating Sadrist threat.533 To many senior officials in the U.S. government, this operation was 
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viewed as proof that Maliki was a “post-sectarian” leader.534 As discussed above, a better 
explanation is that Maliki needed to put an end to Sadr’s threat to his governing coalition and 
to test the loyalty of the Iraqi Security Forces. U.S. officials continued to underestimate these 
internal political challenges, reflected former senior White House and Defense officials.535 
Maliki’s political strategy focused on consolidating his power among the Shi’a parties as the 
Americans were busy co-opting Sunni Arab tribes. With his base secure, he could take on the 
perceived Ba’athist threat. Roughly fifteen months after the Surge began, violence levels had 
plummeted from a high of 1800 per week to roughly 400 per week. They would decline to 
under 200 per week in 2010. 
Some key problems remained unaddressed that would undermine efforts to successfully 
conclude the war in Iraq. First, was the continued lack of a coordinated strategy between the 
United States and Iraq.536 Lute argued that this masked divergent interests and objectives, 
which gave Maliki more space for his sectarian agenda.537 The Bush administration focused on 
milestones but underappreciated how these were being manipulated by Iraqi elites. This 
problem heightened, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, after Petraeus and Crocker left Iraq.  
Second, while more assertive efforts by Petraeus and Crocker curbed some of Maliki’s 
sectarian tendencies, they were unsuccessful in changing his political calculus and its effect on 
Iraqi institutions. An independent commission led by Marine Corps General James L. Jones 
sent to investigate the Iraqi Security Forces offered a scathing review of the Interior Ministry 
and found the Iraqi National Police to be so professionally compromised that they should be 
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disbanded and rebuilt.538 Despite an influx of resources and a new approach to ISF 
development, the Iraqi Security Forces achieved only temporary gains in readiness and 
performance.539 The subjective control problem was never addressed and sectarianism 
resumed. As the United States withdrew, recalls Lieutenant General (retired) James Dubik, 
“Maliki asserted his control over the security forces by assuming the positions of Minister of 
Defense and Interior, using the Office of the Commander in Chief to sell positions to those he 
considered to be politically reliable … and by directing their operations” to advance his 
sectarian agenda.540 The continued alienation of Sunni Arabs fostered the rise of the Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).541 General Petraeus lamented that by 2014 ISIS made “short 
work of the ISF which were led by individuals I’d insisted be fired back in 2007.”542 
Third, there was little thought about how to create a favorable and durable outcome. The surge, 
explained a key senior advisor, was designed to reverse a declining situation.543 The United 
States did not address war termination in any formal manner, nor assess the challenges and 
risks that needed to be addressed. Senior officials acknowledged the concerns about 
sectarianism and political inclusion, but had no political strategy to advance reconciliation.544 
In the difficult days of 2007, it is understandable that the U.S. senior leadership in Baghdad 
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was focused on the immense near-term challenges. No one in Washington, D.C. appeared to 
be looking over the horizon to set the conditions for durable success.545 
 
Conclusion 
Clausewitz argues that a balance of determination and ability to adapt to circumstances is 
essential to military genius.546 Cognitive bias, entrapment, and loss aversion reinforced the 
Bush Administration’s determination and impeded their ability to learn and adapt. This resulted 
in the stubborn persistence of a losing strategy. Although the Bush administration had 
developed metrics to assess progress, the most virulent, strategically damaging problems were 
intangible or difficult to measure. These included factors such as the political scrimmage for 
power, predatory sectarianism, and growing corruption. These normally occurred along the 
seams and fault lines of bureaucratic silos, so were never properly measured or considered in 
assessments of strategic risk. The absence of such considerations may have played a role in the 
willingness of the Bush administration to discount violence levels as strategically relevant. 
Bush took a bold decision for the surge, but American public support for the war had 
deteriorated substantially from 2003 to 2007. 72 percent of Americans surveyed by Pew in 
March 2003 believed that going to war in Iraq was the right decision. 22 percent were opposed. 
By February 2005, opinions for and against were tied at 47 percent. By February 2008, despite 
clear and publicly-recognized positive results from the surge, opposition to the war grew to 
fifty-four percent. Only thirty-eight percent remained supportive. Even though perceptions of 
how well the war was going improved from March 2007 to February 2008, a greater percentage 
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of Americans still wanted to bring troops home as soon as possible rather than keep them in 
Iraq until the situation stabilized.547  
War fatigue had clearly set in among the American public and had become a divisive issue. 
During the 2008 presidential election, huge majorities of Democratic Party voters and fifty-
three percent of Independents favored bringing troops home from Iraq, while large percentages 
of Republican voters wanted to keep them in. By contrast, sixty-one percent of American’s 
polled supported keeping troops in Afghanistan, to include majorities in both parties and among 
Independents.548 Tapping into such sentiments, Democratic Party nominee Barack Obama 
campaigned on a promise to wind down the war in Iraq within 16 months and re-focus 
American energy on the war in Afghanistan.549 Although the economy was by far the number 
one reason Americans voted how they did in 2008, the Iraq war was second.550 Obama won 
the Presidency and made good on his promise to end the war. The last convoy of American 
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Chapter 5: Ending the War in Iraq  
The United States rejected early bargaining opportunities with former Saddam-regime officials 
in 2003 and unwittingly encouraged sectarian violence.552 Until 2007 U.S. officials, often at 
the urging of Shi’a leaders, ignored or blocked opportunities to negotiate with Sunni leaders 
willing to turn on al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). As noted above, the U.S. surge emphasized the 
importance of reconciliation – the increased troop levels combined with Sunni Arab 
Awakening resulted in steep reductions in violence.553 U.S. officials, however, may have 
misread Sunni intentions believing that the latter were supporting the Iraqi government instead 
of allying with the Americans for survival against the two-fold threats of AQI and the Maliki 
government.554 The U.S. missed opportunities to foster and incentivize genuine political 
inclusion.555 The Iraqi government’s sectarianism and corruption undermined the transition 
method of war termination. 
The United States, by this time, tired of the war. Maliki backed the Obama timeline.556 
Negotiations under these circumstances would cede significant amounts of leverage to the 
Iraqis. The Obama Administration’s determination to withdraw may have led Maliki to more 
aggressively consolidate Shi’a political dominance – the small American presence envisioned 
by Obama would be a political liability without the benefit of protecting against a Sunni 
resurgence.557 Maliki’s renewed efforts to marginalize Sunnis led to the growth of  the Islamic 
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State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).558 The group emerged from the remnants of AQI and newly 
disaffected Sunni tribes.559 ISIS took over the city of Mosul and much of northern and western 
Iraq in summer 2014 as American trained Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) fled, leaving large 
quantities of U.S. military equipment, including tanks.560 In 2015, President Obama ordered 
American advisors back into Iraq.561  
 
The Surge Misunderstood: Why did the United States fail to achieve desired outcomes?  
Most recent scholarship views the surge as a military success but political failure.562 The 
reasons for the military success range from US-centric563 (new troops, new doctrine, new 
strategy) to Awakening-centric564 to synergy between the surge and Sons of Iraq.565 This debate 
matters, Stephen Biddle argues, because if policy-makers adopt a US-centric view of the 
significant reduction in Iraq violence, they are likely to apply the same methodology elsewhere. 
If, however, key political conditions on the ground interacted synergistically with the surge, as 
Biddle suggests, then a US-centric template will be necessary but not sufficient in other 
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conflicts.566 These arguments will prove crucial, as we will see in Chapter 7, when a surge for 
Afghanistan was debated in 2009 and 2010. 
The substantial reduction in violence, however, was not accompanied by greater political 
inclusion. Outlining the goals of the new Iraq strategy, President Bush argued, “A successful 
strategy for Iraq goes beyond military operations. Ordinary Iraqi citizens must see that military 
operations are accompanied by visible improvements in their neighborhoods and 
communities.” A successful Iraq, he continued, would be “a functioning democracy that 
polices its territory, upholds the rule of law, respects fundamental human liberties, and answers 
to its people.”567 General David H. Petraeus saw reconciliation as critical for success, “Beyond 
securing the people by living with them, foremost among the elements of the new strategy was 
promoting reconciliation between disaffected Sunni Arabs and our forces — and then with the 
Shiite-dominated Iraqi government.”568 Understanding why political reconciliation failed is 
crucial in assessing war termination in Iraq.  
The main explanations for the failure of political reconciliation and achieving a durable 
outcome center mainly on Maliki’s sectarianism and Obama’s inability to secure an agreement 
to extend U.S. troop presence beyond the end of 2011.569 These were key factors, but the 
criticisms merit further examination. The first criticism largely exonerates the U.S. government 
from any substantive role in promoting durable political inclusion. Why leave such a critical 
element of the war completely in the hands of the Iraqi government? The second argument 
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assumes that a lengthier military presence would have eventually led to political reform and 
reconciliation. Did either administration have a political strategy to advance reconciliation that 
could address the chronic patron-client problems outlined in the previous chapter?  
Despite the reduction in violence, the U.S. was unsuccessful in fostering a durable political 
outcome in Iraq for three inter-locking reasons. First, the U.S. desire to withdraw to zero or to 
what was perceived by Iraqi leaders as an ineffectual presence reduced American bargaining 
leverage. Unless the United States could provide sufficiently compelling incentives for reform 
and reconciliation, Iraqi leaders would be unwilling to make painful sacrifices only to see the 
Americans depart. Second, the success of the surge in reducing violence led U.S. officials to 
under appreciate the risk of new sectarian violence and to over-estimate Maliki’s inclusiveness, 
resulting in a major shift in priorities under the Obama Administration. Third, U.S. leverage 
was further dissipated by civil-military tensions and strategic incoherence in theater, making 
the coordinated and nuanced application of leverage nearly impossible. As problems were 
kicked upstairs to Washington DC, the National Security Council was often required to deal 
with highly complicated problems which its officials had little bandwidth to navigate 
successfully. The result was often ham-fisted efforts that had unintended consequences.           
 
The Absence of a Political Strategy Erodes U.S. Leverage 
Iraq differs from Afghanistan (and Vietnam) in the absence of negotiations with the insurgency 
or its third-party sponsor. While reconciliation efforts during the Sunni Awakening entailed 
negotiation, those were primarily tactical in nature aimed at facilitating revolt against AQI in 
exchange for a cease-fire with U.S. forces and protection from pro-government predation.570 
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The U.S. assumed implicitly that the Iraqis would win a political victory over AQI and the 
Sunni and Sadrist insurgencies, particularly as violence levels reduced so substantially in the 
fall of 2007.571 The surge and Awakening, however, largely failed to lead to national 
reconciliation and broader political inclusion.572 While the Iraqis would need to make 
sustainable arrangements for political inclusion, the United States was not powerless to 
advance the prospects. The warning signs that were present that Prime Minister Maliki 
remained oriented on his sectarian agenda, but the U.S. took an increasingly passive stance. In 
fact, the U.S. had three significant opportunities to apply leverage for political reform and 
reconciliation: the 2008 Strategic Framework (SFA) and Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 
negotiations, the 2010 parliamentary elections, and the 2011 SOFA negotiations. It failed to do 
so each time. 
The surge in Iraq was intended as a time-limited force uplift.573 President Bush made a bold 
decision to “double-down” on success in Iraq, but had only a year left in office. Both 
competitors for the Democrat party nomination, Senators Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama 
campaigned to end the war in Iraq (the so-called “war of choice”) and reinvest in Afghanistan 
(the so-called “war of necessity”).574 General David H. Petraeus, taking command of 
Multinational Forces – Iraq in February 2007, had about seven months to make demonstrable 
progress before his Congressional testimony in September of that year. If successful, he and 
Secretary of Defense Bob Gates believed that they could probably fend off demands for a more 
rapid withdrawal timeline.575 Meanwhile, the United Nations Security Council Resolution that 
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provided the international legal basis for American military presence in Iraq was due to expire 
at the end of 2008 and not likely to be renewed.576 Without a new framework in place, the U.S. 
mission would be even more tenuous. The Bush Administration wanted to keep American 
troops in Iraq, while Iraqi leaders sought an agreement that had greater respect for their 
sovereignty. The agreed way forward was to negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 
to govern U.S. military presence, and a Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) to outline the 
bi-lateral diplomatic, economic, and cultural relationship. The negotiations began in March 
2008. 
Maliki sought to increase his leverage as the withdrawal timelines became a political football 
during the 2008 U.S. Presidential election campaign. By the time presumptive Democrat 
nominee Barack Obama visited Petraeus in Iraq in July 2008, U.S. forces had been steadily 
drawing down for the past eight months.577 Obama campaigned for a 16 month timeline to 
withdraw troops from Iraq, which Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki endorsed during an interview 
with Der Spiegel earlier in the month.578 That Maliki’s remarks occurred during the SFA and 
SOFA negotiations was probably no accident.579 Despite the steep reductions in violence, 
American military presence remained deeply unpopular in Iraq.580 With AQI decimated and 
the Sadrist militia defeated during Charge of the Knights, Maliki’s worries shifted to fears of a 
Ba’athist coup.581 He was looking toward the 2010 parliamentary elections to solidify his grip 
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on power.582 The Americans were a good hedge against a feared Ba’athist resurgence until the 
Iraqi Security Forces could take on the task of internal security. Petraeus forecasted this would 
could occur by the end of 2011.583 Internationally, Maliki indicated to U.S. officials that he 
suspected the Gulf Arab states were fomenting instability in Iraq. Iran, he believed, had been 
largely helpful.584 Iran also had leverage over the Sadrists, which could be useful in the 
elections.585 Securing a withdrawal timeline from the Americans would bolster Maliki’s 
chances of re-election, improve his status with Iran, and give him greater leverage over the 
Sunni Arabs and Kurds.586 Stipulating the need for Parliamentary approval of the SOFA would 
also likely win him support, improve his bargaining position regarding the withdrawal timeline, 
and distribute the risk as widely as possible.587 Once Maliki had heard from Defense Secretary 
Gates that the U.S. had no “Plan B” to keep troops in Iraq without a SOFA, he could stand firm 
and resist unwelcome provisions.588 He had everything to gain by securing the timeline and 
nothing to lose, as long as he left an opening in case things turned sour before the Americans 
departed.   
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The Bush Administration, meanwhile, wanted a withdrawal framework based on the security 
conditions as the U.S. interpreted them, specifically the levels of violence and the capabilities 
of the Iraqi security forces.589 President Bush had faced down the Democrats on that issue, 
having vetoed a 2007 war-spending bill that included a withdrawal timeline.590 Agreeing to 
one now would be a loss of face, but Bush was by nature less wary of audience costs and was 
moving toward the last year of his Presidency. Giving way on the timeline to keep troops in 
Iraq until the end of 2011, when Petraeus forecasted the ISF would be ready to handle security, 
was deemed an acceptable outcome.591 Notably, the conditions did not include political reform 
and reconciliation – which Bush had established as a key goal of the surge.592  
The U.S. side began the effort in disarray with Departmental disagreements.593 Without an 
interagency strategic headquarters on the ground, the disagreements and the negotiations had 
to be managed by the NSC. Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley initially allowed 
Defense to negotiate the SOFA separately, not wanting to create interagency friction. over the 
matter, but U.S. leverage was likely to be much higher if the SOFA and broader Strategic 
Framework Agreement (that the Iraqis keenly wanted) were tied together. The Iraqi 
government valued U.S. economic and diplomatic support more than troop presence. 
Separating the two allowed the Iraqis to stick to their guns on the timeline without suffering 
economic or diplomatic penalties – or having to make painful political concessions. After three 
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months of stalled negotiations by the Defense team, the SOFA negotiations were handed over 
to State.594 The Iraqis maintained their position that a timeline must be included. 
As the negotiations dragged on, Maliki insisted U.S. forces be out of Iraq’s cities by early 2009 
and completely out of Iraq by the end of 2010.595 This aligned with democratic presidential 
candidate Barack Obama’s timeline. Administration officials interviewed by Gordon and 
Trainor claim that Crocker asked for guidance on 29 July from Bush. The latter wanted to avoid 
concrete deadlines. The President reportedly replied that he could only accept the end of 2011 
as a withdrawal timeline and preferred an “as soon as possible” (as defined by the U.S.) 
construct regarding withdrawal from Iraqi cities. In a video teleconference (VTC) with Maliki 
the next day, Bush reportedly offered mid-2009 to be out of the cities and the end of 2011 as a 
“goal” for removing U.S. troops. Maliki agreed, but cautioned that his government could still 
reject the 2011 date.596 For Maliki, getting Americans forces out of the cities showed progress 
on sovereignty, and increased his freedom of action to deal with perceived internal security 
threats. A former senior White House official close to the negotiations recalled that Maliki 
even wanted to rename the annex on troop withdrawal to “Retreat of Coalition forces from 
Iraq.”597 
Wanting to conclude the agreement as soon as possible, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice 
went to Baghdad to try to nail down the remaining issues in a one-on-one discussion with 
Maliki. She believed they had come to a final agreement that included a residual force of 40,000 
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U.S. troops to assist Iraqi forces with training and logistics after 2011.598 If so, this would have 
been a major concession from Maliki who had been consistent about wanting all U.S. forces 
out of the country. It was also a concession he was unable to promise unilaterally and one that 
would likely be rejected by the Iraqi Parliament.  
When Bush met with Iraqi President Talabani on September 10 in the Oval Office, the latter 
was adamant that without a SOFA, U.S. forces must leave. Bush agreed to the end of June 2009 
to be out of Iraqi cities and December 31, 2011, for withdrawing all American forces from 
Iraq.599 The U.S. caved on the deadline. Bush recognized that three years was the best he was 
going to get, confided a senior White House official close to the negotiations.600 The Iraqi 
Parliament approved the SOFA on November 27, 149 in favor, 35 opposed, 14 abstentions, 
and 77 not present.601 
As important as political reconciliation supposedly was to American interests, it did not figure 
into any of the SOFA discussions.602 The U.S. made no effort to trade timelines for progress 
on reconciliation and political reform.603 The absence of a political strategy and a coordinated 
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U.S. – Iraq strategy undermined the ability of the Bush administration to set the condition for 
durable success and to hold Maliki accountable for reforms. Maliki, meanwhile, was taking 
steps to consolidate power, using ISF as a “political targeting force.”604  
The U.S. leadership changed in 2009. Barack Obama was elected President of the United 
States, and General Ray Odeirno replaced Petraeus as the U.S. commander in Iraq. To bring 
the new Administration up to speed, Odierno and Crocker prepared an assessment of the 
situation in Iraq. Notably, according to interviews of participants by Gordon and Trainor, the 
U.S. team in Baghdad cautioned against conditioning troop withdrawal (which had already 
been agreed in the SOFA) to political progress, “While our military presence is key for the 
large issue of guaranteeing an environment for progress in the political process, it does not 
predetermine the outcome of that process.”605 U.S. forces had been successful in diffusing a 
number of potential ethnic and sectarian flashpoints; losing that capacity entailed strategic risk. 
However, the U.S. had no strategy for advancing political reconciliation beyond crisis 
management, meetings, and encouraging pieces of legislation.606  
Perhaps most significantly to diplomatic continuity, Ambassador Ryan Crocker departed. In 
one of his final cables, Crocker highlighted Maliki’s use of Iraqi special operations forces as 
tools of repression. “Maliki has shown that he is either unwilling or unable to take the lead in 
the give-and-take needed to build broad consensus for the Government’s policies among 
competing power blocks.” A key question, Crocker posed, was whether Maliki was becoming 
“a nondemocratic dictator” or was “attempting to rebalance political and security authority 
back to the center…” Hedging his answer, Crocker believed “the answer lies closer to the latter 
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than to the former.” He recommended that the United States “press the PM [Prime Minister 
Maliki] on institution and political consensus building as key to sustaining and advancing our 
relationship and support.”607 Crocker, one of the most talented and accomplished Ambassadors 
in modern American history, had just highlighted the absence of a strategy to advance political 
reform and reconciliation. To an Administration official reading the cable, the message is to 
stay the course and to keep encouraging Maliki to be more inclusive.  
No doubt this was the message conveyed by Crocker to his successor. Ambassador Chris Hill 
had a distinguished career and most recently had been the U.S. negotiator with North Korea 
over their nuclear weapons program. Hill was reportedly determined to be the “un-Crocker.”608 
He brought in his own team, all with strong diplomatic records but little to no experience in 
the region. Hill was also determined to redefine the civ-mil relationship. Petraeus and Crocker 
were seen to be “joined at the hip” – a relationship experts and former officials from both the 
Bush and Obama administrations believed was instrumental in preventing Maliki’s worst 
tendencies.609 Hill reportedly wanted the Embassy to stop acting as an “adjunct to the military” 
and show that the diplomats were really in charge.610 Whereas Crocker was skeptical of 
Maliki’s intentions and would pester him about reform, Hill enthused to Vice President Biden 
of the PM’s intention to build a broad-based cross-sectarian alliance.611 Such efforts were 
blocked, he assessed, by Sunni and Kurdish rivals who refused to get on board with Maliki’s 
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inclusive agenda.612 Hill assessed in January 2010 that the Arab-Kurdish divide, not the 
sectarian conflict, was the “greatest remaining challenge for the U.S. effort in Iraq.”613  
 
New Administration; Similar Challenges 
The Obama Administration embarked quickly on a strategy review for Iraq, determined to 
forge a new way forward to wind down the war and refocus attention on Afghanistan.614 When 
the review was completed and a new policy approved, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton issued 
new guidance to Embassy-Baghdad in 8 April 2009 a cable entitled, “U.S. Policy on Political 
Engagement in Iraq.”615 It outlined six “critical” objectives: successful national elections; avoid 
violent Kurd-Arab confrontation; develop non-sectarian, politically neutral, and more capable 
security forces; avoid Sunni-GOI (Government of Iraq) breakdown; prevent government 
paralysis; and maintain macro-economic stability. After noting some less critical objectives, 
the cable articulated a “new way forward based on a “grand process(es)” policy that “focuses 
on setting in motion and energizing productive processes, but not necessarily resolution, on the 
full range of critical and significant challenges.” The United States, it directed, “Will offer to 
play the role of honest broker and/or third-party guarantor of the Iraqi and U.N. reconciliation 
processes.” This engagement would address five issues, focused primarily on the Kurdish-Arab 
frictions. It would support U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) efforts to address 
disputed internal boundaries; an election law specific to Kirkuk; and passage of a hydrocarbon 
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law; and would sustain a MNF-I coordinating committee with ISF and Peshmerga leaders. The 
fifth issue was Sunni Arab accommodation.  
Due in part to the Administration’s shift in strategic priority to Afghanistan, the cable offered 
no resources or new authorities. “To carry out this policy, the Embassy and MNF-I are 
encouraged to reconfigure resources to support the five major processes (listed below) and to 
formalize an Embassy/MNF-I/UNAMI Working Group (including other parties as necessary) 
to coordinate these efforts.” Embassy-Iraq was directed to advance U.S. objectives through 
meetings, working groups, and support to UNAMI. With no authority over the military 
mission, the Embassy could not direct MNF-I efforts or resources; the latter was free to 
implement U.S. policy guidance as it saw fit. The cable did not direct Embassy-Baghdad to 
devise an implementation strategy or outline ways to use existing U.S. leverage to advance its 
objectives. The guidance cable stated its desire not to limit or constrain the mission. “Indeed, 
creative and responsible initiatives from the field that effectively advance the stated policy are 
encouraged when appropriately proposed and approved (emphasis added).” In other words, the 
Embassy was permitted no latitude without express approval from Washington D.C. 
Ambassador Hill found that the easiest way to advance Iraqi agreement on the non-military 
aspects of the policy was to pressure the Kurds and Sunni Arabs to accommodate Maliki’s 
demands, rather than the reverse.616  
The most likely explanation for the major emphasis on the Arab-Kurd frictions was its recent 
intensity coupled with a belief that enough reconciliation of Sunni Arabs to the Shi’a-
dominated government was occurring to substantially lower the relative risk of a resurgent 
Sunni Arab insurgency.617 The cable mentions areas of potential backsliding on the part of the 
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Iraqi government on reconciliation, but orients on managing Sunni reactions: “Sunni political 
leadership is deeply fractured, rendering them more likely to advocate unhelpful, extreme 
stances, particularly during an election year. If mistrust grows it could push Sunni Arabs out 
of the Iraqi national government and push more hardline Sunni Arabs towards a resumption of 
violence.” There was no mention in the cable of exploring ways that the U.S. might capitalize 
on the elections or apply other leverage on the Iraqi government to advance reconciliation.618 
There was also no suggestion of any future SOFA negotiations. The major change in emphasis 
that resulted from an Obama Administration strategy review presumably benefitted from 
substantial inputs and concurrence by both the Departments of State and Defense as well as the 
Intelligence Community on the status of reconciliation and the highest risks to success. The 
guidance sent by the Secretary of State to the U.S. Embassy reflected the Administration’s 
policy decision – the same decision upon which the Secretary of Defense would issue guidance 
to U.S. Central Command and MNF-I. 
Despite Hill’s upbeat view of Maliki and the Administration’s decreased attention to Sunni 
Arab reconciliation, the Iraqi Prime Minister continued efforts to weaken Sunni leadership.619 
With al Qaeda in Iraq decimated, violence declining, and U.S. forces leaving the cities, Maliki 
had a freer hand to reduce the power of the 100,000-member Sons of Iraq (SoI).620 He began 
to slowly dismantle the Sunni volunteers, after some initial efforts at U.S. insistence to support 
them. In the fall of 2008, following pressure from Odierno, Maliki agreed to continue paying 
the salaries of 60,000 members and incorporate 40,000 into the ISF. The first tranche of 
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volunteers went onto the government payrolls in October without incident.621 When a budget 
dispute erupted, Maliki took money from the Ministry of Interior budget to pay the SoI groups. 
In March 2009, however, he started arresting Awakening leaders.622 One such leader predicted 
to a U.S. official that the government would, “arrest all of us, one by one.”623 Then the Iraqi 
government stopped or substantially delayed paying member salaries. An Awakening member 
who wanted a job in the ISF had to navigate volumes of red tape, only to be offered menial 
janitorial or servant positions. Sunnis in the mixed-sectarian Diyala province, east of Baghdad, 
were targeted disproportionately in for alleged terrorist activities.624  
Meanwhile, al Qaeda in Iraq was morphing into an underground organization, later to become 
the so-called Islamic State. “A few embers of Zarqawi’s Islamic state remained, kept alive by 
flickering Sunni rage,” writes David Ignatius, “The flame was nurtured at U.S.-organized Iraqi 
prisons such as Camp Bucca, where religious Sunni detainees mingled with former members 
of Saddam’s Baath Party, and the nucleus of a reborn movement took shape.”625 They were 
also taking aim at Awakening leaders. Former army officer and battalion commander in Iraq 
Craig Whiteside, now a professor at the Naval Post Graduate School, counts 1345 Awakening 
members killed by Islamic State between 2009 and 2013.626 “Was anyone watching in 
Washington? Evidently not,” Ignatius argues. “Officials in Baghdad, meanwhile, didn’t seem 
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to care; Maliki’s government was probably as happy to see the killing of potentially powerful 
Sunnis as was ISIS.”627 
In Baghdad, Hill orchestrated Maliki’s visit to Washington in July 2009. If political reform was 
important to the Ambassador and the Obama Administration, it should have featured 
prominently in the churn of cables and talking points that go into scripting head of state 
visits.628 Maliki wanted to use the visit to launch the Strategic Framework Agreement.629 Hill 
suggested in his cable to Washington that the Administration advance the economic discussion, 
help facilitate a resolution to decades-long frictions with neighboring Kuwait, and encourage 
Maliki to visit Arlington National Cemetery to honor American sacrifices in Iraq. The cable is 
silent on reform and reconciliation, painting Maliki as a post-sectarian leader.630 In the event, 
Maliki pressed the Iranian threat. If the United States could not get Sunni Arab states to stop 
fomenting unrest among Iraq’s Sunnis, he reportedly cautioned, then Iran was likely to 
intervene more aggressively in Iraqi politics. He also protested that representatives of the 
coalition military met with exiled Baathists in Turkey.631 If conditionality for political reform 
was on the Obama agenda, it apparently never surfaced.  
The next major opportunity for the U.S. to shape political progress arose during the 2010 
Parliamentary elections. In the lead-up to the elections, Maliki aimed to outmaneuver his 
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potential opponents.632 By securing a withdrawal timeline, he showed his ability to advance 
Iraqi sovereignty and demonstrate political independence from the Americans.633 He worked 
to marginalize Sadrists and other rival Shi’a parties while using his security forces to keep 
Sunnis off balance and in political disarray.634 He also aimed to undermine their campaigns. 
Shi’a candidates deployed sometimes graphic anti-Ba’athist themes in efforts to increase Shi’a 
turn out.635 Vice President Hashimi, a Sunni, meanwhile, threatened to veto the election law in 
hopes of gaining Sunni Arab seats from the Kurds. U.S. President Obama intervened 
successfully to pressure Kurdish President Barzani to accept the law.636 Despite the fractious 
political maneuvering, all seemed on track as the US Embassy expressed confidence in the 
Iraqi High Election Commission (IHEC).637 That confidence shattered in January 2010 when 
the Accountability and Justice Commission (formerly the de-Ba’athification commission) 
barred roughly 500 candidates for Parliament, mostly Sunni, over alleged Ba’athist ties.638 Hill 
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noted the subdued reaction of some Sunni communities to the ruling, and even suggested it 
may be the “first tangible example of cross-sectarian cooperation.”639 Odierno reportedly took 
a dimmer view and raised a red flag to Washington. Hill was instructed by the Obama 
Administration to address the issue with Maliki.640 The PM was intransigent.641 Obama next 
sent his point-man on Iraq, Vice President Joe Biden, to Baghdad. According to an Embassy 
reporting cable cleared by Biden’s office, the Vice President noted his two main concerns to 
UN Special Representative for Iraq Ad Melkert: “that the government had a serious 
responsibility to continue service delivery during the [post-election] transition, and that it was 
critical not to waste time during the period of government formation.”642 Advancing political 
reconciliation was absent from the list, and, according to a reporting cable, Biden did not raise 
the issue with Maliki. The Prime Minister assured Biden that he was not paranoid about 
Ba’athists, but viewed them as a “malignant virus.” Biden praised Maliki for democratic 
progress and political consensus, assuring U.S. support while Iraq handled the de-Baathifcation 
issue according to its own laws.643 While the Americans were able to get many barred 
candidates reinstated, the bans had a disruptive effect. Maliki believed his State of Law list 
would win handily.644  
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The U.S. country team was not so sure. Opinion polls suggested a tight race with Ayad Allawi’s 
Iraqiya party—a cross-sectarian Shi’a-Sunni coalition.645 Maliki, however, had tools in place 
to shape the outcome. He had stacked the intelligence and security services with loyalists.646 
The Accountability and Justice Commission could disqualify winning candidates. He 
controlled the judiciary and had the executive powers to declare a state of emergency. The U.S. 
country team consulted with the White House, where, according to Gordon and Trainor’s 
interviews with participants, Odierno pushed for guidance if this scenario came about. “We 
need a Maliki strategy,” Hill reportedly said, “he is the only one with the tools to screw up 
democracy.”647 This was a stunning admission by the U.S. Ambassador. If anyone should have 
developed and briefed a “Maliki strategy” it should have been Hill. Instead, he pushed the 
matter to Washington officials who were in no position to create it from scratch. 
Unsurprisingly, the Administration punted.648 They were in the final stages of a contentious 
strategy review for Afghanistan, a higher priority for them than Iraq.  
The elections provided yet another golden opportunity to exercise leverage. If the results were 
to be as close as the polls suggested, a disputed outcome would be likely. According to the 
Iraq’s election law, the party that wins the largest bloc of seats gets the first opportunity to form 
a government.649 Careful American support, one way or another, could tip the balance. Allawi’s 
cross-sectarian coalition was more likely to promote political inclusion, but would need U.S. 
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support in preventing Maliki from using extra-legal or even violent means to stay in power. 
Hill reportedly believed that Maliki would emerge from the election as PM, whether legally or 
not.650 If that was the Administration’s policy, then American acquiescence should have come 
at a price. Either way, the U.S. had a chance to advance this essential pillar of success.  
The results on March 7 were as Odierno guessed. Allawi’s secular Iraqiya list won 91 seats to 
Maliki’s State of Law coalition’s 89, and narrowly won the popular vote.651 Iraqi National 
Alliance (INA), the competing Sadrist Shi’a bloc took seventy seats. INA and State of Law 
had split because the former did not intend to endorse Maliki for another term. The Kurdish 
bloc won fifty-seven seats. Maliki was incensed and moved forward aggressively to challenge 
the results.652 Convinced he was cheated and that the UN, which declared the election fair, was 
complicit, Maliki reportedly sent a letter to the Americans demanding a recount in Baghdad 
and potentially in Mosul and Kirkuk.653 He also aimed to use de-Baathification. The 
Accountability and Justice commission would conduct another review of candidates for alleged 
Baathist ties. Maliki pursued a legal track as well, asking for a ruling on the “largest bloc” 
language in Article 76 of the constitution. The pro-Maliki judiciary said largest bloc could 
mean the party that won the most seats or a bloc assembled in parliament after the election.654 
These efforts gave Maliki the time and the opportunity he needed. If Maliki could gain INA 
support, he could claim the largest bloc.  
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Odierno, Gordon and Trainor report, argued for the United States to get involved. He supported 
the Iraqiya case. Hill appeared to be less concerned about a Maliki victory, and believed that 
the Saudis bankrolled Iraqiya and other Sunni parties.655 With no in-country political strategy 
in place and the Ambassador and Commander in disagreement, the issue would need to be 
managed in Washington. While Washington considered the contrasting views from the field 
and deliberated whether and to what extent to get involved, Hill urged Iraq’s politicians to start 
forming a government.656  
Iran moved more quickly. They invited Iraq’s Shi’a politicians to Tehran for Nowruz 
celebrations and urged them to come together. Although that was not yet agreed, the Shi’a 
parties on March 22 did support Talabani, who was also in attendance, to remain President.657 
By early May Iran had convinced State of Law and INA to merge into a single coalition: the 
National Alliance with Maliki as the head. Together, they tallied 159 seats, just 4 shy of the 
163 needed to form a government. Iraqiya sought international support for its right to try to 
form a government, but nothing of substance was forthcoming.658 Meanwhile, on April 26 a 
special judicial panel upheld a decision by the Accountability and Justice Commission to 
disqualify fifty-two candidates, one of whom was Iraqiya. Even if Allawi was given the 
opportunity to form a government, he was highly unlikely to amass the needed majority. With 
the Shi’a mega-coalition formed and the election outcome safely in Maliki’s hands, an Iraqi 
appeals court overturned the earlier de-Baathification disqualifications. This removed a key 
obstacle to certifying the election results.659 The Obama Administration rationalized that 
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Allawi would have been unlikely to win enough support to form a government anyway, but 
Iraqiya never got the opportunity to try. Sunnis saw American acquiescence as a betrayal of 
the democratic process.660 Maliki still needed the support of the Kurds to secure the 163-seat 
majority, and Barzai pushed hard to extract the best price for his support.661  
To complicate matters for the Americans, the country team leadership changed with Odierno 
being replaced by General Lloyd Austin and James Jeffrey (who served previously in Iraq) 
taking Hill’s place as Ambassador.662 The Obama Administration instead tried to bandage the 
election dispute by supporting a power-sharing arrangement among the rivals. This decision 
was reportedly made over the objections of James Steinberg, the Deputy Secretary of State, 
who believed it was more likely to produce gridlock and antagonism.663 The Administration 
persisted in the approach through the summer and into the fall of 2010. Maliki would remain 
as PM, but Allawi would get a newly created post called Office of Strategic Policies. Allawi 
saw the powerlessness in the manufactured position and rejected it. The Americans then sought 
to promote Allawi as the President, which would mean Talibani would need to step down. This 
would be a political blow to the Kurds and to Talibani himself, but also a problem for his rival 
Barzani who did not want him back in Kurdistan.664 Various U.S. officials attempted to 
persuade Talibani to give up the Presidency. He refused. On November 4, the Administration 
took the extraordinary step of arranging a phone call between Obama and Talibani. The former 
pressed his fellow sitting President to step down. Talibani refused. The Kurdish leaders felt 
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taken for granted.665 By November 10, with Iran brokering an agreement between Maliki and 
the Kurds, Allawi likely recognized that the Council for Strategic Policies was the best he 
would get. He reluctantly accepted, but the arrangement collapsed immediately. The Council 
was never formed. Allawi never joined the government. Most of Maliki’s promises to the Kurds 
never materialized.666  
Gates argues that the absence of sectarian violence between rival parties was a “mark of 
significant progress.”667 Such an indicator is misleading. Both leading candidates were Shi’a, 
so sectarian violence between them was unlikely. Maliki could manipulate the law to tilt the 
scales in his favor. Alawi would need American support if he hoped to form a government. 
Political violence by his party would have undermined any hopes of securing U.S. backing. By 
focusing on putting the election crisis in the rear-view mirror, the Administration got nothing 
for the effort in advancing reform and reconciliation.668 In fact, their efforts resulted in greater 
Sunni Arab and Kurdish resentment. Over the next 18 months, Maliki moved aggressively to 
crush Sunni leadership.669 
A final opportunity for the United States to exercise its waning influence for reform and 
reconciliation came in 2011 as the Administration attempted to renew the 2008 Status of Forces 
Agreement.670 This would be an uphill climb. The U.S. had agreed in 2008 for all troops to 
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leave the country by December 31, 2011 – an outcome both Maliki and most Iraqis wanted. 
They were not alone. With the Americans out of the country and the governing coalition 
overwhelmingly Shi’a, arguably the biggest winner was Iran. The Obama Administration’s 
enthusiasm for maintaining troops in the country was low. He had campaigned on a promise to 
get out of Iraq, and now his new country team was pushing to maintain a substantial presence. 
The Arab Spring was convulsing the Middle East and, along with Afghanistan, occupying the 
attention of the Administration.671  
As will be discussed in the next chapter, Obama had dramatically escalated the war in 
Afghanistan but the Taliban appeared no closer to collapse or entering a peace process. The 
Karzai government was rife with corruption. Tensions between the two Presidents were high. 
The U.S. troop surge there was to begin receding in July 2011. Obama and his inner circle may 
have been sensitive to criticism about ignoring the advice of his commanders on the ground. 
They had accused the military of trying to “box-in” the President regarding the troop surge in 
Afghanistan, and then fired General Stanley McChrystal after disparaging remarks by his staff 
were reported in Rolling Stone.672 With the 2012 elections just around the corner, another crisis 
with the military could be unhelpful. In short, the main incentives for both Maliki and Obama 
were to let the SOFA expire while avoiding blame for doing so. The concessions needed to 
secure an agreement would need to be high enough for both to justify the political risk.673 
Gordon and Trainor report that General Austin offered his estimate for the post-2011 force to 
cover the training, advising, and counterterrorism missions: 20,000 to 24,000 troops. He 
assessed that a force of this size would still entail moderate risk. The Pentagon asked Austin to 
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review the numbers again, which the latter revised downward with a preferred option of 19,000 
troops, a middle option at 16,000, and a low option of 10,000 which he deemed high risk.674 
The Pentagon must have massaged the numbers a bit more because a 29 April 2011 Principals 
Committee discussed options at 16,000, 10,000, and 8,000 troops.675 Secretary of Defense 
Gates thought the lower two options could work.676 Admiral Michael Mullen, the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, supported Austin’s recommendation of 16,000. Both flag 
officers reportedly believed that having no troops at all in Iraq was better than having too few. 
Mullen exercised his legal right as Chairman and the President’s principal uniformed military 
advisor to express his concerns in a written memo to the National Security Advisor, Tom 
Donilon.677 The arguments, however, remained fixated on troop numbers, without any serious 
mention of advancing political reform and reconciliation.678 In May 2011 Maliki hinted that he 
might support an American military presence if he could garner enough political support.679 
Obama, fresh off the successful Abbottabad raid that killed Osama bin Laden in his villa in 
Pakistan, approved a residual force in Iraq of up to 10,000 troops.680 By early June the Obama 
Administration communicated four conditions that the Iraqis would have to meet in order for 
U.S. forces to remain. First, the government of Iraq needed to make an official request. Second, 
Maliki wound need to gain parliamentary approval for a SOFA continuing the same 2008 legal 
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immunities for U.S. soldiers in Iraq. Third, Maliki would need to fill the vacant Ministry of 
Defense position and other open positions within the security ministries. Finally, Maliki had to 
act against Iran-supported Special Groups which had been using EFPs (explosive force 
penetrators) and IRAMs (rocket assisted mortars) against U.S. troops.681 Whether intended or 
not, the second requirement was a poison-pill. The U.S. appeared to be dictating internal Iraqi 
government procedures. Even if Maliki wanted U.S. troops to remain, the concessions he 
would likely have to make to gain approval would have been substantial – especially 
considering Iraqi public opinion on the matter.682 Two former senior White House officials 
with knowledge of both the 2008 and 2011 negotiations note that Maliki got what he wanted 
in 2008; he would be highly unlikely to overturn the timeline without major U.S. 
concessions.683 
Nonetheless, this provision gave both Obama and Maliki a reasonable escape from potential 
blame.684 In August Obama further reduced the maximum presence to 5,000.685 The political 
risk of meeting the conditions for so little gain was likely deemed by Maliki to be too high. In 
the event, Iraqi leaders supported U.S. military trainers but ruled out immunities (only the 
Kurds supported the immunities). Obama ended the negotiations on October 21.686 A former 
senior White House official told New York Times correspondent Peter Baker, “We really 
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didn’t want to be there and he really didn’t want us there…. It was almost a mutual decision, 
not said directly to each other, but in reality that’s what it became. And you had a president 
who was going to be running for re-election, and getting out of Iraq was going to be a big 
statement.”687  
As the U.S. forces prepared to leave, Maliki’s sectarian agenda was in full swing.688 Provinces 
with significant Sunni populations such as Diyala, Salahuddin, Ninevah and Anbar began to 
demand autonomy under a provision in the Iraqi constitution.689 Shi’as stormed the provincial 
council building in Baqubah (Diyala).690 In a joint press conference on December 12, 
meanwhile, Obama praised Maliki’s efforts in leading Iraq’s “most inclusive government 
yet.”691 Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq told CNN he was shocked that Obama greeted 
Maliki as the “elected leader of a sovereign, self-reliant and democratic Iraq” in light of his 
continued aggressive targeting of Sunni Arab leaders.692 Maliki reportedly told Obama that 
Iraq’s Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi and other Sunnis in his government supported 
terrorism.693 One week after being lauded by Obama for inclusiveness, Maliki sent troops to 
arrest Hashimi. The latter fled in time, but thirteen of his bodyguards were tortured and 
sentenced to death.694  
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By mid-2014 a new Sunni Arab insurgency was flourishing.695 Daesh had taken Ramadi, 
Fallujah, Mosul, and Tikrit, and established a proto-state along the Euphrates in Iraq and Syria 
by feeding on the alienation of Sunni Arabs and engaging in a sophisticated combination of 
coercion, selective violence, and local governance.696 In September 2014, U.S. Director of 
National Intelligence James Clapper confessed, “We underestimated ISIL [the Islamic State] 
and overestimated the fighting capability of the Iraqi Army. … I didn’t see the collapse of the 
Iraqi security force in the north coming. … It boils down to predicting the will to fight, which 
is an imponderable.”697 That might be true, but the misjudgment was much larger. Winding 
down the Iraq war was given much higher strategic priority than taking steps needed to bring 
about a favorable and durable outcome, which may have motivated U.S. policymakers to 
rationalize the myriad signs of trouble that pointed to a potentially explosive political fragility. 
“U.S. policymakers and planners did not pro-actively consider the transformative nature of the 
withdrawal of U.S. military forces,” argues a RAND study, “and the effects that transformation 
would have on strategic- and policy-level issues for both Iraq and the region.”698  
 
Conclusion 
The picture that emerges of war termination in Iraq is one of highly sophisticated military 
efforts and fragmented under-resourced political activities untethered to an integrated strategy. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Bush administration assumed a decisive victory over Saddam 
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Hussein’s fielded forces would yield lasting success. Obsessed with military details, the U.S. 
government failed to develop a strategy that brought together and managed the elements of 
national power to bring about a favorable and durable outcome. When decisive victory failed 
to materialize, the United States was left scrambling for a way forward. The failure to consider 
war termination led to a myopic strategy that fixated on the military campaign and ignored the 
aftermath. This led to the super-empowerment of mostly Shi’a exiles and elites and decisions 
to launch a de-Ba’athification campaign and disband the Iraqi Army. Aggressive military 
efforts fed perceptions of Sunni Arab disenfranchisement. The latter fought back, igniting a 
fierce insurgency. This gap in strategy heightened the risk the war would turn into a quagmire.   
Chapter 4 showed how the strategy became intractable as the un-prioritized elements of 
national power self-synchronized in unproductive ways. Confirmation bias, political and 
bureaucratic frictions, and patron-client problems impeded the Bush administration’s ability to 
recognize and modify a failing strategy. Political development was viewed largely as an 
engineering project, setting milestones to be achieved using highly pliable resources. Arranged 
in the right sequence, the project was assumed to succeed. The milestone-centric approach 
failed to account for the aggressive and sometimes bloody scrimmage for power. The major 
problems were occurring at the interface of the silos. Local elites manipulated the milestones 
and the gaps between U.S. military, political, and economic silos. The fault-lines between 
political and military silos damaged legitimacy while amplifying violence. The more the 
United States uncritically backed a sectarian government, the greater the resistance to 
American presence. Sectarianism and insurgency fed on one another into a downward spiral. 
Meanwhile, U.S. officials stubbornly refused to change strategy, citing examples of progress 
in achieving milestones as evidence of disaster mounted.  
When offered a new approach to salvage the war, Bush boldly decided to surge in the face of 
opposition calls for withdrawal. The new approach succeeded in diminishing the Sunni Arab 
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insurgency, but failed to advance reconciliation and substantive political inclusion. The 
continued absence of a political strategy and waning support in the United States and Iraq for 
the American troops presence damaged U.S. leverage and undermined the prospects for a 
favorable and durable outcome. U.S. military and diplomats managed to curb some of the worst 
excesses and defuse myriad crises, but could not change the underlying logic of Maliki’s 
aggressive sectarianism. The Bush Administration missed an opportunity to use the SOFA 
negotiations to advance what they considered to be an essential requirement for success. Maliki 
got the troop withdrawal dates he so eagerly sought in exchange for no political concessions.  
The Obama Administration, eager to end the Iraq war, attempted to apply low-leverage 
conditionality with troop presence that unwittingly played into Maliki’s hands. Ambassador 
Hill and General Odierno had very different views on the way forward in Iraq. Neither one had 
the authority to manage the U.S. efforts or the relationship with Maliki and the Iraqi 
government. This resulted in issues getting kicked upstairs to Washington DC. Instead of 
attempting to use the 2010 elections and the 2011 SOFA negotiations to advance the prospects 
of reconciliation, the Obama Administration took the path of least resistance – pressuring the 
Sunni Arabs and Kurds to go along with Maliki. In the end, both leaders got what they wanted 
– a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces.  
Kenneth Pollack, a Middle Eastern expert at the Brookings Institution argues in the case of Iraq 
that “military success is not being matched with the commensurate political-economic efforts 
that will ultimately determine whether battlefield successes are translated into lasting 
achievements.”699 What the U.S. has lacked was not a set of plans but a strategy to achieve a 
favorable and durable outcome that accounts for the competing and conflicting interests of 
others. In his landmark study on strategy, historian Lawrence Freedman described the ancient 
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Greek concept of metis as a form of strategic intelligence. It “conveyed a sense of a capacity 
to think ahead … grasp how others think and behave … and stay focused on the ultimate goal 
even when caught in ambiguous and uncertain situations.”700 The combined challenges of 
cognitive bias, political frictions, patron-client problems and bargaining asymmetries 
undermined the prospects of a favorable and durable outcome. Both U.S. administrations relied 
on a transition method for war termination, but failed to address the critical risks to success.   
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Chapter 6: Pursuit of Decisive Victory in Afghanistan 
In response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on America by al Qaeda, the United 
States issued an ultimatum to the Taliban government in Afghanistan, where Osama bin Laden 
was residing, to hand over al Qaeda’s senior leaders. When the Taliban refused, the United 
States initiated military action on October 7. By the end of 2001, the regime had disintegrated, 
with many senior Taliban and al Qaeda leaders fleeing into hiding across the border into 
Pakistan.701 The United States believed it had won a decisive victory. Northern Alliance forces 
moved into and beyond Kabul.702 The Bonn Conference in November 2001 began the process 
of forming a new government and political order in Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai was selected 
to lead the transitional administration, and would be elected president in 2004 and again in 
2009. All that was left, the Bush administration believed, was to hunt down the remaining al 
Qaeda and Taliban senior leaders, while the international community rebuilt Afghanistan, and 
move to the next phase in the Global War on Terrorism.703 After the U.S. rejected peace 
overtures in late 2001 and early 2002, the Taliban began reorganizing.704 The insurgency 
gained strength by 2006 due to external support and sanctuary in Pakistan as well as increasing 
local support in Afghanistan.705 At the same time, the Afghan government was developing into 
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a predatory kleptocracy that generated widespread resentment and fueled the return of the 
Taliban.706  
 
What Went Wrong? 
Afghanistan had good potential for a successful outcome. The Taliban was among the world’s 
most maligned and incompetent governments.707 The September 11 attacks generated global 
antipathy toward them and support for a change in Kabul. The state of ruin in Afghanistan after 
over twenty years of continuous conflict and misrule engendered international sympathy and 
support. No external support was forthcoming for the Taliban (aside from continued assistance 
from parts of the Pakistan Army). The regime collapsed quickly after the U.S.-led attack. No 
ethnic or sectarian conflict stirred in the wake of the Taliban’s fall. Although a polyglot of 
several ethnicities and a small, ethnically distinct Shi’a minority, Afghanistan exhibited general 
acceptance of such differences.708 
What went wrong? New York Times reporter and long-time regional expert Carlotta Gall 
blames Pakistan for “driving the violence in Afghanistan for its own cynical, hegemonic 
reasons,” and criticize the ineffectual U.S. responses to it.709 Ahmed Rashid adds American 
neglect of nation-building.710 Afghanistan expert Barnett Rubin and others include additional 
U.S. mistakes, such as an overly militarized focus, bureaucratic dysfunction, failure to develop 
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early opportunities for reconciliation, and torture at American detention facilities.711 Former 
ISAF and Pentagon senior advisor Sarah Chayes includes corruption and U.S. acquiescence 
and unwitting promotion of it.712 Stephen Walt and Dan Bolger cite overly ambitious aims and 
underestimation of the means required to achieve them. 713  
These are all important challenges that the Bush administration underappreciated. As in Iraq, 
the Bush administration fixated on the military campaign to overthrow the existing Taliban 
regime, and failed to properly consider war termination and the challenges of creating a 
favorable and durable outcome. This gap in strategy heightened the risks that the problems 
cited above would materialize and result in an intractable conflict. Returning to the model 
outlined in Chapter 2, success hinged upon two critical factors: 1) the establishment of a 
government that could earn and retain legitimacy, particularly in the Taliban’s southern 
Pashtun constituency; and 2) preventing armed resistance from becoming a sustainable 
insurgency. Decisive victory was possible had those two conditions been achieved. Neither 
was met.  
The Bush Administration took a minimalist approach to post-Taliban Afghanistan. As this 
chapter will show, they rejected the opportunity to promote an inclusive political process that 
enabled former pro-Taliban constituencies to participate. Blinded by the view that the Taliban 
and al Qaeda were terrorist bedfellows, and encouraged in this belief by Northern Alliance 
partners, U.S. officials promoted an exclusive political order that alienated many southern and 
eastern Pashtuns. As the new Afghan government turned predatory and elites used unwittingly 
international forces and officials to intimidate or eliminate their personal and political rivals, 
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disaffected Afghans began looking to the Taliban and others for help. Pakistan, fearing 
Afghanistan would become a client of India, provided the sanctuary necessary for the Taliban 
to regroup and begin an insurgency.  
 
Light Footprints to a Long War 
The September 11, 2001, terror attacks by al Qaida on the American homeland were 
psychologically dislocating. The day was deadlier than the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 
December 6, 1941, and left Americans with a chilling sense of vulnerability. President Bush 
felt compelled to respond, but sought to carefully limit the scale and duration of the American 
commitment. The Bush Administration’s light footprint approach to the war in Afghanistan 
was rooted in an ideological rejection to nation-building; a desire to avoid getting bogged down 
in a remote, land-locked country; the belief that information technology had revolutionized 
military affairs; and a misreading of Afghan history and politics. Combined with lack of 
strategy that included little serious thought about war termination, these views set the 
conditions for a bloody and expensive quagmire.  
Presidential candidate George W. Bush had campaigned against nation-building to distinguish 
himself from President Clinton and from his 2000 election opponent Vice President Al Gore. 
The peacekeeping mission in Somalia, begun during the George H.W. Bush Administration, 
ended disastrously early in the Clinton Administration.714 Similar missions to Haiti, Bosnia, 
and Kosovo were unpopular with many military officials and critics, who viewed such efforts 
as a distraction from the primary mission of fighting and winning the nation’s wars.715 
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Although the Balkan missions had kept the peace with a sizable NATO military footprint, Bush 
argued during the campaign that they had drained resources, sapped readiness, and undermined 
the military’s morale.716 As U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld later put it in December 
2001: “Nation building does not have a brilliant record across the globe.”717 The U.S. wanted 
to overthrow the Taliban and bring terrorist leaders to justice, and the dominant view in U.S. 
government was that the military should focus on the fighting and let others worry about 
reconstruction.  
The Bush Administration was also seeing the conflict as a “global war on terrorism” rather 
than a war in Afghanistan alone. “This military action is a part of our campaign against 
terrorism,” Bush told the American people on the eve of the Afghanistan invasion, “another 
front in a war that has already been joined through diplomacy, intelligence, the freezing of 
financial assets and the arrests of known terrorists by law enforcement agents in 38 
countries. Given the nature and reach of our enemies, we will win this conflict by the patient 
accumulation of successes, by meeting a series of challenges with determination and will and 
purpose.”718 In this view the Taliban and al Qaeda were ideological bedfellows within the 
global jihadi network.719 Terrorist attacks on the Indian Legislative Assembly on October 1, 
2001, and on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001, which India blamed on Pakistan, 
appeared to add credibility to the global nature of the threat (even though both attacks were 
actually manifestations of a longstanding simmering conflict between India and Pakistan).720 
Meanwhile, the Bush Administration was convinced that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was a state 
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sponsor of terrorism.721 If the latter provided al Qaeda with weapons of mass destruction, future 
attacks on the United States could be far more damaging than those of September 11. “We're a 
peaceful nation,” Bush argued, “Yet, as we have learned, so suddenly and so tragically, there 
can be no peace in a world of sudden terror. In the face of today's new threat, the only way to 
pursue peace is to pursue those who threaten it.”722 In his state of the union address on 29 
January 2002, Bush famously called out Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as constituting an “axis of 
evil” that threatens American and its allies with weapons of mass destruction – weapons they 
could provide to “a terrorist underworld -- including groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic 
Jihad, Jaish-i-Mohammed – [that] operate[s] in remote jungles and deserts, and hide[s] in the 
centers of large cities.”723 The threat was shadowy, dispersed, and deadly. The United States, 
in this view, could not afford to get fixated on Afghanistan.724 
The globalized nature of the perceived threat reinforced Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s 
belief that the Pentagon needed to adapt. Information technology, he believed, had 
revolutionized military affairs and permitted wars to be fought and won with far fewer ground 
forces. The new defense secretary had challenged what he considered to be an antiquated view 
of war by the Pentagon’s brass, particularly the Army. Enthusiastic about concepts of ‘network-
centric warfare’ which supposedly promised dominant battlespace knowledge by harnessing 
information technology, Rumsfeld envisioned wars of the future fought from the air and by 
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small special operations forces teams calling in precision fires on massed enemy formations.725 
Reductions in costly military personnel could be better spent on advanced military technology. 
In a war with global dimensions, harnessing such promise would be critical for success. 
Afghanistan was to be a proving ground for his vision of future war and solidify his intellectual 
victory over what he considered to be a pedantic uniformed military.   
The light footprint approach was fortified by misreading Afghan history and politics. Infamous 
for being the so-called “graveyard of Empires,” Afghanistan had earned a reputation – justified 
or not – for suffocating occupying powers into quagmires.726 With the Soviet defeat there less 
than fifteen years old and in the recent memories of senior officials such as Vice President 
Richard Cheney and Rumsfeld, the Administration wanted to avoid the same trap.727 By using 
special forces and local partners instead of a large scale conventional attack, Rumsfeld could 
conserve valuable resources, maintain strategic agility, usher in a new way of war, and prevent 
backlash against foreign presence.728 Experts on Afghanistan reportedly reinforced the 
Administration’s fears, leading Rumsfeld, at least, to believe that a very limited military 
footprint would best prevent a supposedly congenital Afghan hostility toward foreigners from 
spilling over into armed conflict. 729  
Acclaimed UN envoy for Afghanistan Lakhdar Brahimi may have invented the term “light 
footprint” during a UN conference in 2000, but he argued retrospectively that the idea should 
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not fixate on a small international presence. Instead, he proposed that international experts 
should avoid creating parallel structures and engaging in capacity-substitution efforts that 
undermined legitimacy and created dependency. “A golden principle for international 
assistance,” he said, “should be that everyone shall do everything possible to work himself or 
herself out of a job as early as possible.”730 Richard Holbrooke, architect of the 1995 Dayton 
Accords that brought an end to the war in Bosnia, warned, “Afghans have been fighting among 
themselves too long to form an integrated security force right now. The only real options are a 
UN peacekeeping force or a multilateral force that is sanctioned by the UNSC but run 
separately from the UN.”731 The “light footprint” mantra was easily appropriated by those 
wanting to limit commitments of people and resources to Afghanistan.732 There exists no 
equivalent to the Chilcot report for Afghanistan, so the nature and extent of U.K.’s emphasis 
on a post-Taliban strategy is not yet known. The lack of discussion about war termination for 
the Iraq war suggests that such discussion was likely absent for the Afghan conflict as well. 
 
A Recent History of Bad Neighbors and Worse Governance 
Regional politics weighed heavily on Afghanistan. Pakistan, India, and Iran have historically 
co-opted certain Afghan constituencies to secure their interests and to check or undermine their 
rivals. Frictions between Afghanistan and Pakistan since the latter’s founding in 1947 created 
enduring tensions, leading Afghans to view malign activity from their eastern neighbor as the 
root cause of most of their problems. Support from India and Iran (and often Russia) has been 
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a historic counterbalance.733 The Indo-Pak rivalry in Afghanistan has been intense and bloody 
as both countries have sought controlling influence.734 Iran has mainly sought to secure 
political and economic interests in their near abroad of western Afghanistan and with their 
Shi’a co-religionists, the Hazaras in central Afghanistan.  
Pakistan and Afghanistan have had a particularly difficult history. An 1893 memorandum of 
understanding between Mortimer Durand, the foreign secretary of British India, and the Afghan 
emir Abdur Rahman Khan demarcated the border between British India and Afghanistan. The 
so-called Durand Line separated various Pashtun tribes between the two empires and placed 
Baluchistan in British India.735 These were once lands of the Afghan empire that stretched to 
the Indus river in the east and Indian Ocean in the south.736 By 1893 these areas were locally 
controlled but under the influence of British India. Nonetheless, the Afghans were quick to 
deny the validity of the agreement. Perhaps seeking to take advantage of British exhaustion 
after the First World War, the Afghans sought to test the boundary during the third Anglo-
Afghan war of 1919. The latter were defeated and emir Aminullah Khan reaffirmed the border 
in Article 5 of the peace treaty ending the conflict.737 Afghans, however, persisted in not 
recognizing the border. When British India was partitioned in 1947 to create (primarily Hindu) 
India and (Muslim) Pakistan, Afghanistan was the only state in the United Nations that refused 
to recognize Pakistan.738 Conflict between the two countries has been persistent. Afghanistan 
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sought and received material and economic support from India and the Soviet Union.739 The 
United States and Pakistan became partners in SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organization) 
and CENTO (Central Treaty Organization), part of a system of alliances designed to contain 
the Soviet Union and communist expansion. CENTO was largely unsuccessful as Soviet 
influence expanded in the Middle East and Central Asia. Pakistan tried twice to call on U.S. 
military assistance in its wars with India in 1965 and 1971, only to be disappointed.740 This 
history began to form a narrative in Pakistan about American abandonment.  
In 1973 Mohammad Daoud Khan, first cousin and former Prime Minister to King Zahir Shah, 
overthrew the latter and established a republic with himself as president.741 Frictions with 
Pakistan increased as each sponsored proxy conflicts against the other. Among those sponsored 
by the Pakistanis were Ahmad Shah Massoud, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and Jalaluddin 
Haqqani.742 Daoud Khan was overthrown by the communists in the 1978 Saur revolution, who 
declared the PDRA (People’s Democratic Republic of Afghanistan). Instability soon followed 
as Afghan mujahideen parties rebelled against the new government. CENTO dissolved in 1979 
with the Iranian revolution. That same year the Soviets installed Babrak Kamal into power and 
began large scale military support to help him combat a burgeoning insurgency. Hundreds of 
thousands of Afghans fled to neighboring countries, mostly to Pakistan, as the latter provided 
financial and military support to the mujahideen. Seeing an opportunity to bloody the Soviet 
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nose, the United States began a large-scale covert program, funneled through Pakistan, to 
support the rebels.743  
By 1985 the Soviets began withdrawing from Afghanistan. The 1988 Geneva Accords signed 
by the USSR, Pakistan, and the United States, called for a cease fire to permit the Soviet 
withdrawal and an end to external support for the Afghan mujahideen.744 Pakistan, contrary to 
the Accords, continued providing support and sanctuary to the Afghan mujahideen. The Soviets 
kept military advisors to support the Najibullah regime in their fight against the insurgent 
groups. With the Soviets out of the war and the Warsaw Pact crumbling by November 1989, 
American interest in Central Asia faded. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan would add this to the 
betrayal narrative.  
The seven main mujahideen parties continued fighting the Najibullah regime from 1989 to 
1992. As the Soviet Union collapsed and could no longer fund their Afghan clients, the Afghan 
state imploded under the combined weight of insurgency and fiscal crisis. Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyer, Pakistan’s closest mujahideen ally, while on the verge of victory was beaten into 
Kabul by Ahmad Shah Massoud’s Shura-e-Nazar army. Control of the capital meant leverage 
in forming a post-communist government. Osama bin Laden reportedly tried but failed to 
broker a peace agreement between Hekmatyar and Massoud.745 
With the communist government overthrown and the mujahideen in control, Pakistan must 
have believed it could finally secure a friendly – even client – government in Afghanistan. 
They would be disappointed. Pakistan brokered the Peshawar Accords of 1992 that created the 
Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA). This was a power-sharing agreement which salami-sliced 
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the government among six of the seven mujahideen parties into warlord-controlled fiefdoms. 
Hekmatyar refused to sign the agreement because he believed that he deserved to control the 
government. His powerful Hizb-i-Islami party began fighting the ISA, with support from 
Pakistan, leading to the onset of the Afghan civil war. Pakistan attempted to broker another 
peace deal in 1993, resulting in the Islamabad Accords. This agreement installed Hekmatyar 
as Prime Minister, with Burhanuddin Rabbani, head of the overwhelmingly Tajik Jamiat party, 
as President. The cease-fire lasted barely twenty-four hours as the new Prime Minister’s forces 
began shelling the capital.746  
With Pakistan backing Hekmatyar, the other warring parties and the ISA would seek funding 
elsewhere. Sayyaf’s party was reportedly bankrolled by Saudi Arabia, Abdur Rashid Dostum’s 
Uzbeks by Uzbekistan, and the Shi’a parties by Iran. ISA and its mainly Jamiat party were 
funded mainly by India who seized upon an opportunity to ensure Afghanistan did not become 
a client state of Pakistan.747 When al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was kicked out of Sudan 
following pressure from the U.S., Sayyaf and President Rabbani invited him to Afghanistan.748 
Aside from being a participant in the jihad against the Soviets, bin Laden’s money and 
connections could be useful for prosecuting the civil war. The warring factions destroyed 
Kabul. Throughout the countryside, warlords and local strongmen ran amok murdering, raping, 
and pillaging. Their crimes against the Afghan people were staggering.749  
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The Taliban arose in 1994 in opposition to such lawlessness and wanton abuse.750 As the 
Taliban gained momentum and Hekmatyar looked increasingly unlikely to be successful, 
Pakistan moved more and more support to the former. The Taliban rapidly gained support 
among the population and by 1996 had overthrown the ISA and established a new government. 
On September 27, 1996, the Taliban seized control of Kabul and established the Islamic 
Emirate of Afghanistan. By 2001, they controlled 90 percent of the country, imposing an 
incompetent semi-theocratic rule and committing new levels of abuse on the people. Only three 
states recognized the Taliban government: Pakistan, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. 
If Pakistan had hoped the new regime would become a client state, or at least recognize the 
Durand line, they were again to be disappointed. During the five years of misrule by the 
Taliban, no agreement ratifying the validity of the border was forthcoming. The groups loyal 
to ISA continued to fight on from their strongholds in northeast Afghanistan, funded in part by 
India and Iran and others who sought to deny complete Taliban control of the country and 
Pakistani hegemony in Afghanistan.751  
To the west, Iran had opposed the Taliban regime and supported the Hazara factions fighting 
it. They maintained a policy of influence in their eastern near-abroad, centered on Herat and 
the central Afghanistan Hazarajat. Keen to prevent the rise of a Saudi Arabian client state in 
Afghanistan and renewed nacro-trafficking across their borders, Iran proved helpful in the 
Bonn process to form a new government.752 That support ended abruptly with Iran’s inclusion 
by President Bush in the 2002 axis of evil. Nonetheless, Iran continued backing the Hazara 
factions and promoting economic development in Herat and western Afghanistan.753     
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The U.S. recognized as early as October 2001 that some of these regional frictions and interests 
could be problematic, but did little to prevent the risk of them becoming destabilizing. A U.S. 
state department cable noted optimistically, “We do not see any irreconcilable conflict among 
these interests as long as Afghans and outside interests are flexible.”754  
 
Back to the Future: Operation Enduring Freedom and the Bonn Conference 
As the Northern Alliance and coalition forces advanced against the Taliban and al Qaeda in 
Afghanistan in October and November 2001, US and international diplomats began discussions 
about post-Taliban Afghanistan. With the Taliban’s military collapsing soon after the 
beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, the United Nations convened an international 
conference outside of Bonn, under the leadership of Brahimi, to pave the political way forward. 
The Conference would establish key milestones for the development of a new government: 
creation of an Afghan Interim Transitional Administration, an Emergency Loya Jirga in 2002 
to select an Afghan Transitional Administration which would develop a new constitution and 
govern the country until the elections; a Constitutional Loya Jira in 2003, a presidential 
election in 2004, and Parliamentary elections a year later.755  
The U.S. State Department believed the effort needed to include the Northern Alliance, Zahir 
Shah supporters, and “southern Pashtuns.” Taliban rank and file would be expected to integrate 
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peacefully into society.756 Diplomatic efforts, U.S. envoy James Dobbins observed, had 
difficulty keeping pace with the rapidly unfolding military events. Northern Alliance forces 
under Mohammad Qasim Fahim, against U.S. demands to the contrary, captured Kabul on 13 
November and began taking control of the city.757 Although the design was to invite a diverse 
array of non-Taliban leaders to chart a new political future for Afghanistan, the Northern 
Alliance and warlords from the former Islamic State of Afghanistan now wielded controlling 
influence over make-up of the Bonn Conference and Interim Transitional Authority.758  
The selection of who would lead the transitional authority, therefore, was a delicate one. With 
Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud assassinated by al Qaeda operatives on 9 
September 2001, no natural consensus leader was available. Even so, many would likely have 
opposed such an appointment given Massoud’s role in the Afghan civil war and his Tajik 
ethnicity in a country traditionally ruled by the plurality Pashtuns. Some favored the return of 
the king, Zahir Shah, who lived in exile in Rome after being deposed in the 1973 coup. Various 
warlords vied for control, too, but none had the stature of Massoud. Aside from the victorious 
and fractious Northern Alliance the most powerful and organized party, as well as being 
Pashtun, was Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG), but they had not been invited to 
Bonn. Hekmatyar, a power-obsessed warlord who was once considered America’s favorite 
mujahideen leader during the Soviet war, had run afoul of US sentiments. He welcomed the 
removal of the Taliban, but opposed the presence of international forces in Afghanistan for the 
obvious obstacle they would pose to his ambitions. Seeing the HiG party as a threat, the 
northern alliance factions sought to marginalize the former and to paint them as a Taliban and 
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al Qaeda – allied security threat. Leaflets reportedly appeared in refugee camps in Pakistan 
claiming Hekmatyar had joined al Qaeda and the Taliban. He was later accused of an April 
2002 assassination attempt on Karzai, which he vehemently denied.759 Such manipulative 
efforts were successful. The US began targeting the HiG and in February 2003 designated 
Hekmatyar as a global terrorist. They reportedly fired on the warlords’ vehicle in May.760 
Hekmatyar declared jihad on the Americans afterward. His reported efforts to join the Karzai 
government in 2004 were rebuffed.761  
Consensus on who would lead the interim administration began to form around Hamid Karzai. 
Scion of the Popalzai tribe of the Durrani Pashtuns – the tribe from which earlier Afghan kings 
had emerged – fiercely anti-Taliban, and without blood on his hands from the civil war – Karzai 
proved an attractive option.762 Because he had no party, militia or following of his own, he was 
unobjectionable to the Afghan warlords who traditionally favored weak leaders they could 
control and manipulate. He spoke perfect, almost poetic English, which made him attractive to 
the US and the western powers. He spent much of his life in Afghanistan and in the region, 
rather than in the US or Europe. The factors which made him an attractive choice to lead the 
new government would also leave him beholden to warlords, who could make his life miserable 
or even kill him if Karzai threatened their interests, unless the international military backed 
him against them. He was reportedly arrested and tortured in 1994 by Fahim Khan.763 
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During the Bonn process the ISA seemed to emerge again under a different guise.764 Shura-e-
Nazar controlled the key security ministries: Defense (Fahim), Interior (Younis Qanooni), 
National Directorate of Security (Sarwari), and Abdullah Abdullah as Foreign Minister. Other 
warlords such as Dostum, Ismail Khan, Mohaqqeq, Atta Noor, and Khalili were given positions 
of power and influence. The international community, Barnett Rubin concludes, empowered 
leaders that “the Afghan people had rejected.”765 Efforts by various international organizations 
to address the history of human rights abuses during the Afghan civil war were repeatedly 
repressed by the U.S. and Afghan elites.766 “The Bonn conference did not reflect the interests 
of the Afghan people,” a former Afghan government senior advisor reflected.767 
The rapid overthrow of the Taliban must have been disconcerting to Pakistan. Even more 
troubling for them would have been the largely former ISA and monarchist (the so-called Rome 
party that supported exiled King Zahir Shah) make-up of the Bonn conference. According to a 
second-hand report of a meeting between Brahimi and French Foreign Minister Vedrine, the 
former cautioned that Pakistan would need to play a role in arranging a compromise between 
the northern alliance and the Zahir Shah’s supporters.768 If so, this would be an odd role for 
Pakistan to play given their historic relations. Threats from the U.S. to Pakistani President 
Musharraf were successful in gaining a measure of Pakistani support against al Qaeda, but 
Afghanistan’s eastern neighbor would be unlikely to turn on their Taliban allies.769 The myriad 
Afghan refugee camps still in Pakistan gave the Taliban plenty of places to hide, plan, recruit, 
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and reconstitute.770 India quickly became a close partner of Afghanistan, in part because so 
many former partners – ex-communists and ISA leaders – were back in power, in part to thwart 
Pakistani designs.771 Pakistan came to believe that India and Afghanistan were supporting the 
Baluchistan insurgency and, most conspiratorially, to partition much of Pakistan between 
them.772 A stable, hostile, India-allied Afghanistan was seen traditionally by Pakistan as an 
existential threat. For the first time since Pakistan’s creation that possibility seemed to some to 
be very real. The provision of or acquiescence in sanctuary for the Taliban would be a useful 
hedge against such an outcome. Instability in a hostile Afghanistan was a preferable 
alternative.773  
Seeking to remain focused on al Qaeda, senior Bush Administration officials wanted to hand-
off responsibility for security and reconstruction in Afghanistan to the international community 
as soon as possible while the U.S. pursued the counterterrorism mission.774 By mid-December 
2001, the Taliban forces had collapsed and their leaders either returned home or fled to Pakistan 
for safety.775 As diplomats continued discussing the size and scope of an international 
peacekeeping force, however, the U.S. military sought to delay the deployment of international 
forces to avoid complicating the hunt for al Qaeda and Taliban leaders. “General Franks is very 
much in charge of everything, and he doesn’t want to worry about a multinational force,” 
explained a U.S. military spokesman. “The US has one goal: Attack AQ and get the job done. 
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And they’re not too worried about the rest of it right now.”776 CIA and Afghan militia forces 
closed in on Osama bin Laden and the remaining al Qaeda forces in the Tora Bora region of 
eastern Afghanistan, but failed to prevent their escape to Pakistan.777 The Americans set up 
bases primarily in the southern and eastern parts of the country to support the counterterrorism 
efforts, restricting international forces (ISAF) to Kabul.778 
This arrangement left internal security up for grabs. The vacuum created by the removal of the 
Taliban was filled by Northern Alliance forces and local militias, primarily those associated 
with the Panjshiri Tajik faction of the Jamiat party, Shura-e-Nazar.779 As the latter seized 
control of Kabul, they also assumed the security mission by fait accompli. With the security 
ministries led entirely by Shura-e-Nazar, they were free to organize their own police and 
military forces, and direct allied warlords and strongmen to do the same in their local areas.780 
Minister of Defense Fahim promoted himself to “Marshal” and aimed to communicate clearly 
to Karzai who controlled the guns (and hence the real power) in Afghanistan. When Karzai 
arrived in Kabul in December 2001 as the newly appointed head of the Afghan Interim 
Authority, he was greeted on the tarmac by Fahim with his forces in military formation. 
Karzai’s former jailer pointedly asked the newly appointed head of the interim government 
where were his men. Karzai pointed to Fahim’s militia and deftly replied, “You are my men.” 
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Karzai would have been unlikely to miss Fahim’s not-so-subtle message.781 Politics was blood-
sport in Afghanistan. Karzai would either need international military support in limiting the 
influence of the warlords or he would have to co-opt them. This political calculation would 
shape decisively the rule of Hamid Karzai. 
 
Setting the Stage for Kleptocracy and Taliban Resurgence 
Neither the United States nor the nascent Afghan government developed and coordinated a 
strategy for a durable political outcome beyond establishing milestones and allocating tasks to 
donors. The Bonn process called for several steps in the political formation of a new 
government, and the warlords and elites craftily exploited each one. An Emergency Loya Jirga 
was convened on 7 June 2002 with the purpose of establishing the Afghan Transitional 
Administration (ATA), to include the presidency and cabinet positions. A proposal to invite 
the Taliban was floated and quickly rejected.782 The stakes were high for warlords and 
strongmen to consolidate their positions and influence. Their significant wealth and ability to 
use militia forces for intimidation, due in part to the light footprint international approach, 
enabled elites to ensure their representatives were present, to buy votes as necessary, and to 
intimidate opposition.783 The U.S. grew increasingly concerned that former President 
Burhanuddin Rabbani would try to engineer the loya jirga to get himself installed as 
President.784 Former King Zahir Shah appeared to be willing to be to selected as head of state, 
as an ordinary citizen rather than a monarch, but US Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad went to Rome 
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and reportedly arm-twisted the former ruler to drop out and endorse Hamid Karzai.785 While 
the latter was chosen as the leader of the ATA, mainly northern alliance and ISA warlords 
retained control all but two ministries. Aside from Karzai, southern Pashtuns had little 
representation in the new government. Feeling marginalized during the proceedings, many 
southern Pashtuns walked out.786 The ATA was responsible for drafting the new constitution, 
which was to be ratified at a Constitutional Loya Jirga in December 2003. Once again, vote 
buying and intimidation by the warlords ensured the votes went the way they wanted. The new 
constitution, modeled somewhat after the 1964 Afghan constitution, created highly centralized 
government with little to no provisions for accountability. The Afghan parliament was given 
the authority to approve and to impeach ministers, a process that would be later used to extract 
enormous bribes.787 The failure to implement a census, called for in the Bonn Agreement, and 
a poorly organized voter registration process left elections open to widespread fraud.788 The 
Single Non Transferable Vote system was selected, which favored the better organized warlord 
parties.789 The preamble of the constitution placed the resistance against the Taliban on equal 
footing with the jihad against the Soviets.790 The message to the former was quite clear – the 
Taliban had no place in the new order.  
Believing the victory was won, the debate within the Bush Administration centered on 
minimizing levels of support to Afghanistan rather on how to secure a durable political 
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outcome. As early as November 2001, the State Department had been calling for international 
efforts to rebuild Afghanistan, but the Administration wanted to limit the scope of American 
assistance.791 In January 2002, President Bush committed to help Afghanistan build its army 
and national police.792 By April 2002 President Bush began to recognize the need to provide 
more support, “We know that true peace will only be achieved when we give the Afghan people 
the means to achieve their own aspirations.” He noted later in his memoir, that although the 
U.S. was not prepared to do nation-building, “We had liberated the country from a primitive 
dictatorship, and we had a moral obligation to leave behind something better.”793 His 
Administration, however, remained divided.794 On 8 April 2002 Rumsfeld wrote to Powell to 
discourage the latter from further committing American resources to Afghan reconstruction, 
“The U.S. spent billions of dollars freeing Afghanistan and providing security.... There is no 
reason on earth for the U.S. to commit to pay 20 percent for the Afghan army. I urge you to get 
DoS [Department of State] turned around on this – the U.S. position should be zero.”795 Powell 
replied eight days later noting the President’s decision to support Afghan reconstruction and 
the need for the US to do its “fair share” particularly regarding the Afghan military and 
police.796 The Bush administration hoped that accelerating the development of Afghan security 
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forces would enable the United States to draw down its own forces in Afghanistan more 
quickly.797 
In April 2002, the Group of Eight (G8) announced a “lead nation concept” for the Afghan 
security sector, which entailed five interdependent lines of effort each assigned to a lead donor 
nation, but without an overarching central authority: Afghan National Army (U.S.), Afghan 
National Police (Germany), Counter-narcotics (U.K.), judiciary (Italy), Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration [DDR] (Japan).798 According to a RAND study on the 
development of the Afghan security sector, “When U.S. [Security Force Assistance] efforts in 
Afghanistan were first being planned in 2002, a driving assumption was that the Taliban had 
been decisively defeated and would not reappear. Instead, the major threat envisioned was a 
return to the warlordism that had plagued the country in the 1990s and had given rise to the 
Taliban.”799 Minister of Defense Fahim wanted a large, 200,000-man conscript force raised by 
provincial levy with a handpicked cadre to secure the country and defend its borders.800 His 
rationale was to build ownership in the new Army and state from across the country, while 
keeping leadership and decision-making in his control. Fearing that a larger, locally recruited 
military could break-down along ethnic or political lines (while ignoring the fact that warlords 
still had huge weapons caches and could readily reconstitute their militias), the US sought to 
limit the size of the Afghan Army to a volunteer force of roughly 50,000. Fahim was forced to 
accept this and sought to use the opportunity to secure his control.801 By November 2002, UN 
Security Council Resolution 1444 called for the establishment of a “fully representative, 
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professional and multi-ethnic army and police forces,” but little help had been forthcoming.802 
German efforts to build the police forces proceeded very slowly, planning to train only 1,500 
officers in a five-year program.803  Rumsfeld began to get frustrated at the slow pace of the 
army and police and demanded ways to accelerate the efforts. “There is not a sufficient sense 
of urgency on the part of anybody,” he complained to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
Douglas Feith and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Myers.804 
The lead nation concept was quickly and ably exploited by Afghan elites to promote personal 
and political power. With no overarching strategy or decision-making body that could set 
priorities, integrate efforts, and mitigate unintended consequences, the efforts of each lead 
nation were open to manipulation. The coalition military footprint was small, Kabul-based, and 
commanded by a series of generals who rotated in rapid succession. Fahim engineered 
recruiting and training efforts to lock in Shura-e-Nazar control of the Army and freeze out 
rivals. Of the first 100 general officers, 90 were from Panjshir.805  
The Ministry of Interior, meanwhile, was responsible for the police, sub-national governance, 
and counter-narcotics. The Germans and Americans began to pull the police in different 
directions – the former toward basic western-style law enforcement, the latter toward a 
paramilitary role.806 Police chief positions went to favored local strongmen or the highest 
bidder. Governorships were often allocated the same way. This would create perverse 
incentives for officials to turn a profit on their positions through misappropriation of customs 
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revenues, aid dollars, or even extortion such as land-theft and kidnapping for ransom.807 
Afghans perceived these officials were backed by the U.S. military. The absence of any 
ombudsman or government watch-dog, and perceptions of international acquiescence or 
complicity, meant people had no avenue to register complaints or air grievances. No lead nation 
was established to promote sub-national governance, so the international community had little 
visibility on how well or poorly the new government was connecting to the people outside 
Kabul. The British counter-narcotics efforts were exploited by local strongmen who directed 
international eradication efforts at their rivals, while keeping their own crops away from 
unwanted attention.808 The Rule of Law sector did not develop beyond an Italian-written plan 
that was never implemented. The justice sector positions were often allocated in ways like 
those used for police chiefs and governors.809 Open to bribery, justice would often go to the 
highest bidder. The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) efforts by the 
Japanese were manipulated to quickly bring friendly militias into the army and police while 
disarming rivals.810 Each Ministry developed a strong, informal chain of command tied to the 
major warlords who exercised major influence over key appointments. Successive ministers 
were never able to assert authority over the army or police, let alone enact tough reforms.”811 
Threats of violence and the ability to block policy or legislative action prevented reforms that 
would damage elite interests.  
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Perhaps most damaging of all, local elites duped US-led counterterrorism efforts into 
unwittingly targeting personal and political rivals. The United States military was a separate 
command from ISAF until 2007. It had a wider footprint focused on hunting Taliban and al 
Qaeda leaders. Afghan elites played on the Americans’ dangerous combination of 
aggressiveness and naiveté, and began manipulating intelligence to use unwitting American 
forces to settle scores with rivals or to consolidate power.812 Such military operations, 
combined with the predatory actions of warlords and strongmen and Afghan police, military 
or government officials, and reports of torture in American prisons such as Bagram and 
Guantanamo, caused significant civilian harm. These problems began to foster a sense of 
alienation and unwanted military occupation – themes the Taliban would ably exploit in their 
recruiting and propaganda. When directed against community leaders, civilian harm had 
disproportionately large effects in driving the people away from the government and often into 
the embrace of armed opposition groups.813 
The perception, therefore, that post-Taliban Afghanistan was peaceful was an illusion. Many 
warlords and local strongmen who occupied positions of authority under the new Karzai regime 
quickly became predatory as they sought to impose and consolidate control. The violence was 
being perpetrated by the very people who were supposed to be providing security and reporting 
incidents.814 “The Taliban insurgency started as a grassroots movement, in reaction to the 
repression unleashed by Afghan security forces, private militias and Enduring Freedom units 
in 2002-3,” Antonio Guistozzi wrote in a retrospective assessment to NATO. “Without that 
repression it is unlikely that the few Taliban leaders who wanted to fight on would have been 
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able to re-engage.”815 In the face of US resistance, UN envoy Brahimi continued to push in 
2002 and 2003 for greater international military presence to protect Afghan civilians from 
predatory militias. “Skirmishes between local commanders,” he observed in July 2003, 
“continue to cause civilian casualties in many parts of the country where terrorism is no longer 
an issue…. There are daily reports of abuses committed by gunmen against the population…all 
too often – while wielding the formal title of military commander, police or security chief.”816 
US officials did tire of efforts by Fahim to manipulate the development of the nascent Afghan 
Army while keeping his own large militia.817 However, some other American officials sent 
very different messages. In an April 2003 meeting with Karzai, U.S. Congressman Dana 
Rohrbacher, who had longstanding relationships with the Northern Alliance warlords, 
encouraged the Afghan President to “integrate” these “ethnic leaders” into the government and 
to devolve power to them. Karzai reportedly rejected the idea and compared their current 
actions that were harming the population to the situation in 1994 before the Taliban arose. 
Rohrbacher reportedly replied that the “wild West” in America was secured by local strongmen 
and their militias. He also contended that radical Islam and Pashtun nationalism were in league 
with one another, which seemed to imply that US was at war with both. In yet another stunning 
statement, the Congressman reportedly told Karzai that the U.S., Saudis and Pakistanis 
“created” the Taliban to bring law and order to Afghanistan.818 Karzai must have been deeply 
troubled by the conversation. He may have perceived that Rohrbacher was expressing true U.S. 
policy – with respect to empowering the warlords or carving up Afghanistan, the war on 
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Pashtuns, and the American role in allegedly creating the Taliban. Karzai would, in the future, 
levy charges against the US on all three counts. American officials would dismiss them as 
paranoid conspiracy theories. 
The former Northern Alliance leaders used their influence with the United States to block 
Karzai’s efforts toward peace. Jim Dobbins and Carter Malkasian describe how the Taliban 
sent several peace overtures in the early years, even offering to surrender in December 2001.819 
Negotiations were rejected by the U.S. and the Northern Alliance factions in government.820 
Secretary of State Colin Powell’s suggestion that the U.S. seek talks with moderate Taliban 
were ridiculed as naïve by Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah and ultimately rejected by the 
Bush Administration.821 Rumsfeld flatly rejected Karzai’s December 2001 idea that the Taliban 
be allowed to “live in dignity” in retirement.822 He told Karzai that al Qaeda and Taliban leaders 
still need to be hunted down. “There are a lot of fanatical people,” he concluded, “And we need 
to finish the job.''823 Brahimi later described this decision to be a fundamental error in the Bonn 
process.824 Taliban leaders who turned themselves in were sent to prisons in Bagram and 
Guantanamo, some reportedly tortured. Others were killed or captured in raids. The rest fled 
to Pakistan.  
 
Conclusion 
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The lack of strategic thinking about war termination heightened the risk that the successful 
overthrow of the Taliban would turn into a quagmire. The Bush administration had given 
detailed attention to the military campaign but wished away the challenges of the aftermath. 
American officials in Kabul and Washington found themselves completely unprepared for the 
intense and sometimes violent struggle for control among Afghan elites. “Local elites know 
how to consolidate power,” observed Lieutenant General Terry A. Wolff, “but not how to build 
a country.”825 This was particularly true of Afghanistan which had not known political stability 
since King Zahir Shah was overthrown in 1973. The so-called lead nation concept and the 
tendency of U.S. agencies to operate in bureaucratic silos undermined the woefully under-
resourced stabilization effort and left international civilian and military efforts open to 
manipulation.  
The Taliban, in fact, had begun reorganizing as early as 2002.826 Pakistan, appreciating their 
limited and receding influence in Afghanistan, supported the Taliban’s use of Pakistani 
territory for sanctuary to foment and sustain an insurgency.827 Prolific military businesses and 
logistics companies in Pakistan, as well as a secretive intelligence service that operated outside 
civilian control, gave the Taliban ready access to supplies, logistics, and expertise. The vast 
refugee camps there offered the potential for substantial recruits. Predatory activities by the 
government and civilian harm by Afghan and coalition forces provided the opportunity to 
attract the disaffected groups to the Taliban cause.  
The limited U.S. interests in Afghanistan, and the Bush administration’s desire to minimize 
security and reconstruction commitments, should have led to a more thoughtful discussion with 
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Karzai about the Taliban’s offer to capitulate. The Taliban had little to no leverage – 
negotiations by competent Afghan and international authorities were highly likely to result in 
a favorable outcome and could probably have prevented or limited the scale of the insurgency. 
The Bush administration, however, viewed the Taliban and al Qaeda as one in the same – 
international terrorist organizations bent on attacking the United States. Given the attacks of 
September 11 and the way American political leaders framed the conflict, an effort to negotiate 
with the Taliban in 2001 or 2002 probably would have entailed huge audience costs.  
Taliban made another overture in 2004, claimed a former Taliban official who was part of the 
delegation.828 The Bush Administration still refused. Standing alongside President Karzai in 
February 2004, Rumsfeld said, “I've not seen any indication that the Taliban pose any military 
threat to the security of Afghanistan.” Karzai, noting that he was being contacted daily by 
Taliban leaders seeking to be allowed to return home, surmised, “The Taliban doesn't exist 
anymore. They're defeated. They're gone.”829 The 2004 overture would be the Taliban’s last 
for many years.  
Had the Bush administration included war termination considerations during strategy 
development, they still might have come to the view that negotiations with the Taliban were 
unacceptable. Transition-and-withdraw was another option, and one that the Bush 
administration backed into as the insurgency fomented. A strategy that considered the 
requirements in advance for a successful transition would likely have centered on factors such 
as political legitimacy and inclusiveness, sufficiently capable peacekeeping forces in place 
until credible local forces were built and trained, civilian protection, and regional cooperation 
as more important to success than hunting down Taliban remnants. Instead, the latter was 
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prioritized over, and even undermined, the others.  By 2006, an insurgency that had durable 
internal and external support was fighting against a predatory, kleptocratic host nation 




Chapter 7: Persisting in a Failing Approach 
The U.S. government had not developed a clear and coherent strategy for the war in 
Afghanistan and was having difficulty understanding and adapting to a deteriorating situation. 
The Taliban’s insurgency, with sanctuary in Pakistan and growing internal and external 
support, expanded. As we saw in the previous chapter, the civilian harm caused by pro-
government predatory militias and coalition forces contributed significantly to the growth and 
sustainability of the Taliban. High-profile civilian casualty incidents were driving deep wedges 
between the U.S. and Afghan governments, undermining the legitimacy of both, and 
antagonizing the Afghan population.830 The insurgency gained strength by 2006 due to 
increased support in Afghanistan and external backing and sanctuary in Pakistan.831 The 
Afghan government, meanwhile, had self-organized into a predatory kleptocracy that was 
driving more people into the arms of the Taliban and other militant groups.832 The U.S. 
approach unwittingly reinforced rather than diminished these problems. American military and 
civilian officials, however, continued citing myriad examples of progress even as the security 
situation deteriorated.833 
The ineffective strategy remained in place until 2008, when Barack Obama was elected 
President of the United States. He campaigned that America needed to withdraw from Iraq and 
focus instead on Afghanistan. As will be detailed below, he made good on this pledge. He 
directed a thorough review of the Afghan conflict and opted for a military, civilian, and 
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diplomatic surge to reverse a deteriorating situation. To encourage Afghan government reform, 
Obama put a timeline on American presence. The surge was designed to build Afghan 
government and security-force capacity, gain Pakistani support in closing insurgent 
sanctuaries, and degrade the Taliban into a residual insurgency. Despite impressive examples 
of progress, however, the Afghan government and security forces remained corrupt and unable 
to win the battle of legitimacy in contested and insurgent-controlled areas, Pakistan proved 
unwilling to close insurgent sanctuaries, and the Taliban continued to sustain high levels of 
violence. Obama clung stubbornly to the withdrawal timeline as the situation deteriorated. By 
2015, Obama felt compelled to slow and eventually stop the drawdown. 
 
What Went Wrong? 
Why did both administrations persist in strategies that were not succeeding? As with the Iraq 
case, this question has received little attention. The most common argument is that the Bush 
administration was distracted by the Iraq war.834 To be sure, that growing debacle began to 
consume the Bush administration. But the distraction argument presumes that more focus on 
Afghanistan would have resulted in the necessary modifications to the strategy. As discussed 
in chapter 4, even the significant energy that the Bush administration gave to Iraq was 
insufficient to recognize the growing disaster and change course. Outside help was needed. 
With respect to the Obama administration’s strategy, criticism of the White House’s timeline 
has been widespread.835 The military did express concerns that the timeline was more 
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aggressive than advised, but ultimately backed the plan.836 The existing scholarship does not 
address the reasons for the persistent beliefs, shared by the military and State department, that 
the strategy was working well enough and did not need major modification.  
This chapter will demonstrate how confirmation bias, political and bureaucratic frictions, and 
patron-client difficulties offer important insights on the persistence of ineffective strategies in 
both administrations. These problems impeded their abilities to recognize that critical strategic 
factors, such as insurgent sustainability and host nation government’s inability to win the battle 
of legitimacy, were undermining the viability of their strategies. Although both administrations 
would make changes on the margins, they never properly examined the underlying logic of 
their approaches. Due to the length of time covered and the complexity of the issues, this 
chapter will proceed chronologically as a narrative while interweaving the main themes 
outlined above.  
 
Accelerating Success, 2003-7 
American had difficulty modifying its strategy in the early years of the war due to confirmation 
bias, bureaucratic frictions, and patron-client problems. After more than a year of bureaucratic 
infighting over the scale and scope of U.S. assistance to Afghanistan, Rumsfeld finally relented 
in mid-2003 to a plan drafted by Zalmay Khalilzad called “Accelerating Success.” Khalilzad 
was chosen to be the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and would have the opportunity to 
implement his ideas. Overall, the so-called Marshall Plan for Afghanistan amounted to $1.2 
billion in aid (Congress would eventually approve $1.6 billion). Although acquiescing in 
greater expenditures for development, Rumsfeld continued to resist further troop increases. He 
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reportedly accepted “Accelerating Success” and a larger NATO-run ISAF to extricate the 
United States from Afghanistan more quickly.837 To enact Khalilzad’s plan the U.S. and NATO 
began fielding Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) across Afghanistan to implement local 
assistance projects. USAID was to manage larger infrastructure development.838 
“Accelerating Success” gave a much-needed boost in resources, but did not sufficiently address 
or measure the factors that would pose highest risks to success – an insurgency with durable 
internal and external support and a host nation government unable to win the battle of 
legitimacy in contested areas. The plan focused on key milestones and developmental efforts. 
An 18 January 2005 National Security Council memorandum to Principals assessed the 
progress of Accelerating Success. “The President's 2004 ‘Accelerating Success in Afghanistan’ 
initiative,” the memorandum explained, “led to transformative changes in governance, 
security, and reconstruction in Afghanistan” [emphasis added]. The memo lauded the 
President’s leadership in motivating the interagency, highlighted the development of biweekly 
program and activity metrics, and explained that a new working group on Afghanistan had 
improved interagency coordination. It cited as examples of progress the 2004 election, the 
creation of 19 PRTs, the fielding of a 16,000-strong Afghan Army and a Police force of 25,000, 
efforts to check warlords, over 25,000 militia troops demobilized, and completion of the Kabul 
to Kandahar highway. It noted challenges with counter-narcotics, police training, and donors 
making good on pledges. All metrics were coded “Yellow” which indicated reasons for 
caution, but there were no red flags.839  
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The NSC measured government legitimacy positively because voter-turnout in the 2004 
election and the assessment that warlord influence was “progressively undercut.” The latter, 
the memo remarked, were now turning to peaceful politics. Although violence was noted, the 
NSC memo did not measure the state of the insurgency. Curiously, it claimed that the UN 
reported improved country-wide access in September 2004 compared to the previous year. A 
US Government Accountability Office report, however, cites UN maps that show significant 
deterioration in security for the period covered by the memo.840 The NSC document did not 
assess regional malign activity, despite the existence of insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan. In 
short, the Administration was grading its own homework.  
Reflecting the tendency of the intelligence community to focus its attention on insurgent 
violence rather than host nation politics, DIA Director Maples noted on 28 February 2006 the 
“significant progress on the political front” in Afghanistan.841 Sufficiently confident were they 
in progress that the Pentagon suggested at the Berlin Conference in September 2005 to 
withdraw up to 4,000 US forces and replace them with NATO troops.842 “It makes sense that 
as NATO forces go in,” Gen. John P. Abizaid, the head the United States Central Command, 
reportedly told the New York Times, “that we could drop some of the U.S. requirements.”843 
The Pentagon eventually scrubbed the withdrawal plan due to NATO objections.  
As in Iraq, major risks were developing along the seams and fault lines between bureaucratic 
silos.844 The tendency to measure progress within each silo reinforced confirmation bias that 
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the war was on track and masked the emerging strategic risks. The achievements to date were 
certainly impressive, given the state of catastrophe in Afghanistan after over twenty years of 
war. Other indicators, however, were present that should have led the Bush administration to 
question its optimistic assessments. The previous chapter noted the widespread violence on the 
part of various warlords who aimed to consolidate and expand their control, to include their 
use of predatory militias and manipulation of international forces and officials.845 Karzai was 
caught in an extraordinarily difficult position. Nearly every Afghan leader over the past century 
had been overthrown or murdered. Karzai’s political rivals controlled the security forces. 
International military forces, in a bit of mirror imaging, mostly found themselves incapable of 
conceiving a military not fully accepting civilian control – or military leaders that had interests 
other than selfless service to their country.846 Warlords could also mobilize well-armed militias 
rapidly and organize street protests. Both the Pentagon and State continued to underestimate 
the importance of these internal dynamics and multi-faceted patron-client issues.847  
Karzai’s best hope to keep them in check was political support – with military backing – by 
the international community and specifically the United States. Little was forthcoming. The 
United States refused to support him in a 2002 effort to take on a threat from eastern warlord 
Pacha Khan Zadran.848 A year later, Rumsfeld was adamant to CENTCOM Commander John 
Abizaid, Zalmay Khalilzad and others, “We do not want him making moves [against warlords] 
under the mistaken belief that we are going to back him up militarily.”849 International officials 
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would continue to press Karzai to make reforms and keep the warlords in check, but provided 
no clear backing or muscle to help him manage the fall-out.  Nonetheless, Karzai took the bold 
step of selecting Ahmad Zia Massoud rather than Fahim as his first vice presidential running 
mate for the 2004 elections, which caused significant tensions.850 After winning the election in 
2004, Karzai removed several warlords and their lieutenants from ministerial positions, to 
include replacing Fahim at Ministry of Defense with his deputy Rahim Wardak.851  
The 2005 parliamentary elections, however, would offer the warlords new opportunities for 
political influence. In May 2005 protests erupted across Afghanistan, instigated by a Newsweek 
article that alleged interrogators at US military prison at Guantanamo had desecrated the 
Koran.852 Due in part to this instability, the September 2005 parliamentary elections were a 
major victory for warlords and local strongmen.853 They could use parliamentary action to 
block legislative efforts that might undermine their influence. Rather than turning their 
attention to peaceful politics, the warlords used the elections to expand their means of 
control.854 The U.S. had made it clear that Karzai could not count on the international military 
to help him disarm and impose his will on the warlords. Karzai was forced to undertake efforts 
that kept the international community happy while balancing the interests of dangerous elites. 
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These factors, Sarah Chayes argues, began to provide the perverse incentives that would turn 
the Afghan government into a predatory kleptocracy.855 The milestone-centric approach to 
political and economic development was easily captured by Afghan elites who quickly froze-
out their rivals while the international community lauded the progress. Elites super-empowered 
by their proximity to the United States gained significant political and economic power, backed 
up by the military muscle of local militias, police, or unwitting coalition forces. Government, 
police, and military positions were increasingly for sale at exorbitant prices. Officials would 
purchase their positions from elites in Kabul, in return for license to make the money back and 
turn a profit. International aid and development dollars, customs revenues, black market 
racketeering were all eligible for extortion. A 2008 report by Oxfam found that barely 15 
percent of international aid dollars made it to the local levels.856 More problematically, some 
officials would engage in land theft, kidnapping for ransom, and other forms of extortion, 
seemingly backed by coalition military might. “You Americans are either too stupid to realize 
you are being used in this way,” an Afghan elder explained to me, “or you are complicit.”857 
As in Iraq, well-meaning efforts by agencies or lead nations self-synchronized in damaging 
ways. The whole was perpetually less than the sum of its parts.    
It is no wonder, then, that the political instability and major Taliban offensives in 2006 came 
as such a shock to the Bush Administration. Karzai’s tone, as seen in reporting cables from the 
American diplomats, grew deeply suspicious and pessimistic that year. He suspected some of 
the warlords were fomenting violence to destabilize his government. Angry anti-U.S. 
demonstrations in Kabul erupted on 29 May 2006, after a road traffic accident in which an 
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American military vehicle plowed into a dozen civilian ones. 14 civilians were reportedly killed 
and 90 injured during the riots.858 The demonstrations came on the heels of an incident in 
Kandahar in which 35 civilians were reported killed.859 “If it had been Taliban or al-Qai'ida,” 
Karzai explained darkly, “the bombs [in Kabul] would have been more effective.”860 Other 
anti-American protests erupted in February and September 2006 over cartoons in a Danish 
newspaper and an American film, respectively, that mocked the Prophet Mohammad.861 Major 
problems in governance continued, to include predatory behavior by Afghan officials.862 
Karzai worried that his government and the coalition were losing the support of the people.863 
To reduce the internal tensions, he began to slow-roll disarming some militias and to bring 
more warlords into the cabinet.864 
Meanwhile, the Taliban initiated large-scale military offensives, particularly in southern 
Afghanistan.865 Retired U.S. General Barry R. McCaffrey, in a June 2006 assessment for 
Rumsfeld, was alarmed by the deteriorating security situation.866 An August 2006 security 
assessment on southern Afghanistan that was given to President Karzai noted, “The Taliban 
are becoming increasingly willing to defend key terrain with large sophisticated, well-armed 
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groups of fighters.”867 Afghan and Indian officials had been warning American officials since 
2005 that Pakistan was actively supporting the insurgency.868 The evidence for the scale and 
scope of Pakistani complicity were not disclosed in reporting cables, but the existence of 
sanctuary in Pakistan from which the Taliban were able to plan, coordinate logistics, train and 
recruit, was clear.869 By 2006, Karzai’s tone on Pakistan had moved from conciliation to 
hostility.870 This served to bring the Afghan government closer to India, likely reinforcing 
Pakistan’s fear of a hostile Afghanistan and creating a downward spiral of mutual suspicion 
and antagonism.871 In November 2006, DIA Director Maples forecasted that insurgent attacks 
in 2006 were likely to be twice as high as 2005. He also revised his previously optimistic 
assessment of Afghan governance. “Nearly five years after the Taliban’s fall,” Maples testified, 
“many Afghans expected the situation to be better by now and are beginning to blame President 
Karzai. These unrealized expectations are likely contributing to an erosion of support for his 
administration.”872 
Such problems should have led Bush administration officials to question the assumptions 
underpinning their strategy. In response to the growing challenges, however, the U.S. and 
Afghan governments and international community sought to improve coordination and levels 
of support. The London Compact of February 2006 called for an expansion of the Afghan 
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Army from 34,000 to 70,000 by the end of 2010.873 By that time, the Army and Police were to 
be able to secure the country and allow international forces to withdraw. Governance, anti-
corruption, rule of law, and myriad other reforms were to be achieved by then as well, but no 
conditions were attached to the benchmarks.874 The commitments for reform were aspirational. 
To improve coordination on the ground, Karzai agreed in August 2006 to the “Afghan 
Development Zone” (ADZ) concept, developed by the ISAF commander, British General 
David Richards. The ADZ, the American Ambassador noted, “attempts to unify security and 
development efforts from the GOA and IC … and should expand to encompass ever widening 
territories.”875 The underlying assumption was that projects and “service-delivery” rather than 
good governance were the key to restoring public confidence in the government. 
In the absence of clear guidance from Washington, the U.S. Embassy and military command 
in Afghanistan published a “Strategic Directive for Afghanistan” on 11 September 2006, 
signed by US Ambassador Ronald Neumann and Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry. The 
intention was to better integrate American civilian and military efforts in Afghanistan. The 
country team outlined its strategic goal as “[c]reate a self-reliant Afghanistan that provides 
effective governance; is self-securing, committed to representative government, economically 
viable, and rejects narco-production.” The military identified its primary task as “defeat 
insurgent and terrorist threats and establish effective, adequate security.” Success, they noted, 
will be achieved when “insurgents are defeated and no longer threaten internal development 
nor the safety and security of Afghanistan,” and “the ANSF are capable of effectively securing 
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their territory against insurgent and criminal threats with only limited coalition support.”876 
The document specified lines of effort related to security, governance, development, and 
strategic communications and portrayed how they all point to a self-reliant Afghanistan. 
The directive noted that the 34,000-strong ANA would double in size to 70,000 and be capable 
of operating independently by fiscal year 2011. With more resources, they argued, the ANA 
could achieve that milestone by 2009. A police force of roughly 80,000 would be merely one 
year behind.877 The military command made these aggressive forecasts even though the 
international training mission for the Afghan Army and Police were, as McCaffrey described 
in a June 2006 assessment read by Rumsfeld, chronically and “miserably” under-resourced.878 
The commonly used rule of thumb was 20 military or police for every 1000 people.879 With a 
population of roughly 30 million, Afghanistan would require a security force 600,000-strong. 
Barely one-third of that number of Afghan and international forces was forecasted to be 
available by 2009. The small army and police were justified by U.S. military officials based on 
comparisons with the security forces of neighboring states, none of them in the grip of an 
insurgency.880 In spite of General McCaffrey’s alarming report, Rumsfeld only asked 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace to look into the reported lack of 
effective small arms for the ANA and whether the ANSF should be bigger.881 The Pentagon 
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reportedly forecasted in 2006 that the Afghan government would not be able to fund an Army 
of only 50,000 until 2063.882  
 
Failing to Keep Pace with the Insurgency, 2007-9 
Confirmation bias, bureaucratic frictions, and patron-client problems continued to undermine 
the Bush administration’s ability to make critically-needed changes in strategy. In September 
2006, as Karzai was heading to Washington, D.C. to meet with President Bush, Ambassador 
Ron Neumann noted that the Afghan president “is at the lowest point of public confidence in 
his government. A deteriorating security situation, coupled with rampant corruption at all 
levels, has sapped confidence and feeds public perceptions of a weak government and 
governance system.” The Ambassador also cited the problems with Pakistan and the nexus of 
corruption, narcotics, and insecurity. He advised Bush to improve funding for Afghanistan, 
increase the size of the security forces, and urge Karzai to “do more” on corruption and 
narcotics. “We, in turn, must recognize he is not strong enough and Afghanistan not stable 
enough for him to do these things without our encouragement, our occasional pressure, and a 
lot of our money and force to back him up.”883 
Bush took stock of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in the fall of 2006. He fundamentally 
changed the strategy in Iraq, as noted in Chapter 4. For Afghanistan, he simply provided more 
resources. “Today, five short years later, the Taliban have been driven from power, al Qaeda 
has been driven from its camps, and Afghanistan is free.” President Bush announced in a 
February 2007 speech on Afghanistan. “That's why I say we have made remarkable progress.” 
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Nonetheless, he noted the significant Taliban offensives in 2006, and decided to increase 
support to Afghanistan even as he was surging military forces in Iraq. He outlined five major 
capacity-building efforts: increase the size of the Afghan Army from 32,000 to 70,000; 
strengthen the NATO force in Afghanistan (to include an increase of U.S. forces); build 
provincial government capacity and develop local economies; reduce poppy cultivation; and 
help Karzai fight corruption, especially in the justice sector. He added a sixth effort, which was 
to work with Pakistani President Musharraf to defeat terrorists and extremists in Pakistan. 884  
Confirmation bias reinforced the Bush administration’s tendency to overestimate the 
legitimacy of the Afghan government and underestimate the growing strength of the Taliban. 
They misdiagnosed the problem in Afghanistan as one of inadequate capacity. Warning signs 
of an increasingly capable insurgency with external sanctuary and a predatory, corrupt Afghan 
government, were met with more resources but not a new approach. Exploitable bureaucratic 
silos and patron-client problems meant that more resources were at high risk of elite capture. 
Without major changes to address such problems that were placing success at increasing risk, 
more resources might even make corruption worse. Interests and incentives with Pakistan, 
which was designated by the United States as a major non-NATO ally in 2004, were 
misaligned, too. A Pakistani military offensive to eliminate Afghan Taliban sanctuaries could 
theoretically bring about an end to the insurgency, but Musharraf was not about to go to war 
with a group that was advancing Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan even as they undermined 
American interests there and conducted operations that killed American soldiers.885 Musharraf, 
instead, used U.S. funding to support operations against the Pakistani Taliban.886  
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Despite Bush’s desire to increase support, by August 2007 the U.S. training teams fielded only 
1,000 of the 2,400 trainers required. The NATO teams were even worse: of the 70 teams 
needed, only 20 had been fielded. The ANA had only 53% of the equipment deemed critical 
by CSTC-A (Combined Security Training Command – Afghanistan).887 By June 2008 only 2 
of 105 Afghan Army units were rated as fully capable.888 The Afghan police were in even 
worse condition.889 CSTC-A revised their readiness forecast by only one year in 2008, noting 
the army and police would be “fully capable” by the end of 2011.890 When Lieutenant General 
James Dubik conducted a CENTCOM-directed assessment of the ANSF in 2008, he found that 
their slow rate of growth was unable to keep pace with the growing insurgency.891 
As the Taliban threat and U.S. resources grew, so did the scale of corruption. In 2005 
Afghanistan ranked 117 out of 158 in the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions 
Index. By 2009, it vaulted to 179 out of 180, behind only Somalia.892 Afghanistan expert Astri 
Suhkre blames the growth in corruption on international community largesse, “The money flow 
simply overwhelmed the country’s social and institutional capacity to deal with it in a legal 
and socially acceptable manner.”893 This argument presumes that international aid bespoke to 
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Afghanistan’s “absorptive capacity” would have been used for its intended purposes and excess 
would not have been available for misappropriation.  
The patron-client challenges discussed in Chapter 2 cast doubts upon this premise. Sarah 
Chayes, for instance, illustrates that the government had self-organized into a vertically 
integrated kleptocracy. As noted above, government positions were sold by power-brokers in 
Kabul at increasingly high prices. In exchange, officials were given license to recoup the 
money and turn a profit – many using predatory practices to do so.  An official who could not 
or would not pay would lose the job.894 Even if international aid and contracts had been 
calibrated to Afghanistan’s “absorptive capacity” the primary incentive for most government 
officials was sustaining the kleptocracy, not serving the people.895 DoD’s 1230 report in 
January 2009 cites data showing governance getting worse from 2006 to 2008.896 By 2010, 
according to a United Nations report, corruption had eclipsed insecurity and unemployment as 
the greatest concern among Afghans.897 Annual surveys showed an overwhelming majority of 
Afghans viewed corruption as a major problem in their everyday lives.898 A highly 
sophisticated kleptocracy and international largesse became mutually reinforcing. Officials and 
power-brokers insatiable demand for money and power were sapping the legitimacy of the 
government and international community. The predatory nature of the government and 
associated warlords led more Afghans to withhold their support or even transfer it to the 
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Taliban.899 Civilian casualties by international forces continued to undermine the international 
mission. UNAMA attributed 39% of the civilian fatalities in 2008 to international forces.900 
Bush had fundamentally changed the strategy in Iraq, but not in Afghanistan. Iraq was 
unravelling rapidly. Afghanistan was a slow, less perceptible, failure. Confirmation bias had 
led to a dangerous complacency about the prospects of success as American officials fixated 
on examples of progress. 901 The tendency to operate in bureaucratic silos created seams that 
were being ably exploited by Afghan elites and fault lines that were interacting in destructive 
ways. Military efforts were damaging governance and legitimacy; political milestones were 
captured by elites; diplomatic efforts resulted in Pakistan being awarded Major non-NATO 
ally status despite their support for the Taliban, which reinforced Karzai’s cynicism and India’s 
alarm. Patron-client challenges reinforced these problems. The United States had not 
developed a coordinated strategy with the Afghan or Pakistani governments. The interests and 
incentives remained dangerously misaligned. The lack of conditionality reinforced tendencies 
toward political instability and kleptocracy in Afghanistan, and double-dealing by Pakistan. 
The harder the international community tried to fight and to spend its way out of the problems, 
the more deeply it was sucked into the quagmire.902  
 
2009 Assessments: The Good War Going Badly 
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As is often the case, a change in Administration was necessary for a change in strategy. The 
Obama changes, however, were more significant in scale than approach. Cognitive bias, 
bureaucratic frictions, and patron-client problems continued to impede the U.S. government’s 
ability to recognize the limited prospects for a successful transition to Afghan government lead 
in the war. Obama campaigned that Afghanistan was the good war – a war of necessity, while 
Iraq was the war of choice.903 One of his first acts as President was to order an interagency 
review of the war in Afghanistan, led by former CIA official and South Asia expert Bruce 
Reidel. The process served to concentrate the minds of senior Administration officials and 
bring a common appreciation of the challenges. Reidel’s report outlined that the situation in 
Afghanistan was worse than expected. Afghanistan and Pakistan, it argued, should be a single 
integrated theater; the success of one country was tied to the success of the other. The United 
States needed a stronger relationship with Pakistan to change its strategic calculus away from 
the use of militant groups to advance its interests. The report called for a more effectively 
resourced counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, to include holding President Karzai 
accountable for dealing with corruption. It also supported an Afghan-led reconciliation effort. 
President Obama outlined these findings in a 27 March 2009 speech and approved ISAF 
Commander General David McKiernan’s request for 17,000 more American troops.904  
Obama also made key personnel decisions. He directed Secretary of State Clinton to create a 
Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) and selected veteran diplomat 
Richard Holbrooke for the position. Soon, other international partners created similar positions. 
The Director of the Joint Staff, Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, created the Pakistan-
Afghanistan Coordination Cell (PACC) to improve the effectiveness of the Joint Staff’s efforts. 
                                                                 
903 Nasr (2013), 13-14. 
904 The White House, “Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,” 27 March 
2009. 
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Gates, who had been kept on as Secretary of Defense by Obama, picked former deputy chief 
of mission to Afghanistan, David Sedney, to lead an upgraded Afghanistan-Pakistan-Central 
Asia office, and appointed former CIA operative during the Afghan-Soviet war Michael 
Vickers, as the Assistance Secretary for Special Operations. Not satisfied with how McKiernan 
was responding to the new direction, Gates relieved him in favor of McChrystal. As the new 
commander was leaving for Kabul, Gates directed him to provide, within 60 days, an 
assessment of the war considering the President’s new direction and to inform him of any 
additional resources required.905  
McChrystal’s assessment described the situation as “serious and deteriorating.”906 The Taliban 
and other insurgent groups had sanctuary in Pakistan and were threatening Kandahar and 
several critical locations across the country.907 They were tightening their grip in the provinces 
and districts around Kabul. The Afghan government was weak and corrupt. The international 
effort was disjointed, ineffective, and creating animosity among the population. To be 
successful, the assessment argued, ISAF would need to address two critical threats: a growing 
insurgency and a crisis in confidence in the coalition and Afghan government. Success was 
achievable, McChrystal noted, but not by “doubling down” on the same ways of doing 
business. A fundamentally different approach was needed. This included protecting the civilian 
population from harm by the Taliban and the Afghan government. He emphasized that 
responsible and accountable governance should be on par in priority with security. Without the 
former, security was not possible. He called for much greater unity of effort, both within the 
military coalition and with the civilian efforts of the U.S. and international community. The 
                                                                 
905 McChrystal directed me to lead a team of civilian and military experts and draft the strategic assessment. 
906 McChrystal (2009) COMISAF Initial Assessment, 1-1; McChrystal (2013), 292-315; Gates (2014), 367-368. 
907 Forsberg (December 2009).  
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coalition, he recommended, should promote conflict resolution efforts, such as reintegration 
and reconciliation.908  
The Assessment outlined five strategic risks: 1) the loss of coalition will and support; 2) lack 
of Afghan government political will to enact needed reforms; 3) failure by ISAF partners to 
provide adequate civilian capabilities to support good governance and economic development; 
4) significant adaptations by insurgent groups; 5) external malign activity from Pakistan and 
Iran.909 All five were clear and present problems; the magnitude of risks 2, 3, and 5 were 
becoming increasingly obvious.910 These are also examples of problems that tend to fall in the 
seams between bureaucratic silos. At no time was any American official held responsible or 
accountable to address them. The assessment did not address directly the question of war 
termination.911  
McChrystal provided periodic updates on the assessment to Gates, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen, and Central Command’s General David Petraeus. 
Recognizing that any discussions over troop increases would be contentious, Gates directed 
McChrystal not to provide a resource recommendation until the assessment was fully 
considered by the NSC.912 The assessment, however, was leaked to the Washington Post soon 
after being sent to Gates.913 The issue of “more resources” was already being discussed by 
pundits in Washington, to include by some civilian members of the assessment team after they 
                                                                 
908 McChrystal (2009), COMISAF, Initial Assessment; 1-1 to 1-4, 2-1 to 2-15; McChrystal (2013), 316-338; Seth 
Jones (2011), ix. 
909 McChrystal (2009), COMISAF, Initial Assessment, 2-22. 
910 For an analysis of the Assessment and its process see Brand (2011).  
911 As the leader of the strategic assessment team and drafter of the document’s core ideas and recommendations, 
I accept my own responsibility for that shortcoming. 
912 McChrystal (2013), 331. 
913 Schmitt and Shanker (21 September 2009). 
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returned home.914 The leak of the document made clear that the military would put a major 
request for more troops on the table. The White House, already suspicious of the military, 
believed the Pentagon was using leaks to force the President to approve a troop surge lest he 
be seen to be acting contrary to field recommendations and military advice. The leak of the 
Assessment, which was not caused by McChrystal or his staff, exacerbated the suspicion into 
mistrust.915 These internal bureaucratic and principal-agent problems set the stage for a civil-
military crisis in June 2010 when a Rolling Stone article reported disparaging remarks by 
McChrystal’s staff about the President.916   
As the NSC reviewed the assessment, Gates directed McChrystal to develop resourcing 
options. McChrystal offered three of them at low, medium, and high risk: 80,000, 40,000, and 
20,000, respectively.917 Equally important, he urged, was a significant increase in intelligence 
capabilities, civilian expertise, development assistance, and a doubling of the size and 
capability of the Afghan National Security Forces. The administration deliberated from August 
until late November.918  
These discussions took place in the wake of the 20 August 2009 presidential elections. 
Convinced that good governance was impossible under another Karzai term, Holbrooke 
                                                                 
914 Chandrasekaran (31 July 2009); Baker and Filkins (31 August 2009); McChrystal (2013), 344-5. 
915 Personal knowledge as lead of the assessment team. We put the early drafts of the assessment on a NATO 
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senior leaders using a classified U.S. email system after the 20 August Presidential election. The assessment was 
leaked in late September 2009 and published by the Washington Post on 21 September. Many Defense senior 
leaders give members of their personal staff access to their email. For an article speculating on the leak see Smith 
(22 September 2009); Gates ((2014), 367), said he was told that someone on McChrystal’s staff leaked the 
assessment.  
916 Hastings (22 June 2010). 
917 McChrystal (2013), 345-6. 
918 For a description of the painstaking process see Nasr (2013), 22-25. 
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actively promoted Karzai’s rivals, particularly former Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah.919 
Karzai suspected this and began accusing Holbrooke of interfering in the election.920 Karzai 
won 55% of the initial tally to Abdullah’s 28%.921 Abdullah refused to accept the results and 
accused Karzai of widespread fraud, claims for which ample evidence was found.922 Holbrooke 
and UNAMA deputy Peter Galbraith pushed hard for the internationally-staffed Electoral 
Complaints Commission to investigate. Galbraith was fired after accusing UNAMA chief Kai 
Eide of a cover up.923 The Electoral Complaints Commission declared roughly one million 
ballots to be fraudulent. This put Karzai’s percentage just below 50%, triggering a run-off 
between the top two candidates. Karzai refused Abdullah’s entreaties and American 
suggestions for a power-sharing deal.924 By November, a frustrated Abdullah declined to 
participate in the run-off, ceding the election to Karzai.925 Obama reportedly called Karzai 
afterward and lectured him to do more about corruption.926 In his inaugural speech, Karzai 
called for transition to Afghan-led security to begin within two years, for Afghan forces to take 
over security responsibility by the end of 2014, and for international forces by then to be 
reduced and limited to training and support roles.927 Having been criticized for getting nothing 
                                                                 
919 Holbrooke would publicly deny these allegations from Karzai and others, but Holbrooke’s efforts were 
confirmed by Defense Secretary Robert Gates in his memoirs - Gates (2014), 340-1; 358-9; McChrystal (2013), 
342-343; U.S. Embassy Kabul Cable, 3 September 2009. 
920 U.S. Embassy Kabul Cable, 7 July 2009. 
921 See Carter, Ericson and Tse (16 October 2009). 
922 U.S. Embassy Kabul Cable, 10 September 2009.  
923 Tavernise and Wafa (11 October 2009). 
924 U.S. Embassy Kabul Cables, 16 October 2009; 6 October 2009; 20 October 2009; 21 October 2009; 26 October 
2009; 27 October 2009; 28 October 2009; 31 October 2009; 1 November 2009. 
925 For an analysis of the election see National Democratic Institute (2010).  
926 Cooper and Zeleny (2 November 2009). 
927 Rubin and Landler (19 November 2009). Interviewee L suggests that the United States recommended this 
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out of the elections dispute in terms of jobs for his supporters, Abdullah and his supporters 
would increase their brinksmanship in the disputed election of 2014, to which the U.S. 
responded by forcing a power-sharing deal.928  
The mess surrounding the elections intensified the debate in Washington over McChrystal’s 
requests for more resources. 929 Eikenberry cabled that a surge would be a mistake because 
Karzai was an “unreliable partner” who lacked the political will to reform.930 Vice President 
Biden continued to advocate for a smaller-footprint counter-terrorism mission (dubbed “CT-
plus”).931 Obama was reportedly upset that the military only offered options in terms of troop 
numbers.932 He believed the Pentagon was trying to box him in to approve a large troop surge. 
Only the military, though, was asked to provide options.933 No one sought, and no agency 
provided, options that placed diplomatic efforts (such as reconciliation) or political efforts 
(such as addressing governance and corruption) as the priority with the military in support.  
Afghanistan, moreover, was not being considered in isolation. Obama wanted to wind down 
both wars so he could resource his domestic agenda, to include a major national health-care 
initiative, addressing massive budget deficits, and bringing the economy out of recession after 
the 2008 banking crisis. Expanding the war in Afghanistan even further than he already had 
could inhibit those priorities. Seeking to limit the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan and to send 
a signal to Karzai to get serious about reform, the Obama administration began debating a 
timeline to withdraw troops. Alternatives to encourage reform, such as conditionality, were not 
                                                                 
928 Nordlund (20 September 2014). 
929 For descriptions of the process see McChrystal (2013), 354-7; Gates (2014), 370-385; Nasr (2013), 28. 
930 Bumiller and Landler (11 November 2009). 
931 Peter Baker (13 October 2009). 
932 Interviewee L; Landler (1 January 2017). 
933 Interviewees L, M, N, P, and X. 
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addressed. Pressed on the timeline, the military deferred to its recent experience in Iraq as a 
gauge for when clear results might be seen.934 Based on advice from the uniformed military, 
Gates suggested that areas cleared of the Taliban could be transitioned to the Afghan 
government within two years.935 The reliance on this availability heuristic gave the White 
House an anchor point to narrow the timeline discussion toward a July 2011 consensus for 
withdrawing the surge forces.936  
No methods for achieving a favorable and durable outcome other than transition-and-withdraw 
were examined.937 The questions for debate were limited to the scale of the surge and its 
timeline. The military was to attrite the Taliban and expand the ANSF while the civilians built 
government capacity and diplomats convinced Pakistan to pressure and eventually shut down 
insurgent sanctuaries.938 The Obama administration believed these efforts would reduce the 
Taliban to a residual insurgency by the end of 2014. At that point, the insurgency could be 
defeated by the ANSF. With decisive victory now ruled out, the administration adopted a 
transition strategy on an aggressive timeline. No one addressed the probability of successfully 
addressing the problems of government legitimacy and insurgent sustainability (to include 
sanctuaries in Pakistan). Beyond the Iraq example, the NSC did not examine readily available 
longitudinal or empirical studies to assess the validity of the theory and the likely amount of 
time required.939 Suggestions to review comparative examples were rebuffed.940 “History,” 
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935 Gates (2014), 378-9 
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former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle A. Flournoy recalled, “never had a seat 
at the table.”941  
 
Surging into the Good War 
President Obama’s updated approach showed the administration’s limited understanding of the 
strategic challenges and the president’s waning patience with the war. The new approach 
increased the scale of the effort, but failed to examine some problematic assumptions about the 
insurgency and the Afghan government that persisted since the Bush administration. The 
increased scale of the effort continued to be undermined by bureaucratic frictions and problems 
with the Karzai government. Assessments of progress made by each agency within its 
respective silo reinforced views that the war was on track, even as the situation continued 
deteriorating. Obama announced his decision in a speech at the United States Military 
Academy on 1 December 2009. Outlining the importance of success in the war, he reiterated 
the March 2009 aims of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda and preventing the re-
emergence of terrorist safe havens in either Afghanistan or Pakistan. The U.S. government 
aimed to achieve a secure, stable, sovereign Afghanistan that could defend itself and prevent 
the re-emergence of terrorist safe havens.942 He approved a three-fold military, political, and 
diplomatic surge. He would commit an additional 30,000 U.S. forces, bringing the American 
total to nearly 100,000 troops. He requested an additional 7,000 from coalition partners. The 
surge forces would begin to withdraw by July 2011 and the transition to handing over security 
to the Afghans would begin. Not stated in the speech, the Administration had set December 
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2014 as the end of the combat mission and transition to full Afghan security responsibility.943 
The larger ANSF was to be able to handle a residual insurgency that had been substantially 
degraded by the military.944 The President also directed a significant civilian increase to build 
Afghan government capacity.945 He directed diplomatic efforts to urge greater support from 
Pakistan and to assist in the reconciliation effort.  
The result of the process was not a clear and coherent strategy, but a highly-detailed policy that 
gave direction to the interagency from which individual military, diplomatic, and 
developmental plans would be written and then executed in silos. Like in Iraq, there was no 
effort to develop with Afghan partners a coordinated strategy for the war or to address the 
misaligned aims and incentives.946 Despite Obama’s concerns about reform, there was no 
conditionality tied to U.S. support and resources. The military campaign plan was purported to 
be a joint endeavor with the Afghan Army and Police, but was written by ISAF and translated 
into Dari.947 The capacity-building plans and programs often followed the same pattern. State 
was not directed to develop a governance strategy and had no requirement to explain how they 
would tackle the corruption problems.948 Capacity-building was assumed to lead to good 
governance. Despite approving a much-needed uplift in civilian support, the Obama 
Administration had enormous difficulty finding qualified people with the right expertise to 
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deploy. Major personnel shortfalls remained, and most of those who did deploy were billeted 
to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul rather than into the provinces and districts.949  
State was likewise not required to develop a strategy for changing Pakistan’s strategic calculus 
or for reconciliation.950 Holbrooke did arrange an important strategic dialogue that consisted 
of a series of meetings and an ambitious list of working groups, but dialogue and more 
economic and military support would not be sufficient to reorient Pakistan’s national security 
assumptions and approaches. His staff wrote concept papers on reconciliation, but did not 
outline ways to integrate it into the Obama strategy.951 For many in Holbrooke’s Special 
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) office reconciliation was an alternative 
to the military campaign, not a complementary effort. Finally, no action was taken to improve 
civil-military integration. The starkly different views presented by McChrystal and Eikenberry, 
for instance, should have raised serious questions as to whether unity of effort was even 
possible unless one of them was placed in charge. Political, diplomatic, military, and 
intelligence efforts continued operating in bureaucratic silos directed from Washington. ISAF 
commanders and Ambassadors attempted to improve on-the-ground coordination, but these 
could not over-ride demands from the top.952 The Obama Administration said that civilian and 
military efforts would be mutually reinforcing, but, as we saw in the Iraq case study, the reality 
was quite different. Afghans would continue exploiting the seams between bureaucratic silos. 
Frictions arose along the silos’ fault lines. Uncoordinated civilian and military efforts self-
synchronized in damaging ways – the most obvious case being the abortive June 2013 opening 
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of the Taliban political office, which will be discussed in Chapter 8. The whole remained less 
than the sum of its parts.      
The new approach, however, was carefully calibrated to limit audience costs. Gates assessed 
that Obama was growing ambivalent and wanted to wind down the war as quickly as possible 
without creating a rift in the Administration.953 The president needed to show he was listening 
to the advice of his military commanders, while not giving them everything they wanted. He 
also wanted to send a signal to the Afghan government and to his base of support in the 
Democratic party that U.S. commitment was not open ended.954 He wanted Karzai to take 
ownership of the war and reform his deeply corrupt government. McChrystal and Eikenberry 
received more resources; the latter’s dim view of Karzai’s bona fides acknowledged. Obama’s 
ambivalence, however, did not result in demands for more details about reconciliation or 
Pakistan. In short, a new President, who campaigned on Afghanistan as the real central front 
in the war on terror, felt compelled to give the military, the diplomats, his Vice President, and 
his political base enough of what they wanted to keep them on board. What suffered was the 
coherence needed for a strategy that could be dispassionately assessed and adapted.955 
The speech also sent mixed messages on war termination which reflected conflicting views 
within the Administration. The announcement of both a surge and a withdrawal timeline in the 
same speech heightened the risk that the Taliban could simply play for time – a problem that 
could undercut U.S. leverage in a future reconciliation effort. Vali Nasr, one of Holbrooke’s 
chief advisors believes that the White House was engaged in a concerted effort to block the 
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issue and to prevent Holbrooke from having any role in policy making.956 Holbrooke, however, 
had yet to coalesce his views into coherent form that could be discussed and debated. How 
reconciliation and counterinsurgency would integrate was never fully considered.957 Had 
reconciliation gone beyond the good-idea stage and been properly presented as a strategic 
option, the effects on reconciliation of announcing a withdrawal timeline would have come 
into question. Participants in the discussions recalled neither Holbrooke nor Clinton raising the 
concern.958 
 
More Shovels in the Quicksand 
Cognitive bias, bureaucratic frictions, and patron-client problems continued to impede 
American decision-making. These problems played a key role in Obama’s stubborn resistance 
to alter the withdrawal timeliness and his unwillingness to examine the assumptions on which 
the transition strategy was based. Obama had lost patience with the war – he was looking to 
leave. Obama was not the only one ambivalent about the prospects of a decisive victory by the 
Afghan government or in a near-term reversal of Taliban fortunes. McChrystal knew he did 
not have the resources or authorities for an outright win. The military’s mission was changed 
from “defeat” the Taliban to “degrade.”959 Even if the counterinsurgency campaign went well, 
without good governance and significant interdiction of Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan, the 
war would drag on. His fears were realized during Operation Moshtarak, a major effort to seize 
and control the Taliban stronghold of Marjah and Taliban held areas in northern Nad-e Ali 
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district in Helmand Province. This operation was to be followed months later by Operation 
Hamkari, an offensive into Taliban-held areas of Kandahar.960 The two operations, if 
successful, would take critical areas in the southern Pashtun heartland away from the Taliban. 
While the initial push into Marjah by a combined force of U.S. Marines and Afghan forces was 
successful in wresting control of the area, the hoped for “government in a box” (district level 
officials with economic resources at their disposal) that was to arrive and begin earning 
legitimacy was disappointing.961 Abdul Rahman Jan, the former Helmand Chief of Police, was 
a predatory actor who reportedly controlled much of the Noorzai-tribe-dominated police in the 
province. He allegedly let the Taliban take control of Marjah in 2007 in retaliation for his 
removal as the Provincial Chief of Police. Retribution, residents feared, would be more likely 
than reconciliation and population security if he returned to the position.962 Marjah, supposed 
to be a signature offensive in a new counterinsurgency campaign, soon became, in 
McChrystal’s words, “a bleeding ulcer.”963 By the spring of 2010, McChrystal, had come to 
believe that a negotiated outcome might hold the best prospects for durable success.964  
The intellectual work for that conclusion began in the fall of 2009. McChrystal asked Retired 
British Lt. Gen. Sir Graeme Lamb, who engineered reconciliation efforts with Sunni tribes in 
Iraq, to come to Kabul and develop a reintegration program.965 Lamb and a small team of two 
U.S. and two U.K. officers talked extensively with Masoom Stanekzai, whom Karzai 
designated to lead the effort for the Afghan government, and a host of Afghan officials and 
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elders from across the country.966 The team reviewed previous efforts, to include several 
localized initiatives that had been effective and the Afghan Government’s Peace through 
Strength (PTS) program. Successful efforts tended to focus on dispute resolution and inclusive 
governance.967 PTS, however, was largely a scheme to bribe insurgents to defect. The program 
was marred by corruption.  
Lamb and his team determined that good governance and dispute resolution were critical for 
reintegration. ISAF would need to support these efforts and develop ways to avoid targeting 
people engaged in substantive discussions. Local development projects that created jobs within 
affected communities could reinforce, but not substitute for, dispute resolution and improved 
local governance.968 Reintegration would probably hit a glass ceiling at local levels, they 
determined, due to the kleptocratic and predatory nature of the government and its resistance 
to reform. Even initial success could be quickly overturned by a new governor or chief of 
police. Furthermore, isolated efforts could be disrupted by the Taliban. Without significant 
support and efforts from the top-down, the bottom-up approach would have only limited 
impact. Reconciliation was critical for success.969 
This problem was outlined to McChrystal, who asked Lamb to study reconciliation further and 
advise him on the results.970 The reintegration effort was handed to an implementation staff 
(the Force Reintegration Cell [FRIC]), while Lamb and the small team thought through the 
reconciliation issue and held meetings with diplomats, current and former Afghan officials, 
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and former Taliban senior leaders. A series of briefings built the case that the Taliban had 
sustainable support within Afghanistan and sanctuary in Pakistan that was unlikely to be 
interdicted. The predatory corruption within the Afghan government and security forces was 
so profound that it undermined any realistic prospect of an Afghan government political victory 
in the foreseeable future.971  
Opportunities existed, too. The Taliban’s “Code of Conduct” and recent Eid messages had 
indicated that many Taliban public political positions were not dissimilar from public 
statements made by the Afghan government. There was a potential basis to for dialogue, but 
the competition for power would be the most difficult issue. An effort at a brokered deal would 
be problematic and potentially destabilizing – like the peace deals that fell apart in 1992 and 
1993 and led to the Afghan civil war. A peace process, Lamb’s team suggested, would need to 
be a deliberate effort, akin to the Northern Ireland process. Finally, the team noted the problem 
with the timeline. There was a major risk that the Taliban could simply wait out the United 
States. The best time to begin talks, therefore, was before all the surge forces arrived: take 
advantage of the uncertainty in the Taliban’s mind and get the effort moving. If the Taliban 
withstood the surge and U.S. forces had begun to drawdown, American leverage would decline 
substantially. The Taliban could play for time. I briefed this issue to a Deputies Committee 
small-group meeting (a restricted meeting of cabinet-level deputies) in late January 2010, after 
having socialized it with Holbrooke’s staff. 
To be successful, reintegration (as outlined by Lamb) and reconciliation efforts had to work 
hand-in-glove.972 Lower-level fighters leaving the ranks would put increasing pressure on the 
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senior leadership, while senior level talks could induce local commanders to bide their time 
(nobody wants to be killed right before a cease-fire) and perhaps engage in local conflict 
resolution efforts. By late Spring of 2010, facilitated by their respective staffs, Holbrooke and 
McChrystal had largely agreed on this view.973 By March 2010 McChrystal believed the time 
was right to begin facilitating discussions between Karzai and Pakistani Chief of Army Staff 
General Ashfaq Kayani on reconciliation.974 McChrystal was keen to avoid stepping into 
Holbrooke’s lane, but needed to help the effort gain traction.975 Such collaboration between the 
military command and SRAP ended abruptly when Obama accepted McChrystal’s resignation 
in June 2010, the day after the aforementioned Rolling Stone article was published.976  
 
Misapplying the Iraq Formula 
Confirmation bias played an important role in keeping the Obama approach on auto-pilot. 
General David Petraeus, the CENTCOM Commander, was selected to replace McChrystal. 
Still recovering from prostate surgery and years of high-pressure assignments, Petraeus brought 
with him vast experience and a brilliant reputation from Iraq. Petraeus’ view was that enough 
military pressure on the Taliban, plus a reintegration effort that could turn former insurgents 
into local police, could work in Afghanistan as it in Iraq. Petraeus tweaked his “Anaconda” 
concept from Iraq for application to Afghanistan, and brought in many members from the 
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MNF-I and CENTCOM teams to execute his plan.977 His reliance on the Iraq experience to 
guide his approach to Afghanistan has come under some criticism.978 A joke around the ISAF 
staff that summer was that every sentence began with the same two words: “In Iraq…” Petraeus 
recognized, though, that time was short and that he needed to produce unambiguous results if 
there was any hope of convincing Obama to delay the withdrawal timelines. His game-plan 
was consistent with the implicit theory of success from the NSC. He did not need people 
questioning the logic or second-guessing.979  
There were good reasons, however, to doubt that the formula in Iraq could be replicated 
successfully in Afghanistan. 980 The prevailing interpretation of the Iraq experience was that 
the surge in forces plus application of the new counterinsurgency doctrine and a reconciliation 
program convinced the Sunni tribes to turn against the deeply unpopular al Qaeda in Iraq.981 
Major reductions in violence were evident within a year.982 The assumption was that a similar 
effort in Afghanistan should produce like results. No other cases, however, were used for 
comparison.983 Escalations of the war in Vietnam or the Soviet war in Afghanistan, for 
instance, failed to achieve success. The sharp downturn in violence in Iraq was more 
complicated than portrayed by the military at the time and relied on political and social factors 
that were not present in Afghanistan. It would also turn out to be temporary. Stephen Biddle 
examined the cause and effect relationships between the surge and the Awakening, and 
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cautioned against a formulaic belief that more troops plus the new doctrine would lead to 
success elsewhere. 984 
The conflict in Afghanistan, in fact, differed substantially from Iraq. The former was far more 
atomized and localized. Tribal cohesion had broken down during thirty years of war and efforts 
by the communists and the Taliban to replace tribal identity with political or religious 
conformity.985 Convincing a Pashtun tribal leader to switch sides and bring thousands of people 
with him would not work in Afghanistan, because hardly any tribal leaders commanded such 
a following. The Taliban, since 2009, were placing increased emphasis on governance and 
were using the full range of coercion and persuasion to gain control and support.986 Their 
political program was far more sophisticated than AQI’s. The Taliban had a durable 
constituency in many rural areas of the south and east, and among Pashtun enclaves in the north 
and west. Unlike Iraq, the conflict did not break down into distinct ethnic and sectarian lines. 
Turning former insurgents into local police ran significant risk of creating new predatory actors 
in mixed communities, changing the make-up of local conflicts rather than resolving them.987 
To add to the challenges, the Afghan government rather than the coalition (as was the case in 
Iraq) ran the reintegration program. The Afghan government had no intention of using the 
program as a forcing function for good governance and local dispute resolution. Reintegration 
councils largely consisted of cronies of the governor or local power-broker, oftentimes the 
same actors who drove people to fight the government in the first place. Soon the program 
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reverted to the bribery schemes of the past.988 The program was absorbed by the kleptocracy, 
as government officials and reintegration councils extorted money and made phony 
reintegration reports. Curiously, the clear majority of “reintegrees” were Tajiks from the North 
and West, where the Taliban had no presence whatsoever.989 In some cases, local elites co-
opted predatory militias to declare themselves to be Taliban so they could “reintegrate,” 
become an Afghan local police force, and be a paid by the coalition.990 The predatory behavior 
never changed, but such militias now had official sanction. ISAF could demonstrate no 
correlation between reintegration numbers and lower levels of violence.991 This information 
was collected by ISAF, but military officials continued citing the program as effective in taking 
Taliban fighters and leaders off the battlefield.992  Such confirmation bias meant that no serious 
efforts were made to reform a program that ISAF viewed as central to success. As time would 
tell, there would be no Sons of Iraq equivalent in Afghanistan.  
 
Assessing Progress, Managing Risks 
The Administration’s new strategy required an annual assessment, which offered the 
opportunity to assess the strategic direction of the war and the likelihood of success. This 
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process began in October and lasted into December 2010. Violence hit record highs that year. 
The Afghan security forces were growing in size and capability, but had serious leadership and 
corruption problems and were progressing more slowly towards being able to operate 
independently than forecasted. The Kabul Bank collapsed late that same year, after over $900 
million had been looted. Mahmoud Karzai, the Afghan President’s brother, and Qaseem Fahim, 
the Vice President’s son, were implicated.993 Afghanistan remained at the very top of the 
world’s most corrupt governments.994 These problems led Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy Michèle A. Flournoy to conclude that the Afghan government was not winning the battle 
of legitimacy.995 Diplomatic efforts to induce Pakistan to “change its strategic calculus” and to 
turn on the Afghan Taliban, meanwhile, had yet to achieve any tangible results.996  
Interagency battle lines were drawn quickly. The intelligence community assessed that the 
Taliban had strengthened; the military command countered that the increases in violence were 
due to ISAF taking the fight into more Taliban controlled areas.997 The Defense Department 
insisted the counterinsurgency campaign was on track and simply needed more time to work.998 
After all, the surge forces had only been fully on the ground for a few months. Gates famously 
noted, “The sense of progress among those closest to the fight is palpable.”999 Holbrooke, who 
died suddenly of a heart attack during the process, was convinced that COIN had already failed 
and wanted a major push on reconciliation. Members of the White House staff, skeptical of the 
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surge in the first place, were convinced the military campaign was unlikely to produce results. 
Some reportedly pushed for a quicker drawdown.1000 The Departments of Defense and State 
both accused the White House staff of being policy advocates rather than honest brokers and 
of placing the greatest weight on the most negative interpretation of events.1001  
Confirmation bias was diluting the utility and objectivity in assessments. Individual agencies 
and the White House were making selective use of information to bolster their cases. The 
intelligence community assessments about the strength of the Taliban, endemic corruption in 
the Afghan government, and sanctuaries in Pakistan competed with optimistic assessments of 
progress from the field.1002 The conflicting assessments had plenty of facts on their side. What 
the NSC did not fully consider was that progress was being made in the field, but not nearly 
enough on the strategic factors that were placing success at highest risk. Interagency 
disagreement and an inability to develop and assess strategically relevant metrics reinforced a 
bias toward maintaining the status quo.  
Overall, the contentious 2010 Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual Review (APAR) refined the war 
aims and specified five lines of effort: a civil-military campaign to degrade the Taliban and 
build Afghan capacity; strategic partnership; transition to full Afghan sovereignty (security, 
economic, political); regional diplomacy; and reconciliation.1003 Reflecting the lack of 
interagency consensus and absence of discussion on war termination, the lines of effort were 
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co-equal and un-prioritized, but assumed to be mutually reinforcing toward a successful 
outcome. Unity of effort problems were not addressed. Each agency could continue optimizing 
efforts in their own lanes. Disagreements were largely addressed by watering down issues 
toward consensus.1004 The problems of bureaucratic silos and efforts on one line of effort 
having negative effects on the others was not considered. Reconciliation became a major 
friction point, as we will discuss in Chapter 8. 
The U.S. had a final opportunity at the end of 2011 to assess whether the transition strategy 
remained viable. This would be the last chance to alter course before the 2012 U.S. presidential 
elections and the major troop draw-downs in 2013. Administration officials and the military 
command in Kabul continued highlighting progress while noting that government corruption 
and insurgent safe havens in Pakistan were critical risks to success. At no point, however, did 
any senior official testify that these risks were insurmountable or that success required a 
significant course correction.1005 The October 2011 semi-annual report from DoD to Congress, 
for instance, summarized the situation in optimistic terms:  
 
[T]he International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and its Afghan partners have 
made important security gains, reversing violence trends in much of the country (except 
along the border with Pakistan), and beginning transition to Afghan security lead in 
seven areas …. Although security continues to improve, the insurgency’s safe havens 
in Pakistan, as well as the limited capacity of the Afghan Government, remain the 
biggest risks to the process of turning security gains into a durable, stable Afghanistan. 
                                                                 
1004 Interviewees H, J, L, M, P, W, X. 
1005 See the Senate Armed Services Committee, testimonies by Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and Chairman 
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The insurgency remains resilient, benefitting from safe havens inside Pakistan…. 
Nevertheless, sustained progress has provided increased security and stability for the 
Afghan population and enabled the beginning of transition in July of security 
responsibilities to Afghan forces in seven areas, comprising 25 percent of the Afghan 
population.1006   
 
The military believed its campaign plan would be successful in its specified tasks. The military 
component, although dwarfing other agencies in resources, comprised only a small part of the 
Administration’s five lines of effort. For the first line of effort, the command was responsible 
for the military portion of the civil-military campaign to degrade the Taliban and build Afghan 
capacity (in this case, the ANSF). The governance and corruption problems, which belonged 
to State, were outside their authorities.1007 For strategic partnership, the military played a 
supporting role to State in negotiations with the Afghan government. On transition, the military 
oversaw the security transition, but not the political and economic transitions. The military 
likewise played only supporting roles to State’s lead on regional diplomacy and reconciliation. 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Admiral Michael Mullen’s congressional testimony in 
September 2011 captures the matter.  
 
The military component of our strategy, to the extent it can be separated from the 
strategy as a whole, is meeting our objectives. Afghan and ISAF forces have rested the 
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initiative and the momentum from the Taliban in several key areas. The number of 
insurgent-initiated attacks has for several months been the same or lower than it was at 
the same time last year. And we are on a pace and even slightly ahead of our end 
strength goals for the Afghan national security forces.1008  
 
When asked directly by Senator Carl Levin, the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, if the effort was on course to meet the Obama timetable for the Afghan security 
forces to assume full security responsibility, Mullen replied, “As far as I can see, yes, sir… 
while the risk is up, I think it’s manageable and that there’s no question that we can get there 
and sustain the military success and the military component of the campaign.”1009 In short, 
military officials stayed in their bureaucratic lane and testified about the military progress and 
risks.1010 What no one questioned was whether a successful military campaign could still result 
in strategic failure if the sustainability of the insurgency and government legitimacy problems 
were not sufficiently addressed.1011 No one was responsible for addressing cross-cutting issues 
such as predatory corruption, Afghan political pressures that degraded ANSF readiness, and 
Pakistan sanctuary that were undermining the prospects of success. Because no echelon of 
command below the President was responsible and accountable for strategic success, this 
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problem was never properly identified or confronted.  Efficacy of the transition-and-withdraw 
strategy was never examined by the NSC. 
Despite important security gains, the insurgency remained sustainable. Violence levels in the 
second half of 2011 were indeed lower than the second half of 2010, but characterizing that as 
a trend would be misleading. 2011 showed a higher level of violence in the first half of the year 
[see Figure 4, below]. The 2010 parliamentary elections counted for much of the spike in 
attacks that summer, as the Taliban aimed to discredit the election and candidates used violence 
to suppress voting in areas where their opponents were popular. Violence in 2011 was three 
times higher than 2009. Although the military was tasked in 2009 to hand-over a residual 
insurgency to the ANSF by 2014, no standards were set to measure what residual meant or if 
insurgent strength in 2009 was the benchmark.1012  
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FIGURE 4 ENEMY INITIATED ATTACKS, AFGHANISTAN 2009-2013 1013 
 
The military offered no reason in its 2011 semi-annual reports to Congress, or in future reports 
or testimonies, to be overly concerned whether the insurgency would be sufficiently degraded 
to be handled by the ANSF at the end of 2014. “The ANSF are on track to assume full security 
responsibility by the end of 2014,” DoD assessed, “after successfully securing the presidential 
and provincial council elections and performing well during the fighting season.”1014 Although 
the ANDSF looked strong on paper, corruption and poor leadership were sapping their strength. 
Patron-client problems such as predation, sale of fuel, food, and equipment on the black market, 
ghost soldiers damaged readiness faster than capacity could be built. “How long would you 
stand and fight if your commander is stealing your food and equipment,” asked a former 
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Afghan military officer.1015 The Afghan Local Police, despite some positive examples, were 
particularly corrupt and predatory.1016 The fielding of western systems and equipment, 
meanwhile, was increasing ANDSF dependency on western advisors. A June 2011 Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee report warned of Afghanistan’s growing dependency and 
corruption.1017 In critical ways, ANDSF readiness to assume security responsibility was 
degrading even as their numbers and resources increased.  
Adding to the problems, insurgent sanctuary in Pakistan remained intact. The efforts to build a 
strategic partnership with Pakistan that would change the latter’s strategic calculus were 
ineffective. In May 2011, Obama approved the raid into Abbottabad, Pakistan, that killed al 
Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. Pakistan was outraged by the breach of sovereignty.1018 A 
month earlier a U.S. contractor had killed two Pakistani citizens in Islamabad, and was detained 
by Pakistani authorities despite American objections about diplomatic immunity.1019 A final 
blow came in a major border incident in which U.S. aircraft killed twenty-five Pakistan Frontier 
Corps soldiers who had fired on a nearby ISAF-ANSF patrol.1020 At that point Pakistan cut the 
ISAF logistics line leading from Karachi to Afghanistan, forcing the coalition to move supplies 
through Russia and Central Asia instead. In his final testimony to the Senate Armed Service 
Committee, Admiral Michael Mullen, who worked diligently to build a productive relationship 
with Pakistan Chief of Army Staff General Kayani, decried Pakistan’s use of insurgents as a 
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“veritable arm” of foreign policy.1021 A frustrated U.S. Senator Carl Levin, the Chairman of 
the Senate Armed Services Committee, reported that he asked Pakistani Prime Minister Gilani 
why Pakistan had not condemned attacks on U.S. forces by groups operating from Pakistani 
soil, and that he had received no answer.1022 
Finally, the Afghan government was not showing any evidence of reform. According to 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, Afghanistan was tied with 
Myanmar as the third most corrupt country in the world, behind North Korea and Somalia.1023 
Karzai resisted efforts to address corruption, faulting instead the United States for the 
problem.1024 Mullen explained, “If we continue to draw down forces apace while such public 
and systemic corruption is left unchecked, I believe we risk leaving behind a government in 
which we cannot reasonably expect Afghans to have faith.1025” Some Defense officials pressed 
hard for the U.S. government to develop a credible anti-corruption strategy, particularly 
Mullen’s senior advisor Sarah Chayes, but State was unable to put one together and feared the 
risks of breaking the relationship with Karzai. The matter was dropped.1026  
The White House was unwilling to address these problems or examine their implications. Part 
of the issue was bandwidth. Senior officials complained that getting any time on the National 
Security Advisor or President’s agenda was a tremendous challenge.1027 By 2011, although 
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Deputies meetings were frequent, NSC meetings on Afghanistan were becoming rare.1028 
Major events such as the Arab Spring, Iraq withdrawal, bin Laden raid, Libya intervention, and 
major domestic challenges all competed for NSC attention. When the war in Afghanistan did 
come up, it generally involved crisis management.1029 Little time or energy was available for 
considering highly complex issues.  
The reconciliation effort, as we will discuss in the next chapter, was in disarray by the fall of 
2011 and was by no means available to serve as a credible alternative approach. Believing that 
the “occupation narrative” was the driving force behind the Taliban’s ability to recruit, some 
senior White House and State officials clung to the argument that the drawdown would reduce 
the strength of the insurgency on its own.1030 In this view, winding down the war would lower 
the threat of the Taliban. This would make the ANSF’s job of securing the country easier, and 
leave greater capacity to pursue higher domestic and international priorities. That Afghans had 
been fighting other Afghans from the Soviet withdrawal in 1988 to the Taliban overthrow in 
2001 suggested the drawdown theory of peace was fanciful. In some ways, DoD’s assurances 
about the military campaign plan were also self-fulfilling for drawdown advocates in the White 
House. As long as the Administration believed that ANSF development was on track to secure 
the country by the end of 2014, there was no reason to take the political risks or suffer the 
political penalties of shifting priority to reconciliation, tackling corruption, or re-examining the 
withdrawal timeline. Confirmation bias, reinforced by measuring progress within bureaucratic 
silos, kept the withdrawal timeline off-limits to serious examination. 
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The Administration decided not to conduct a thorough review as it did at the end of 2010. 
Although DoD believed they could convince the President to “put more time on the clock” (to 
delay the draw-down), Obama held firm. He announced in June 2011 that the drawdown had 
begun and the combat mission would end in 2014, at which time the Afghans would be 
responsible for their own security.1031 The advocates of drawdown had won the argument, and 
there was no reason, from their standpoint, to open an interagency process that would 
invariably try to re-hash the issue.  
In the event, the security situation declined as international forces handed over security 
responsibility to the ANSF in mid-2013.1032 Although the surge achieved temporary effects 
where international forces concentrated, the Afghan government proved incapable of winning 
the battle for legitimacy in contested areas.1033 The United States was surprised by the extent 
of Taliban gains. The Afghan National Security Forces, ISAF asserted, was to be the “defeat 
mechanism” of the Taliban.1034 Problems continued to materialize. Although rated by coalition 
advisors at the end of 2014 as capable of independent operations to secure the province, nearly 
the entire Helmand-based 215th Afghan Army Corps collapsed a year later and had to be 
reconstituted.1035 The 215th was the newest Corps in the Afghan Army, but they were not 
covered by the post-2014 advisory mission. The British refused to take on the task, and the 
Obama administration declined to raise its troop presence to make up the difference. An 
Afghan military officer reported finding a Taliban warehouse of abandoned Corps equipment 
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during an operation in Marjeh.1036 By September 2015, the Taliban temporarily captured 
Kunduz, a provincial capital. This was the first major city they controlled since 2001.1037 Al 
Qaeda presence began to grow in 2015 and an ISIS-affiliate established presence in the 
strategic border province of Nangarhar.1038 In early 2017 over 30,000 suspected ghost soldiers 
were dropped from the rolls – nearly 10% of the ANDSF reported strength.1039 Instead of 
fighting a residual Taliban insurgency, as U.S. policy forecasted in 2009, the ANSF were facing 
the strongest Taliban movement since 2001 and a growing terrorist presence.1040 ISAF handed 
off not a residual insurgency, but one that had maintained or even grown strength, to an ANSF 
severely compromised by corruption, poor leadership, and political pressures. 
 
Conclusion 
Why did both governments fixate on ineffective strategies? Confirmation bias reinforced the 
Bush Administration’s belief that the war was won, that a small military effort could defeat the 
remnants of the Taliban, and that the international community could pick up the burden of 
reconstruction. Progress within political, military, and economic silos was given far greater 
weight than evidence of mounting problems. For the Obama administration, the unfounded 
belief that the Taliban would be unwilling to fight other Afghans and frustration over the Karzai 
government’s endemic corruption coupled with the Pentagon’s narrative about the ANSF’s 
readiness reinforced the logic of the withdrawal timeline. Even as evidence mounted that the 
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Afghan government was losing legitimacy, the ANSF were plagued by corruption and poor 
leadership, and the Taliban remained resilient with their sanctuaries in Pakistan intact the 
drawdown timeline was not re-examined before the end of 2014. Civilian and military officials, 
despite expressing reservations about risks, focused attention within their bureaucratic silos. 
The United States’ national security architecture discourages placing a civilian or military 
official in charge of the full-range of American political, diplomatic, military, intelligence and 
economic capabilities deployed to war zones like Afghanistan and Iraq. The result is that no 
one in the chain of command below President Obama had the authority and responsibility to 
focus on the big picture and to give a holistic appraisal of the situation and the probability of 
success. Each agency focused on progress within its own silo. The Obama administration thus 
hewed to a transition strategy that was unlikely to produce a successful outcome to the war, 
but would certainly result in a massive reduction of American troops in Afghanistan. 
Chapter 6 outlined early bureaucratic frictions that delayed counterinsurgency and nation-
building efforts, and allowed predatory actors at local and national levels to seize control of 
key centers of power and run roughshod over parts of the population. Elites continued to 
manipulate American forces and officials into advancing their personal and political agendas 
– sometimes by targeting their rivals. ISAF grew wise to this by 2010, but the strategic damage 
had been done. As both administrations operated in military, political, diplomatic, and 
economic silos, strategic risks were emerging along the seams and fault lines.1041 Each effort 
was making progress, but the whole was less than the sum of its parts. Military operations 
conducted with inadequate information or manipulated by elites had risk of undermining 
governance. Predatory corruption damaged government legitimacy and motivated people to 
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fight back. The inability of U.S. government agencies to agree about war termination, as will 
be explored in detail in the next chapter, left the Obama administration without a viable 
alternative. The tendency by both administrations to measure success within silos reinforced 
the narrative of progress and undermined their ability to understand and address the emerging 
strategic risks.  
Severe patron-client problems emerged for both administrations that impeded strategic-
decision making and coordination, masked the magnitude of challenges, and undermined 
capacity-building efforts. The U.S. and Afghan governments never developed a common 
strategy for the war. While the United States wanted to win quickly and leave, the new Afghan 
government focused on consolidating power and extending international presence and financial 
support. Karzai grew increasingly disillusioned with the United States, particularly during the 
Obama administration. As corruption grew as the glue holding powerful factions together 
under the Karzai administration, so did Obama’s desire to withdraw. The Obama 
administration, however, failed to develop a way to address corruption and bad governance 
and had no program to apply conditionality. Both administrations, meanwhile, provided 
funding to the Pakistani military in the hopes of inducing them to shut down Taliban 
sanctuaries. They fought the Pakistani Taliban instead. This support to Pakistan increased 
Karzai’s cynicism about American intentions, alarmed India, and reinforced Pakistan’s 
incentives to support instability in Afghanistan while maintaining the flow of American cash. 
The U.S. approach “became a de facto military attrition campaign,” Lute recalls, “the political 
and diplomatic efforts never materialized.”1042 
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These challenges also undermined the use of the transition method to achieve a favorable and 
durable outcome. By 2010, when the Afghanistan mission finally had significant resources and 
Washington’s attention, the deck was stacked against a successful transition. The U.S. 
government did not understand the predatory kleptocracy or appreciate the strategic risks it 
entailed. No one was responsible or accountable for addressing the problem. State was 
unwilling to take on the task. Efforts by ISAF were too limited to have significant effect. When 
the matter finally reached the NSC, the Obama administration punted. Even the Kabul bank 
crisis was not enough to motivate an interagency policy or plan to address the problem. 
Meanwhile, the Afghan government and political elites had long since co-opted the ANSF 
leadership. With army and police positions controlled by power-brokers that were bought and 
sold at exorbitant prices, the primary motivator for too many leaders was feeding the 
kleptocracy.1043 For them, fighting and winning the war was a lesser consideration. The selling 
and buying of offices, a cabinet-level Afghan official said, “is our biggest problem.”1044  
The predatory behavior was creating more support for the Taliban. Sufficient support within 
Afghanistan combined with sanctuary in Pakistan kept the Taliban sustainable. Corruption and 
poor leadership in the government and security forces undermined the Afghan government’s 
ability to win the battle of legitimacy in contested and Taliban controlled areas. Even conducted 
on the sizeable scale by the U.S. Embassy and the NATO Training Mission, the capacity-
building efforts were badly diluted by perverse incentives. These problems were draining 
readiness and performance in the government and security forces at a high enough pace that 
capacity-building efforts never achieved the crossover point. 
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To be fair, the risk factors in Afghanistan were subtler than they were in Iraq. The Iraqi 
government’s predatory sectarianism was easier to deduce and address than Afghanistan’s 
emerging predatory kleptocracy. Pakistan was less obvious in their support for the Taliban (as 
was India for anti-Pakistan factions) than Iran was for Sadrist militias. Al Qaeda in Iraq, 
wanting to provoke a sectarian civil war, never had a governance strategy and could not care 
less about winning the battle of legitimacy. The Taliban did. While Iraq hurtled into disaster, 






Chapter 8: Ending the War in Afghanistan 
President Obama’s decision on 1 December 2009 to announce both a surge of forces and a 
timeline for withdrawal, limited American leverage during exploratory talks and undermined 
the potential to secure a favorable and durable outcome. The Taliban, thus, were interested in 
an arrangement with the United States but not a peace process to resolve the broader conflict. 
They aimed to use exploratory talks to gain concessions that improved their legitimacy while 
coaxing the United States to complete the withdrawal of its forces. They refused to negotiate 
with the Afghan government until foreign forces had left Afghanistan. American bargaining 
power declined as the drawdown continued. By March 2012 the Taliban believed they had little 
to gain by continuing the talks and little to lose by walking out of them.1045 The reconciliation 
effort ended in disaster with the abortive attempt to open a Taliban political office in Doha on 
18 June 2013.1046 The fall-out from that event damaged U.S. legitimacy and contributed to an 
increasingly toxic environment in Afghanistan and the region.1047  
The United States and Taliban did manage to conclude a detainee exchange in June 2014, but 
this effort was de-linked from a peace process. Various exploratory conversations between 
Afghan officials and Taliban figures (outside the political commission) occurred in 2015, but 
stalled after the Taliban announced the death of their reclusive leader, Mullah Mohammad 
Omar.1048 By mid-2016, a new four-party effort called the Quadrilateral Core Group had yet to 
produce meaningful results.1049 As the security situation declined, President Obama ordered an 
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extension of U.S. military presence beyond 2016.1050 “When we first sent our forces into 
Afghanistan 14 years ago,” Obama said as he announced the extension, “few Americans 
imagined we’d be there — in any capacity — this long.”1051 When the conflict will be “ripe” 
for negotiations remains uncertain. 
 
A Fool’s Errand? 
Why did reconciliation efforts in Afghanistan fail? Former Holbrooke senior advisor Vali Nasr 
argues that the White House was “too skittish to try it,” but he does not discuss what factors 
made Obama reluctant to put his eggs in the reconciliation basket.1052 Thomas Waldman, in a 
paper examining the intellectual history of reconciliation, suggests that the military was too 
closeminded.1053 Afghanistan expert and former Pentagon senior advisor Sarah Chayes 
counters that this is too facile.1054 As we will discuss below, the military was quite supportive 
of reconciliation but various parts of the military embraced different concepts of it. The same 
was true of the State Department, the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan 
(SRAP) office, and the White House. Dobbins and Malkasian contend that all U.S. government 
parties were to blame for “a failure to initiate a peace process at the peak of U.S. leverage, as 
NATO troops were retaking large swaths of the Taliban’s heartland in Kandahar, Helmand, 
and nearby provinces.”1055 These arguments do not explore the reasons why the U.S. and 
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Afghan governments, the Taliban, Pakistan, and others ended up preferring to fight an 
inconclusive war rather than negotiate an end to it.   
Bringing an insurgency to a negotiated conclusion has been historically difficult. Political 
Scientist James D. Fearon argued in 2007 that only 16% of the 55 civil wars fought since 1955 
came to a negotiated end.1056 Chris Paul and his co-authors at RAND find that only 19 of 71 
wars against insurgencies since World War Two resulted in “mixed outcomes”, where neither 
side wins outright, but major concessions are made to end the conflict; in other words, a mere 
27%.1057 Fearon notes that, for the most part, the low rate of negotiated outcomes is not due to 
lack of effort. “Negotiations on power sharing are common in the midst of civil wars, as are 
failed attempts, often with the help of outside intervention by states or international institutions, 
to implement such agreements.” Such efforts usually fail, Fearon observes, due to mutually 
reinforcing fears: “combatants are afraid that the other side will use force to grab power and at 
the same time are tempted to use force to grab power themselves.”1058 This problem creates a 
type of prisoner’s dilemma in which both parties might recognize the benefits of peace, but do 
not trust the other party enough to take the risk to stop fighting. An imposing peace-keeping 
force or third-party enforcer might make the sides abide by an agreement temporarily, but 
unless sufficient trust is built the power-sharing arrangement is likely to fall apart.1059  
Scholars and Afghanistan experts have been divided over reconciliation.1060 Some academics, 
civil society advocates, and most Afghan elites associated with the former Northern Alliance 
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believed the Taliban to be irreconcilable.1061 They argued that any talks with the group would 
be akin to negotiating with terrorists, and inevitably result in trampling of human rights and 
legitimizing the use of terrorism as a political weapon. Non-Pashtun elites feared they would 
be sacrificed in any power-sharing arrangement with the Taliban; others likely foresaw a loss 
of economic spoils. Some scholars cautioned about the Taliban tendency to use negotiations as 
a stalling tactic.1062 A presumption of Taliban irreconcilability reflected the views of the Bush 
administration, particularly in the early years.1063  
From 2008 to 2011 an increasing chorus of experts and diplomats encouraged a political 
solution to the conflict. Most came to this conclusion due to the intractable nature of the conflict 
and the unlikely prospects of a clear military victory.1064 British SRAP Sir Sherard Cowper 
Coles was a consistent advocate for reconciliation since at least 2009. His advocacy up to that 
point kept reconciliation in the conversation with the United States, but he had been 
unsuccessful in getting the Obama administration to make it an important priorty.1065 The 
Afghanistan Study Group argued in 2010 that “the US should fast-track a peace process 
designed to decentralize power within Afghanistan and encourage a power-sharing balance 
among the principal parties.”1066 By 2009, senior U.S. commanders began to note that there 
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was no military solution to the conflict.1067 Other experts viewed reconciliation as necessary 
for the end-game, but believed that the surge needed time to place more pressure on the 
Taliban.1068 In this view, Taliban leaders would begin to opt-out of the insurgency and into the 
political and constitutional fabric of Afghanistan.  
Those supporting a negotiated outcome had to contend with the fact that neither the Afghan 
government nor the Taliban were willing or able to enter peace talks. Powerful constituencies 
in both actors believed that they could – or must – win outright. For any reconciliation process 
to become sustainable, these internal groups needed to be brought along. With the conflict in 
Afghanistan raging for over 30 years by 2010, anxieties and animosities were intense. As a 
veteran of the Northern Ireland peace process said to me, “Ninety-percent of the negotiations 
are with your own base, not with your adversaries.”1069 The Taliban, moreover, knew they 
could play for time. Obama’s announcement of a drawdown timeline meant that the Taliban 
simply needed to wait until July 2011 for the pressure to begin to ease.  
Third-party actors complicated matters, creating an even broader prisoner’s dilemma 
problem.1070 The Taliban capitulation and defection models required Pakistan to turn against 
the Afghan Taliban. A loss of sanctuary in Pakistan, plus intense military pressure in 
Afghanistan would have made the Taliban highly vulnerable to outright defeat.1071 The United 
States had proven unable thus far to motivate Pakistan to act against the Afghan Taliban. 
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Pakistan had no interest in forcing the Taliban to negotiate.1072 China might be able to compel 
a change in Pakistan’s strategic calculus, but their wider regional interests far outweighed any 
support for Taliban capitulation.1073 India was unlikely to support a power-sharing arrangement 
that might put their traditional Afghan allies out of power and draw Afghanistan into Pakistan’s 
orbit.  
A reconciliation effort in Afghanistan had to face these challenges. The conditions in early 
2010 were not yet ripe for negotiations to end the conflict. To bring this about required the 
Taliban and Afghan government and their backers to believe that neither side was likely to win 
outright, that the benefit of future military gains was not worth the cost, and that a path toward 
a peace process was compelling enough to overcome the status quo.1074 To bring about a peace 
process, the United States would have needed to modify its war termination strategy from 
transition-and-withdraw to a negotiated outcome. The Obama administration declined to do so, 
and thus had little bargaining leverage with the Afghan government, the Taliban, and Pakistan. 
Reconciliation never gained sufficient traction because it could not pass the credibility bar with 
Obama’s National Security Council (NSC). To do so, it needed to show clearly what conditions 
were necessary for key actors to decide that they could not win outright, how to bring about 
those conditions, and to outline an alternative path toward a peace process. These efforts had 
to be sufficiently compelling to overcome the status quo bias of the key actors, their fears of 
perfidy and loss, and significant audience costs. The absence of a conceptual apparatus for war 
termination within the U.S. government made these problems even harder, undermining 
communication and interagency cooperation. Obama’s focus on transition-and-withdraw, 
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moreover, eroded American leverage and limited the incentives for a negotiated end to the 
conflict. A drawdown timeline, General Petraeus reflected, “tells the enemy that he just has to 
hang on for a certain period and then the pressure will be less. In a contest of wills, that 
matters.”1075 Lack of vision and strategy, poor coordination, and sloppy execution reinforced 
these obstacles and friction points, dooming the effort to failure and Afghanistan to greater 
violence. Success might have been a long-shot, as two former SRAPs have argued. 1076 These 
problems made the odds far steeper than they needed to be. “The United States and Afghan 




Bureaucratic frictions and conflicting assessments undermined the ability of the Obama 
administration to pursue a coherent reconciliation effort before the draw-downs began to 
undermine American bargaining leverage. As mentioned in the last chapter, reconciliation 
became one of five un-prioritized strategic lines of effort in 2010, alongside the civil-military 
campaign, transition, strategic partnership, and regional diplomacy. The SRAP was responsible 
for regional diplomacy and reconciliation. Two factors boosted the importance of the latter. 
First, key advisors within State and Defense were successful in convincing the NSC during the 
2010 Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual Review (APAR) that reconciliation was a logical 
adaptation of the 2009 strategy. With the Afghan government actively resisting reform and 
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efforts to change Pakistan’s political calculus not bearing fruit, they argued, the Obama 
administration should investigate the prospects of reconciliation. If done carefully, exploratory 
measures need not conflict with the other lines of effort.1078  
These arguments were reinforced by requests from the Taliban for direct but secret talks. 
Tayyab Agha, the chief of the Taliban political commission and former secretary to Taliban 
leader Mullah Mohammad Omar, had asked Germany in 2009 to broker a meeting with the 
United States. After confirming his identity, the Germans arranged the first U.S. – Taliban 
meeting in Munich in November 2010.1079 The discussion was general in nature but suggested 
that the Taliban were serious about talks. The result for the United States, as Secretary of State 
Clinton later explained, was the “fight and talk” approach – a dual-track effort that could lead 
toward a reconciliation process or, at worst, confirmation of Taliban duplicity.1080  
The 2010 Annual Review determined that “[o]ur civilian and military efforts … must support 
a durable and favorable political resolution of the conflict. In 2011, we will intensify our 
regional diplomacy to enable a political process to promote peace and stability in 
Afghanistan.”1081 Exactly what reconciliation was supposed to achieve, however, remained 
vague – reflecting a broader conceptual ambiguity within the U.S. government. Officially, 
reconciliation was defined as Afghan-led dialogue with Taliban senior leaders toward a 
political resolution of the conflict.1082 On the one hand, reconciliation could be viewed as the 
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process leading toward the political resolution of the conflict. From this perspective, 
reconciliation should build toward a peace process that, while Afghan-led, would see an active 
American role. On the other hand, it could be interpreted as an enabler to a different process. 
From this perspective, the United States would convince the Taliban, whether by military or 
diplomatic means or a combination, to talk to the Afghan government. Once achieved, the 
United States would step back from the effort. The distinction is subtle, but the ambiguity 
would play an important role in the failure to achieve consensus on the effort. 
To build momentum for reconciliation, Secretary Clinton discussed the political and diplomatic 
surges at a landmark speech to the Asia Society in February 2011. “Today,” she noted, “the 
escalating pressure of our military campaign is sharpening a … decision for the Taliban.” The 
choices were to “break ties with al-Qaida, give up your arms, and abide by the Afghan 
constitution and you can rejoin Afghan society; refuse and you will continue to face the 
consequences of being tied to al-Qaida as an enemy of the international community.”1083 
Clinton had just outlined what became known as the three “red-lines” for reconciliation that 
were agreed with the Afghan government. Those who met the conditions could participate in 
the process. Those who refused would continue to be targeted. “This is the price for reaching 
a political resolution,” she announced. “If former militants are willing to meet these red lines, 
they would then be able to participate in the political life of the country under their 
constitution.” The speech was welcomed by many coalition partners who had come to the same 
conclusion about the need for a political resolution to the conflict.   
This new ‘fight and talk’ approach was complicated because the Obama administration had not 
formally discussed or come to an agreement about how to best achieve a favorable and durable 
outcome. Exactly what reconciliation was designed to achieve and how it would integrate with 
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other efforts was never properly settled. Petraeus, notes Vali Nasr, was skeptical of the 
reconciliation ideas envisioned by Holbrooke.1084 When asked by the latter to discuss 
reconciliation, the general reportedly replied, “that’s a 15-second conversation. Eventually yes, 
but no. Not now.”1085 Despite having only one year with surge forces in place (unless he could 
convince Obama to delay withdrawals) Petraeus believed such efforts to be premature. “It was 
clear from the outset – due to sanctuaries they enjoyed in Pakistan,” Petraeus recollected, “that 
we could not sufficiently pressure the leaders of the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network to 
get them to negotiate seriously.”1086 The lack of war termination doctrine and clarity on 
reconciliation led to divergent views within the U.S. government. Petraeus’ view is consistent 
with capitulation and the three red-lines articulated by Clinton. Holbrooke envisioned 
discussions leading toward a compromise political settlement. Although the White House 
authorized the exploratory talks, but was unwilling to put any political capital behind the 
effort.1087 The matter was also potentially compromised by how reconciliation was framed to 
the Taliban. They could surrender and trust the Afghan and U.S. governments to treat them 
fairly or they could keep being targeted. Unless the Taliban believed themselves to be on the 
verge of defeat, they would be unlikely to capitulate.  
Within the Obama administration, at least four different ideas competed for traction. The status 
quo position, albeit implicit, was that the civil-military campaign to build Afghan capacity and 
degrade the Taliban, plus efforts to change Pakistan’s political calculus and shut-down 
insurgent sanctuaries, would make enough progress to allow the Afghan government and 
security forces to take over responsibility for security by 2014 and finish off a residual Taliban 
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insurgency. The Afghan National Security Forces, ISAF claimed, would be the “defeat 
mechanism” of the Taliban.1088 In this view, reconciliation would bring surrendering Taliban 
into the political fabric of Afghanistan. This was the concept implied in Clinton’s February 
2011 speech and was supported by the Afghan government, the military command and 
Ambassador in Kabul, the Pentagon, and the White House. This approach was attractive 
because it required no substantive political compromise, limited audience costs, and, if 
achieved, could be viewed as a clear victory. This approach could have been successful in 
2001. The downsides ten years later were its obvious conflicts with reality. The Taliban were 
under significant pressure, but nowhere near the point of contemplating surrender. American 
officials involved in reconciliation had to deal with the incongruity in one of two ways: either 
change the strategy or simply do what you could within an unrealistic construct.   
Some members of the SRAP team addressed the incongruity by arguing that reconciliation 
should aim for a peace deal or “grand bargain” with the Taliban.1089 Vali Nasr argues that this 
was largely the view of Holbrooke and some of his key advisors.1090 “COIN has failed,” a 
senior SRAP official told me in 2011, now it was the diplomats turn to take over.1091 The grand 
bargain offered the potential for a near-term end to the conflict. There were major downsides, 
however. First, peace deals in low trust environments can be destabilizing.1092 Recent Afghan 
experiences with peace deals were not positive ones. As noted in Chapter 6, the Peshawar 
(1992) and Islamabad (1993) Accords led to and perpetuated the Afghan civil war. Second, 
there seemed little appetite within the Afghan government or polity for such a deal. To many 
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Afghans, particularly the former Northern Alliance factions in government and civil society 
groups in Kabul, a peace deal with the Taliban was anathema. Senior SRAP Advisor Rina 
Amiri voiced concerns about the potential for backlash and the need to carefully gain Afghan 
buy-in.1093 Senior State and Defense officials, myself included, voiced these same concerns.  
Marc Grossman, a highly accomplished and respected career ambassador, was in a difficult 
position as Holbrooke’s replacement. He likely recognized the unlikelihood of large-scale 
Taliban defections assumed in the status quo and the downsides of the grand bargain. He 
consequently developed, over time, a less ambitious and potentially more achievable approach 
of using confidence-building measures and regional diplomacy to get the Taliban to agree to 
meet with the Afghan government. “To try to open the door for Afghans to talk to other 
Afghans about the future of Afghanistan,” as he described.1094  
The upside to this approach was its limited and potentially attainable goal. It focused on playing 
a declining hand well rather than seeking to improve the hand or change the game. The United 
States was losing negotiating leverage, but it might still have enough carrots to get a Taliban 
agreement to begin official talks with the Afghan government. Such a step would imply Taliban 
recognition of the Karzai government as a legitimate negotiating partner – a substantial 
achievement. This approach limited the need for interagency coordination and conformed 
closely to the traditional envoy-to-envoy discussions diplomats spend their careers doing. It 
also removed the United States from negotiating peace. 
The downsides included the potential backlash in the United States and Afghanistan of talks 
with and concessions toward the Taliban – which constituencies in both countries regarded as 
a terrorist group. Talks with the United States would confer more political legitimacy on the 
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Taliban than they had had to date. There was also the potential for the United States to make 
key concessions to the Taliban in exchange for a single meeting that the latter could easily 
orchestrate into a propaganda coup. This approach would not bring an end to the conflict nor 
set the conditions for negotiations that gave maximum advantage to the Afghan government 
and protection for U.S. interests. Unless sufficiently coordinated, it might also be viewed 
suspiciously by the Afghan government. At best, this process would set a precedent for 
discussions, which would realistically occur only after international forces completed the 
drawdown. At that point, the Afghan government would be in a relatively weaker position than 
it was from 2011 to 2014. In short, the approach might accomplish the narrow objective of 
arranging a meeting, but arguably little to support U.S. strategic goals. 
My personal view, as the Defense Department lead for the effort, together with some senior 
advisors at State, was that reconciliation should be a deliberate and incremental peace process 
(rather than peace deal) that was closely coordinated with the Afghan government. I based this 
view on a significant amount of personal research at the time on war termination.1095 The 
prospects for a favorable and durable outcome that met U.S. interests, we felt, were more likely 
to be achieved by this approach than the other three. Reconciliation should take a strategic 
rather than tactical approach – and be the priority among the five lines of effort.  
We argued that given the strategic situation, a deliberate peace process held the best 
opportunity for the United States to achieve the most favorable and durable outcome realistic 
at the least possible costs. Rather than continue with a strict drawdown timeline, the 
Administration should stabilize the troop presence indefinitely to convince the Taliban it would 
not win through force of arms. Ideally, exploratory talks should begin before the surge forces 
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arrived to take advantage of the uncertainty within the Taliban about how much damage the 
military effort would do to them. If the Taliban withstood the surge and the United States began 
drawing down forces, we argued, the Taliban could simply play for time. They might negotiate 
our withdrawal, as the North Vietnamese did during the Vietnam War, but not an end to the 
conflict. A stalemate in which the Afghan government controlled 90% of the country to the 
Taliban’s 10% would certainly put the Afghan government in a position of significant strength 
for negotiations.  
A compelling vision and strategy was needed to bring about a peace process. A step-by-step 
approach that built trust and confidence, we reasoned, could lead within a few years to growing 
consensus on key political principles and measures to reduce violence, and eventually to cease-
fires and discussions on more sensitive political issues. This process could also test Taliban 
intentions at relatively low risk, while assessing the veracity of their statements and credibility 
of their commitments. The national-level process needed to be complemented by local 
reintegration efforts that focused on good governance and conflict resolution, and a regional 
dimension to address inter-state issues. This approach was more likely than the alternatives to 
result in a successful resolution to the conflict, but would probably take years to come to 
fruition. Afghanistan had been at war by then for over 30 years. A durable peace would not 
break out after a few meetings. The other lines of effort would need to align their efforts 
accordingly.  
This approach had its downsides, too. It would require Obama to modify the withdrawal 
timelines and suffer potential audience costs.1096 Talks with the Taliban were politically risky 
in the United States and Afghanistan. The Administration would also incur the fiscal risk to 
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higher domestic and international priorities of having large numbers of troops in Afghanistan 
beyond 2014, if the negotiations had not progressed by then to entail troop reductions. This 
approach required strategic patience and a long-term view, both often in short supply in Kabul 
and Washington. In short, it was very difficult politically, but preferable, we thought, to losing 
or to post-2014 negotiations in which the Taliban had much greater leverage. State and Defense 
coordinated closely on a paper along these lines just before Grossman took over at SRAP. This 
proposed approach was approved by NSC Deputies, but was never moved forward for approval 
by Principals or disseminated to the field for implementation.1097 Some State and Defense 
officials close to the effort suggested that the concept was much more ambitious than Grossman 
was comfortable attempting.1098 
SRAP moved forward with the more limited approach. DoD agreed that a serious reconciliation 
effort needed to employ in concert several elements of national power.1099 With 100,000 troops 
on the ground, the Pentagon believed their military capabilities could be of significant help. 
They were also concerned about the security and force protection implications if uncoordinated 
agreements were made during talks. Conversely, military operations conducted in isolation 
could have very damaging effects on reconciliation. Talks could easily be derailed, for instance, 
if an interlocutor was killed or captured. Spoiler activity needed to be understood and 
managed.1100 Moreover, the military had several “tribes” of its own that needed to support the 
effort. In addition to the military and civilian officials at the Pentagon, the four-star commands 
at ISAF, US Central Command, US Special Operations Command, and NATO all had equities. 
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Two ISAF commanders told me that they wanted to support the effort but needed to know what 
to do.1101 The military wanted to help, but needed to be brought along.1102  
SRAP’s resistance to a reconciliation strategy might seem odd, while the Pentagon’s insistence 
on having one might appear to others as a terrible encroachment. Because of their effects on 
reconciliation, it is worth explaining the different institutional views on strategy between the 
US military and diplomats. Borrowing from management theory, the military tends to favor 
deliberate strategy, while diplomats tend to embrace emergent strategy.1103 The Pentagon is 
very good at the former. Any serious issue undergoes a rigorous planning effort that is vitally 
important for the coordinated activity of thousands of people, the organization of massive 
amounts of logistics, and the integrated application of lethal force and capabilities. Deliberate 
strategy, however, can over-engineer problems and limit flexibility. State’s institutional culture 
views planning as a waste of time. As explained to me by former State Department officials, 
when a diplomat wants to slow-roll something into non-existence one of the first acts is to call 
for a plan.1104 American diplomats tend to be more comfortable with emergent strategy – 
skillfully playing the hand you are dealt while adapting to a dynamic situation and the efforts 
cooperative or adversarial partners, all to protect or advance U.S. interests. Holbrooke 
appropriately likened diplomacy to jazz.1105 This approach, however, limits interagency 
coordination and integration, and can come across as simply making it up as you go along. If 
the players do not understand music, noise results. The risk may be low if the diplomatic effort 
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is operating on its own, but increases significantly when other stakeholders and American lives 
are involved. Those who do not think ahead and set conditions for success can be 
outmaneuvered by others who do.  
Reconciliation, under any of the concepts except perhaps Grossman’s very limited method, 
needed an appropriate blend of both deliberate and emergent strategies. The United States 
never properly articulated its reconciliation strategy, which frustrated Defense and some in 
SRAP and probably made Grossman feel second-guessed and micromanaged. “There were 
occasions,” Grossman reflected, “when some colleagues tried to micromanage the conversation 
with the Taliban in ways designed to make it impossible to continue, but the need to keep inter-
agency representatives engaged and as supportive as possible overrode my periodic 
frustrations.”1106 To be sure, ideas on reconciliation from Defense could be as unwelcome to 
some diplomats as State recommendations on military efforts would be to some generals. 
The result was the lack of an agreed concept within State, within the U.S. government, and 
between the American and Afghan governments. Various stakeholders were pulling in different 
directions and potentially sending mixed messages to other parties. “Bureaucratic silos and turf 
battles undermined coordination on reconciliation,” reflected former Deputy SRAP Vikram 
Singh.1107  
 
Competing Visions: Karzai, Taliban, Pakistan  
Patron-client challenges further undermined the prospects of bringing the war into a peace 
process. Other key stakeholders, of course, had their own views and interests which would 
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need to be addressed for reconciliation to gain sufficient traction. At the risk of 
oversimplification, I will focus on the Afghan government, the Taliban, and Pakistan, 
recognizing that they are not unitary actors (or the only actors) but that their positions had to 
address views from an array of internal and external stakeholders. Their policies, in many ways, 
were designed to account for these varied inputs, pressures, and constraints.   
Karzai had an altogether different view on reconciliation, beyond agreement on the three red-
lines (renounce violence, accept the Afghan Constitution, and cut ties with al Qaeda). In some 
ways, Karzai could not accept the fact that Afghans were fighting against his government. He 
believed that local fighting was the result of America bringing the war to Afghan (mainly 
Pashtun) villages and the associated backlash over civilian casualties and questionable 
detentions.1108 The Taliban leadership, he believed, was wholly a creature of Pakistan. With 
enough money and American pressure on Pakistan, he argued that he could bring about the 
defection of Taliban senior leaders and bring them into his orbit.1109 To increase pressure on 
Pakistan, the Afghan government had also begun clandestine support of the Pakistani 
Taliban.1110 Karzai was not interested in formal talks between his government and the 
insurgency, which he believed gave the latter political legitimacy they did not deserve. He 
rejected participation in reconciliation conferences in which his government would be treated 
as one of many “Afghan parties” along with the Taliban, political opposition figures, and civil 
society groups.1111 The US intelligence community did not believe the Karzai approach was 
realistic given the political cohesion of the Taliban, the weakening ties between the Pakistani 
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government and Taliban, and the near impossibility of eradicating Taliban sanctuaries 
alongside densely populated Afghan refugee camps and city sectors that had existed for over 
thirty-years.1112 By 2014 only one estranged former Taliban senior leader, Agha Jan Mutasim, 
had defected after he was shot and left for dead by his erstwhile compatriots.1113 
Karzai’s approach reflected the limited political space in Afghanistan for reconciliation. Elites 
from the former Northern Alliance, warlords, and civil society actors were adamantly opposed 
to negotiations with the Taliban.1114 Such talks might re-open the issue of accountability for 
war crimes during the Afghan civil war; anti-Taliban warlords had orchestrated an amnesty bill 
in 2007 that forgave them of such crimes.1115 They also feared that a deal with the Taliban 
would come at political and economic cost to them. Civil society actors highlighted the 
potential for backsliding on human rights. A peace deal or process would likely result in 
discussions about political reform or changes to the constitution. The co-opt and defect model 
would not. India, meanwhile, was not keen on any reconciliation effort that diminished the 
influence of their supporters or increased Pakistani influence in Afghanistan.1116 
To build support for his approach, Karzai held a Consultative Peace Jirga in June 2010. The 
jirga appointed a High Peace Council under the leadership of former President Burhanuddin 
Rabbani.1117 Rabbani was the head of the Badakhshan-based Jamiat-e Islami Afghanistan party 
during the Soviet war and had served as the President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan from 
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1992 to 1996 when his government was ousted by the Taliban. The High Peace Council (HPC) 
led by the fiercely anti-Taliban Rabbani could provide Karzai with the political cover he 
needed. As Indo-Afghan ties strengthened due to Pakistan’s malign activity, so did Karzai’s 
caution on reconciliation. 
The view from the Taliban was quite different. Although many U.S. and international officials 
regarded Secretary Clinton’s February 2011 speech as a breakthrough towards peace, the 
Taliban viewed the red-lines as unacceptable pre-conditions.1118 To lay down arms and cut ties 
with their allies, even ones as problematic to them as al Qaeda, before entering talks was 
tantamount to surrender. Moreover, to forfeit so much leverage before negotiations would be 
foolish, and potentially suicidal. The Taliban were under substantial military pressure, to be 
sure, but their sanctuaries remained intact and they had no trouble recruiting in Afghanistan or 
funding the insurgency.1119 They were certainly not on the brink of surrender or defeat, and 
many senior leaders remained confident in their prospects for eventual success. In addition, to 
accept the Constitution meant accepting the legitimacy of the Bonn process, from which they 
were excluded, and to accept the provision in the preamble that resistance to the Taliban was 
on par with resistance to the Soviets.1120 Some current and former Taliban senior leaders 
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considered the provision hypocritical, noting to me that Afghan officials and warlords do not 
themselves abide by the Constitution.1121  
The Taliban developed their own dual-track approach.1122 They were keenly interested in 
discussions with the United States, but not in negotiations to end the conflict. Their approach 
to talks was not cynical; it reflected strategic calculation.1123 They would continue the military 
campaign, but use diplomacy to build legitimacy in the eyes of Afghans and the international 
community.1124 If the Taliban overthrew the government, they would need international 
assistance to survive.1125 As Tayyab Agha explained to me in September 2010, “We were the 
government once, but we were isolated from the international community…. When we return 
to government, we need to have good relations with the world, especially the United States.”1126 
If the Taliban could not win outright and the war came to a stalemate, their leverage in 
negotiations would be far higher after international forces left. The gradual drawdown of 
international forces served to increase the Taliban bargaining leverage over time, while 
reducing that of the United States.  
The Taliban had audience costs to consider, too. They had to build support carefully within 
their diverse and highly decentralized movement, just like the United States and Afghan 
government would have to bring along their constituencies. After vilifying the Karzai 
government as puppets and the international forces as infidel occupiers, a sudden move toward 
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peace negotiations risked splintering the insurgency.1127 The dual-track approach afforded the 
opportunity to sustain the military campaign, while building international credibility that would 
be needed if the Taliban returned to power.1128  
Confirmation bias and political frictions undermined the U.S. government’s ability to exploit 
key differences between the Taliban and al Qaeda. Many senior U.S. officials and Members of 
Congress viewed the Taliban and al Qaeda as largely one in the same, and wanted no 
negotiations with terrorists.1129 Of course, such a view was overly simplistic. In fact, the 
relations between the Taliban and al Qaeda were always rocky and had atrophied over time.1130 
As discussed in the previous chapter, bin Laden was invited to Afghanistan in 1996 by Abdul 
Rassoul Sayyaf with Rabbani’s permission. Tayyab Agha commented several times during the 
talks that the Taliban had “inherited al Qaeda.” They accepted their support and provided them 
sanctuary, too. Nonetheless, it is interesting to examine some of the documents from the bin 
Laden raid that have been released recently by the Department of National Intelligence. In one, 
al Qaeda senior leader Abu Yahya felt compelled to issue a guidance letter about proper 
behavior to presumably Gulf Wahabbis wanting to join the fight in Afghanistan among 
Deobandis.1131 In a letter to bin Laden an al Qaeda operative describes their support as only 
moral and symbolic, “We are participating in the work in Afghanistan, and we have to do that, 
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but praise be to God, Taliban almost does not need us.”1132 After bin Laden questioned Mullah 
Omar on the wisdom of talking with the international community, Tayyab Agha issued a 
strongly worded reply explaining the Taliban’s rationale on religious and practical grounds and 
rejecting bin Laden’s description of talks as appeasement.1133 The Taliban also seem to have 
asked bin Laden not to return to Afghanistan or to appoint an al Qaeda representative for 
Afghanistan.1134 The Taliban, in short, could potentially offer the US what it wanted most 
(cutting ties with al Qaeda) in exchange for what the Taliban wanted most – withdrawal of 
international forces so the insurgency could fight an unaided Afghan government.1135 
To support their diplomatic efforts, the Taliban revamped their strategic communications and 
political program. Prior to 2008, their Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha statements attributed to 
Mullah Omar were pedantic vitriol. Beginning in 2009, these statements became far more 
sophisticated and clearly aimed at both Afghan and international audiences. The new narratives 
repeatedly noted the strictly national aspirations of the Taliban and that they posed no threat to 
other countries. The September 2009 Eid al-Fitr message explained: 
The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan wants to maintain good and positive relations with 
all neighbors based on mutual respect and open a new chapter of good neighborliness 
of mutual cooperation and economic development.  
We consider the whole region as a common home against colonialism and want to play 
our role in peace and stability of the region. We assure all countries that the Islamic 
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Emirate of Afghanistan, as a responsible force, will not extend its hand to cause 
jeopardy to others as it itself does not allow others to jeopardize us.1136  
 
The last line was carefully crafted to show the Taliban’s distance from international terrorism. 
Although the nuance was largely lost on western governments, the statement caused a stir 
within the larger jihadi community.1137 Despite the controversy, the Taliban doubled down on 
the sentiment in a 14 October 2009 open letter to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
Conference.1138 The Taliban also began discussing issues such as good governance, civilian 
protection, and human rights in terms that were not dissimilar to Afghan government 
positions.1139 Some compared quite favorably to U.S. allies in the Gulf. 
One potential explanation for the change in tone and substance was taqiyya – the statements 
were propaganda designed to deceive Afghans and the international community about the 
Taliban’s true agenda. Their increased use of suicide bombings and victim-operated IEDs in 
2009, for instance, certainly undermined elements of the Taliban narrative. On the other hand, 
they may have surmised that they were getting little strategic benefit from al Qaeda but 
incurring great costs in legitimacy. They may also have determined a need to focus on 
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governance and to adapt to Afghan expectations on various political and social issues.1140 The 
progressive statements were likely more reflective of the views of the political commission 
rather than the rank and file. Nonetheless, the new narrative on these issues caused no apparent 
ripple with the Taliban movement – a reasonable test for potential audience costs.1141 Sincerity, 
of course, would need to be tested. 
The Taliban senior leadership authorized their political commission in 2009 to begin outreach 
with the international community, including the United States. To support these efforts, the 
Taliban established an unofficial office in Doha, Qatar. This would give those such as Tayyab 
Agha who were not on the UN sanctions lists better access to the outside world. Having an 
office in Doha also helped the Taliban political commission operate independently of 
Pakistan.1142 Diplomatic efforts by the Taliban required freedom of movement and the ability 
to meet interlocutors – an office in Pakistan could be subject to considerable pressure from the 
ISI. Because Qatar hosted a major U.S. military base, the Taliban believed that the Americans 
might be more willing to engage them in Doha. They likewise surmised that the Qataris could 
play a helpful intermediary role. Qatar, aspiring to be a diplomatic force in Gulf, accepted the 
opportunity.1143 By the end of 2011, the Taliban had reached out to over twenty countries and 
was participating in unofficial conferences in places such as Norway, Japan, and France.1144   
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Pakistan, with its national security policy run by the Army, was arguably more of a unitary 
actor than the others. Their spy service, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) – whose external 
operations branch is responsible for monitoring, liaising, and supporting various “asymmetric 
groups” – is subordinate to the Chief of Army Staff. As Stephen Tankel notes, scholars have 
developed three broad terms to explain government relationships toward militant groups: 
collaboration (active support), enablement (passive support), and belligerence. Borrowing a 
term from the field of economics, Tankel adds a fourth relationship: coopetition, which denotes 
“frenemies” or groups that straddle more than one category.1145 The categorization has its 
limits, but is sufficiently useful to describe the relationship between Pakistan and the Afghan 
Taliban, and its effects on reconciliation.  
The ISI’s command and control relationship with Kashmir-oriented groups like Lashkar e-
Taiba is collaborative. Their support for Afghan insurgent groups during the Soviet war could 
be described as somewhere between collaborative and enabling – providing logistics, funding, 
and expertise, but normally not directing operations in Afghanistan.1146 In contrast, the ISI’s 
relationship with Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – or the Pakistani Taliban – on the other 
hand is one of belligerence.1147 The Pakistani relationship with the Afghan Taliban appears to 
be a hybrid. The Taliban clearly have sanctuary in Pakistan, particularly within the densely 
populated refugee camps that have been in existence since the late 1970s, where they can 
recruit, train, plan, and gather logistics. The Afghan Taliban, moreover, has been de-stabilizing 
the India-friendly Afghan government, something that works to Pakistan’s interests. The latter 
may see little need to assert direct control – the attempt to do so would likely create greater 
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animosity. The relationship, however, is distant. The Afghan Taliban both needs and fears 
Pakistan.1148 They need the sanctuary; they fear being perceived as or coerced into being a 
puppet.1149 This dilemma helps to explain why the Taliban sought a political office in Doha – 
a country outside Pakistan’s orbit and pressure. The ISI longstanding relationship with the 
Haqqani Taliban, on the other hand, is much closer to collaboration.1150 Occupying parts of 
North Waziristan, the Haqqanis (who are also believed to have closer ties with al Qaeda) have 
been useful to the ISI as intermediaries with various TTP groups and with the Quetta-based 
Taliban leadership. In return, the Haqqanis receive direct support from the ISI, enabling them 
to carry out high-profile operations inside Afghanistan.  
This view of the relationship is not universal. Many Afghans and some US officials and 
scholars view Pakistan’s relationship with the Afghan Taliban as puppet-master to puppet – an 
extreme form of collaboration.1151 Such views are often corroborated in remarks by Pakistani 
officials, who have recently been open about the existence of Taliban sanctuary in Pakistan.1152 
In early 2010, Mullah Omar’s deputy Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar was apprehended in 
Karachi, allegedly for participating in unauthorized talks.1153 A Pakistani security official told 
The New York Times, “We picked up Baradar . . . because [the Taliban] were trying to make a 
deal without us. We protect the Taliban. They are dependent on us. We are not going to allow 
them to make a deal with Karzai and the Indians.”1154 Such statements seem proof positive of 
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Pakistan’s control of the Afghan Taliban. However, they are also consistent with the hybrid 
model, in which Pakistan acquiesces in Taliban presence and provides enabling support, but 
will act against them when its interests are threatened. The hybrid model also better explains 
the Taliban decision to put the political office in Doha and Pakistan’s adverse reaction to it.1155  
The nature of the relationship is important for reconciliation. Were Pakistan the puppet-master, 
they could have delivered the Taliban to negotiations. These have been the demands of the 
Afghan and U.S. governments. If, however, the relationship is more of a hybrid in which the 
Taliban are autonomous in their strategic decision-making but not fully independent (due to 
the needs and constraints of sanctuary), then the prospects of Pakistan forcing the Taliban into 
negotiations are unrealistic. As Barnett Rubin and Ahmed Rashid conclude, “No state can be 
successfully pressured into acts it considers suicidal.”1156 Pakistan has not been against 
reconciliation, but they want to assure their interests in the outcome and this presents a major 
obstacle given their historic tensions with Afghanistan and India. As such, they have opposed 
the capitulation and the co-opt and defect models because they believe the result would be a 
stable, hostile, pro-India Afghanistan.  
 
Exploratory Talks: Building and Damaging Confidence 
Political and bureaucratic frictions within the U.S. government, the lack of a body of expert 
knowledge for wartime negotiations, and major resistance from Karzai, undermined the 
reconciliation effort as exploratory talks began. In late 2010 US officials began meeting 
periodically with Tayyab Agha. After a few sessions, the talks centered on confidence building 
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measures. The Taliban wanted several prisoners released, particularly five senior leaders 
detained in the U.S. military prison at Guantanamo (GTMO). They also wanted UN sanctions 
on them lifted and recognition of their political office in Doha. In turn, the United States wanted 
the Taliban to release Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, a U.S. soldier they captured in 2009, and for 
the Taliban to denounce international terrorism, announce support for a peace process, and to 
begin meeting with the Afghan government.1157 The Taliban said they would talk with the 
Afghan government at the end of the confidence-building process.1158 The talks continued 
throughout 2011 and into 2012. Karzai was informed of the main points after each meeting.1159  
Grossman and I joined the talks in mid-2011 as the confidence building measures were gaining 
definition. The London conference in early 2011 had solidified Karzai’s call for December 
2014 to be the end of the ISAF combat mission. Obama’s speech in June 2011 specified that 
transition to ANSF-led security was to be complete by the end of 2014.1160 The timeline 
announcements likely solidified the Taliban’s negotiating strategy. Having withstood the 
surge, they had no incentive to negotiate an end to the conflict until they could take on the 
Afghan government after international forces had left. They also had little incentive to make 
compromises that might cause tension within their ranks, particularly any actions that might 
confer legitimacy on the Afghan government.  
Grossman played the hand he was dealt as well as he could. He focused on creating a sequence 
of confidence-building measures designed to result, step-by-step, in the opening of a Taliban 
political office in Doha and Taliban statements denouncing international terrorism and 
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supporting a peace process; a series of detainee releases in which a portion of the GTMO-5 
would be transferred to Doha; Bergdahl released; the remainder of the GTMO-5 sent to Doha; 
and then meetings with the Afghan government.1161 A couple of obstacles remained. First, the 
Taliban needed to agree to terms of reference for the detainees sent to Doha which included 
limitations on activities and a travel ban until the end of 2014. Second, they needed to agree to 
rules for the political office. These included certain restrictions, most importantly, that the 
office not appear as an embassy or use the name “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.”  
Tayyab Agha was soft-spoken, even-tempered, and highly pragmatic. His closely cropped hair 
and beard little resembled the 2001 pictures of him. He earned Mullah Omar’s trust as his 
secretary and in 2009 became the head of the political commission. He described the Taliban’s 
views of the conflict in two dimensions: external and internal. The Taliban wanted to deal first 
with the external conflict (particularly with the United States), and then address the internal 
conflict.1162 The goal of addressing the external conflict was the withdrawal of all foreign 
forces – the international coalition as well as non-Afghans fighting the government. By this he 
meant al Qaeda and other foreign militant organizations. The lifting of international sanctions, 
establishment of the political office, and transfer of the GTMO-5 were the confidence-builders 
he said the Taliban needed to move forward on including the Afghan government in meetings. 
As Taliban experts explained, GTMO was a symbol to the Taliban of injustice.1163 The five 
detainees they wanted released had either surrendered to the Northern Alliance or turned 
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themselves in based on agreements that they would be free to live in peace. The GTMO 
transfers were their biggest test of American sincerity. 
Some administration officials, to include ones at State and Defense, viewed the Taliban 
participation in talks as insincere. This was mainly based on a misguided belief that if the 
Taliban wanted peace they would first stop fighting. High profile or large-scale attacks were 
cited as proof of Taliban mendacity, even as the United States continued night raids and major 
operations against them. There was a clear incongruity in the view that the United States could 
fight and talk but the Taliban could not. Some exchanges with very senior officials became 
intense over these issues. Such challenges illustrated the importance of taking the effort slowly 
and step-by-step to build political space on all sides. If U.S. officials found the notion of talks 
with the Taliban distasteful, many Afghans had far stronger reactions. Administration officials 
often wanted big unilateral signals from the Taliban as proof of sincerity. This was unrealistic 
and potentially counter-productive.  
Intelligence officials and Taliban experts often described the Taliban as a decentralized, 
pragmatic, consensus-based organization.1164 If they have an ideology, it is unity and the 
prevention of disunity and dissension. Although Mullah Omar was the iconic leader of the 
movement, he did not rule by diktat. To maintain unity, the Taliban use councils (shuras and 
jirgas) to discuss issues, examine ideas, and come to consensus.1165 Changes do not occur in a 
traditional jirga-system except by unanimous approval. This approach lowers the risk of 
dissension, but makes decision-making very slow and very conservative. The status quo bias 
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in an organization like the Taliban thus tends to be quite high. A major unilateral concession 
from the Taliban at that point was extremely unlikely.  
Confidence-building measures consumed most of the U.S. – Taliban meetings, which were 
held for a couple hours once every four to six weeks or so through the summer and fall of 2011. 
Unfortunately, no minutes were taken. Tayyab Agha and the Qatari intermediaries spoke good 
English, in which the meetings were conducted, but it was clear to me from Agha’s body 
language that he would sometimes miss parts of the conversation. I would note to Grossman 
when I detected this and he reiterated key points, but the absence of a written record of agreed 
items heightened the risk of misunderstandings. Nonetheless, texts containing the terms of 
reference for the Taliban political office went back and forth. These were agreed by November 
2011, except for some ambiguity about the name. The terms of reference were sent to the 
Afghan government in advance of the hoped-for office opening in early 2012.1166  
Tensions with Karzai over reconciliation were growing. The key points of each meeting with 
the Taliban, as Grossman noted, were relayed, but this was not creating ownership and buy-
in.1167 Unlike the closely coordinated security transition effort, the United States had not 
developed a common view or approach with the Afghan government on reconciliation.1168 The 
U.S. and Afghan governments were far more aligned on security transition than they were on 
reconciliation, which made close coordination on the latter even more important. Defense 
officials expressed concerns about the lack of buy-in and coordination with the Afghan 
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government and the absence of a clear strategy, but no changes were forthcoming.1169 “Karzai 
is irrelevant,” a senior SRAP official told me at the time. “His interests are so different from 
ours that there is no point in trying to discuss it.”1170  
Karzai, in fact, grew increasingly worried that the United States was attempting to make a deal 
with the Taliban as a cover for withdrawal, just as America did in Vietnam.1171 A Foreign 
Affairs article by former U.S. diplomat Robert Blackwill argued for the soft-partition of 
Afghanistan. Karzai viewed this article as reflecting an option being considered seriously by 
the Obama administration – ceding the south largely to the Taliban (and Pakistan) in exchange 
for a cease-fire and an end to the conflict.1172 He perceived the efforts by the United States on 
reconciliation to be dangerously naïve and potentially catastrophic.1173 The lack of serious 
engagement and coordination with Karzai on an effort so central to the political order and 
future of Afghanistan would have grave consequences. 
These problems exploded into controversy just before the beginning of the Bonn II conference 
on 5 December 2011. The atmosphere in Kabul was highly charged, particularly after High 
Peace Council Chairman and former Afghan President Rabbani was killed in September by a 
suicide bomber posing as a Taliban representative for talks. Karzai’s political rival, Dr. 
Abdullah warned, “This is a lesson for all of us that we shouldn’t fool ourselves that this group, 
who has carried out so many crimes against the people of Afghanistan, are willing to make 
peace.” 1174 A major concession to the Taliban in which the government looked powerless had 
                                                                 
1169 Interview with Lieutenant General Terry A. Wolff. 
1170 Discussion with senior SRAP official, November 2011. 
1171 Neumann (May 2015); p.11; Dobbins & Malkasian (2015), p. 58. 
1172 Blackwill (January/February 2011). 
1173 Interviewees F, G, I, M, P, Q, W; Dobbins & Malkasian (2015), p. 58 
1174 Alissa J. Rubin (20 September 2011). 
 285 
a high risk of backlash among groups critical to Karzai’s governing coalition. The way the 
Taliban office discussions were unfolding amplified these concerns. After receiving the 
unsigned agreement on the Taliban office, Karzai requested a meeting with Clinton. 
Participants with knowledge of the discussion recalled that Karzai was outraged at being 
blindsided with a fait accompli.1175 He demanded the effort be suspended until he had the 
opportunity to review and comment on the document. He recalled his Ambassador from Qatar 
a few days later.1176 The United States reluctantly acceded to his demands.  
Frictions increased in Washington as well. Sensitive to how negotiating with the Taliban would 
be perceived by Congress, the White House arranged meetings with House and Senate leaders 
in the late fall of 2011 and January 2012.1177 An interagency team supported the briefings. 
Grossman outlined the different measures under consideration and explained that the entire 
focus of the effort was to arrange a meeting between the Afghan government and the Taliban. 
To manage expectations, he noted that the chances of success were low and surmised that the 
assassination of Rabbani and the 13 September 2011 attack on the U.S. embassy in Kabul may 
have reflected the Taliban’s true intentions about peace.1178  
That explanation came across to House and Senate leaders as a high-risk low-reward 
proposition. The Administration, they perceived, was having Grossman negotiate with the 
Taliban to recognize a political office in Doha, trade five Taliban senior leaders in GTMO for 
one U.S. soldier (who some believed had deserted), and lift UN sanctions – all with the aim of 
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getting the Taliban to agree to a meeting with the Afghan government. Why, they questioned, 
was the Administration even considering such a bad deal? These concessions, they argued, 
would improve the Taliban’s legitimacy and capabilities, and place American soldiers at 
greater risk, for no meaningful return. Those present for the briefings were many of the same 
Congressional leaders who received testimony from Defense and State officials that everything 
was on track in Afghanistan and that the risks were manageable.1179 The discussion was leaked 
to the press immediately. Members voiced strong opposition.1180  
Still, the Administration sought to lay the foundations for a potential detainee exchange. Some 
observers mistakenly believe the Defense Department opposed the effort and tried to derail 
reconciliation talks.1181 Defense officials did want to take smaller steps first, because 
transferring detainees from GTMO had become highly politicized. Due to concerns that several 
detainees transferred by the Bush Administration to other countries had returned to the 
battlefield, the U.S. Congress passed legislation in 2009 that the Secretary of Defense had to 
personally notify Congress 30-days in advance of a transfer and to certify in writing that he 
had taken all measures necessary to ensure the individual would no longer pose a national 
security threat. The requirements were reaffirmed through 2014.1182 In short, the Secretary of 
Defense would be held personally accountable if a transferred detainee returned to the 
battlefield. The Obama Administration often complained that such provisions made GTMO 
transfers virtually impossible.1183 Pre-maturely moving forward on such a potentially explosive 
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issue could create even more obstacles for future transfers, heighten suspicion and cynicism, 
and potentially undermine the entire effort. 
To meet the certification requirements, the Principals Committee determined that the United 
States needed sufficient assurances from the Qatari government that the detainees would be 
fully monitored, not allowed to engage in acts against the United States or its allies, and not 
permitted to leave the country. A senior Defense official and I worked closely with the Qatari 
Attorney General on the provisions, capturing them in writing over a series of meetings. After 
a few months, we came to agreement on the terms of reference and gained the approvals of 
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and Clinton. The Qataris, however, would enforce the 
provisions only if the Taliban agreed to them. They understandably wanted the Taliban to share 
the blame for any transgression. The Taliban, however, had still refused to agree to a travel 
ban. When the problem was raised with the Principals Committee in late 2011, their decision 
was unanimous and unequivocal – the transfers could not take place until the Taliban agreed 
to the travel ban.1184  
 
Coming off the Rails 
Confirmation bias, bureaucratic frictions, and the Obama administration’s deteriorating 
relationship with Karzai continued to undermine the prospects of reconciliation. Meanwhile, 
the draw-down of international forces was eroding American leverage for both reconciliation 
and trainsition. With the Taliban intransigent on the travel ban and Karzai objecting to the 
Office, the process was stuck. Adding to the complications, discussions about the political 
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office were leaked to the press.1185 This caused a major stir within the insurgency, noted former 
intelligence officials and Taliban experts. Taliban commanders wondered if the senior leaders 
were trying to cut a deal with Karzai.1186 Perhaps wanting to keep the effort secret until the 
agreement was finalized, the leadership had not fully socialized the political office and its 
purpose. The insurgent leadership went into damage control. “In this regard,” explained 
Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid, “we have started preliminary talks and we have reached 
a preliminary understanding with relevant sides, including the government of Qatar, to have a 
political office for negotiations with the international community.” The office, he emphasized, 
was not going to talk with the Karzai government (a condition Karzai said was unacceptable). 
Reflecting how the Taliban leadership considered the conflict as having external and internal 
dimensions, he continued: “There are two essential sides in the current situation in the country 
that has been ongoing for the past 10 years. One is the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and the 
other side is the United States of America and their foreign allies.”1187 He mentioned, in 
particular, that the Taliban sought the release of GTMO detainees.1188  
This episode is revealing in how the Taliban leadership responds to the rank and file. As noted 
above, the Eid statements attributed to Mullah Omar from 2009 onward discussed a variety of 
issues regarding relationships with the international community, distancing themselves from 
terrorism, and relatively progressive statements on human rights. None of these statements 
created any dissension in the Taliban ranks. The announcement about the office did. Even 
though the statement came from the Taliban spokesman, the rank and file likely surmised that 
such a major step would not have occurred without the Taliban leader’s blessing. From 3 
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January until 15 February 2012, the Taliban issued no fewer than seven statements concerning 
the office and ongoing negotiations.1189 The winter months are when Taliban leaders tend to 
gather in Pakistan for annual discussions about their upcoming military campaign, so the Doha 
office was likely a subject of debate. The Taliban leadership managed to build the necessary 
consensus about the office during that time, but would need to proceed more carefully in the 
future.1190  
The administration wanted to get the Taliban office moving forward again. Defense officials, 
myself included, continued to express concerns about the lack of coordination and agreed 
framework with the Afghan government. To get the process back on track, Grossman arranged 
for a meeting with Karzai in January 2012 before heading to Doha for another round of talks 
with the Taliban. Karzai made three demands for the Office: Qatari government representatives 
needed to come to Kabul to explain the office to him, the Afghan government would re-write 
the rules as the grantor of the office to the Taliban, and the Taliban had to meet in advance with 
the Afghan government.1191 These were three well-crafted poison pills designed to derail what 
Karzai perceived to be a highly dangerous process.  
Grossman flew to Doha and outlined Karzai’s three demands. The Taliban and Qatari 
representatives reacted in shock.1192 Karzai had insulted the Qataris a month earlier by recalling 
his Ambassador; the Gulf nation believed that they had done nothing wrong and were trying to 
be helpful in resolving the conflict. The Americans had said repeatedly that they had Karzai on 
board. For the Qataris to come penitently to Kabul to seek Karzai’s forgiveness and blessing 
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was tough to swallow. Second, the Taliban were not willing to take the office as a gift from the 
Afghan government; that would be recognizing the government’s legitimacy before they were 
ready to do so and placing the Taliban in a supplicant position. Third, the meeting with the 
Afghan government was agreed to come at the end of the U.S. – Taliban confidence-building 
process. Particularly given the internal strife over the office earlier that month and their 
explanations that they were not talking with Karzai, the Taliban could not accept meeting with 
the Afghan government as a pre-condition.1193  
Tayyab Agha replied that he would consult with “the leadership” about the demands and 
reiterated the Taliban’s non-concurrence on the travel ban for the GTMO-5. I asked him to 
consider whether the five were better off in GTMO or spending time with their families in 
Doha. Two months later, the Taliban issued a statement suspending the talks, suggesting that 
the United States was negotiating in bad faith.1194 They had always considered Karzai a puppet. 
If the Americans were serious about the effort, they believed, they would have convinced or 
forced him to consent to the office rather than simply accepting and verbalizing his demands. 
In fact, the United States had a long history of ignoring or overriding Karzai’s wishes and 
concerns on matters like civilian casualties, detentions, night raids, the 2009 surge, parallel 
governance structures, anti-corruption measures, and reconciliation.  
The process remained in limbo for the rest of 2012. On 1 May, the one-year anniversary of the 
successful bin Laden raid, Obama announced during a speech at Bagram Air Base that he had 
signed a Strategic Partnership agreement with the Afghan government. He also provided an 
update on the five lines of effort and the pace of the draw-down of U.S. forces. “In coordination 
with the Afghan government,” he explained, “my administration has been in direct discussions 
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with the Taliban. We’ve made it clear that they can be a part of this future if they break with al 
Qaeda, renounce violence and abide by Afghan laws…. The path to peace is now set before 
them. Those who refuse to walk it will face strong Afghan security forces, backed by the United 
States and our allies.”1195 The Taliban were unmoved. 
By continuing the draw-down the United States was losing negotiating leverage. The military 
pressure kept declining. The Taliban had every reason to believe they could wait out the 
American presence and that their leverage would be far stronger when fighting with the Afghan 
government unaided by over 100,000 international troops. They would be very unlikely to risk 
dissension in the ranks regarding the talks. If Obama viewed that working toward a peace 
process was more important than completing the draw-down, he could amass plenty of reasons 
for extending troop presence – the September 2011 attack on the U.S. embassy, the 
assassination of Rabbani, Pakistani intransigence, the Taliban’s suspension of talks. His 
administration, as discussed in Chapter 7, continued to testify that the war was on track.  
In early 2013 the Qataris attempted to re-start discussions on the Taliban office. The Taliban 
indicated that were willing to make another go at it, and U.S. officials put pressure on the 
Afghan government to move forward. Karzai acceded, but insisted that the office was for 
negotiations between the High Peace Council (HPC) and Taliban. The joint statement by 
Obama and Karzai in January 2013 summarized the agreed points, “The Leaders said that they 
would support an office in Doha for the purpose of negotiations between the High Peace 
Council and the authorized representatives of the Taliban. In this context, the Leaders called 
on the armed opposition to join a political process, including by taking those steps necessary 
to open a Taliban office. They urged the Government of Qatar to facilitate this effort.” They 
also agreed to negotiate a bi-lateral security agreement (BSA). “The scope and nature of any 
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possible post-2014 U.S. presence, legal protections for U.S. forces, and security cooperation 
between the two countries is to be specified in the Bilateral Security Agreement.”1196 Obama 
made quite clear that without a BSA, the United States would not maintain troops in 
Afghanistan after 2014. His withdrawal from Iraq after SOFA negotiations failed underscored 
the point.  
U.S. officials worked over the next few months to get an agreement so the office could be 
opened. A team of us met with Afghan National Security Advisor Dadfar Spanta in May 2013 
who said that the Afghan government could support a US-Qatar-Taliban agreement on the 
office if the Afghan government could review and approve the document, and if the Qataris 
would agree to a strategic partnership, in writing, with the Afghan government first. The 
Qataris demurred. Spanta then suggested that there be no written agreements at all. If there 
could be no written agreement between the two governments, there should be no written 
agreement between the Qataris and the Taliban. All parties, including the Taliban, agreed to 
this idea.1197 Seeking assurances, Karzai asked for a letter from President Obama that the office 
would be for the purposes of negotiations with the HPC and not refer to itself as “the Islamic 
Emirate of Afghanistan” or look or act as an Embassy. Obama provided the letter in June.1198 
The stage was set for the office to be opened. One potentially fatal flaw, however, existed. 
Without a written agreement about the rules of the office, the Taliban could largely do what it 
wanted. These concerns were not addressed.  
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The date for the office opening was set for 18 June 2013. This was the same day as the transition 
ceremony marking the transfer of lead security responsibilities across the country from ISAF 
to the ANSF. This was to be the signature event of the civil-military campaign since 2009.1199  
When I asked if the U.S. should off-set the dates to avoid the risk of stepping on the transition 
ceremony, a White House official said that having both on the same day would be a great 
statement of progress. Indicators that the Taliban were going to make a spectacle of the office 
opening prompted Defense and Embassy-Kabul officials to suggest that the United States 
ensure its requirements were being met.1200  
The transition ceremony took place in the morning to moderate media coverage. A couple 
hours later the Qatari-based al Jazeera televised worldwide the opening ceremony for the 
Taliban office. International press filled the large room. A senior official from the Qatari 
foreign ministry stood at a podium next to a Taliban representative. Taliban flags adorned the 
ceremony. A large banner behind the speakers declared the opening of the “Political Office of 
the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” [emphasis added]. The office was housed in a large 
enclosed compound in an area of Doha where other embassies were located. “Political Office 
of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” was etched into a plaque affixed to the outside wall. A 
Taliban flag was raised in the courtyard.1201 A U.S. official involved in the process reportedly 
explained the importance of the event to a journalist,  
It … very much reflects this whole process, which began with a series of loya jirgas 
that Karzai held in 2010 and 2011. It includes the Karzai visit here to Washington in 
January [2013]. And this is an Afghan initiative and it’s a perfect representation of what 
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we mean by Afghan-led, Afghan-owned. So if the Afghan delegation makes this a 
priority in their engagements with the Taliban, then that’s completely in keeping with 
Afghan ownership.1202 
Karzai and Afghan officials were apoplectic. The United States asked Qatar to suspend the 
office. U.S. officials blamed the Qataris for this debacle, and some of that was rightly 
placed.1203 But a large burden falls on the Obama administration for poor coordination, 
ignoring warning signs, and abysmal communication.1204 The next morning Karzai announced 
the suspension of talks on the BSA because of “inconsistent statements and actions in regard 
to the peace process.”1205 The Taliban office opening had violated nearly every assurance given 
by Obama. Protests erupted in Kabul.1206 The new SRAP, Ambassador Jim Dobbins, and an 
interagency team went to Kabul to try to assuage Karzai’s outrage. The latter was convinced 
the fiasco was deliberate. “Unfortunately, the manner that the office was announced, including 
the title given to the office and the imagery on display, were all in breach of the written 
assurances we received from the U.S. government,” a senior Afghan official explained to the 
Washington Post.1207 “The bizarre turn of events following the opening of the Taleban office 
in Doha,”  Afghan analysts Borhan Osman and Kate Clark reflected, “has led many [Afghans] 
to wonder whether the affair could have been deliberately sabotaged. Was it possible it had just 
been badly handled?”1208 The poorly coordinated effort to make progress on reconciliation had 
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adverse consequences on the civil-military campaign, transition, the BSA, and regional 
diplomacy – not to mention American credibility. “The reconciliation effort became too 
limited,” former Deputy SRAP Singh observed, “and was not fully connected to the 
strategy.”1209 
 
Fall-Out: BSA, Bergdahl, and the 2014 Elections 
The ever-decreasing American leverage added to the strategic uncertainty as the 2014 elections 
approached with a peace-process nowhere in sight, the Taliban resilient, and the Afghan 
government continually plagued with problems of corruption and predation. International 
actors began further hedging their support for the Afghanistan project by increasing contacts 
with the Taliban. These factors eroded confidence in Kabul and persuaded Karzai to take an 
increasingly aggressive anti-American policy.  
Karzai eventually permitted BSA negotiations to resume. While American and Afghan officials 
worked out an agreement Karzai called for a loya jirga to examine and recommend approval 
or disapproval on the text. The agreement was then to be sent to Parliament for approval before 
being signed by Karzai. This was also the time William Dalrymple’s book Return of a King 
was published, which discussed the sad reign of Afghan King Shah Shuja – the last Popalzai 
ruler before Karzai – who was considered a British puppet and was overthrown shortly after 
the disastrous British retreat from Kabul in 1842.1210 Already sensitive to being considered an 
American puppet, Karzai wanted to distribute the political risk as widely as possible.  
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The support from the assembled delegates in favor of the BSA was overwhelming. Karzai, 
however, took to the podium and urged members against it.1211 He waved the assurance letter 
Obama sent him regarding the BSA, recalling the earlier assurance letter about the Taliban 
office, and explained how U.S. promises could not be trusted.1212 Karzai ultimately refused to 
sign the agreement – he had more to gain by standing up to the United States. The document 
would not be signed until October 2014, after the new Afghan Administration had come to 
power, and just two months before the U.S. was to end its combat mission. Neither Ashraf 
Ghani nor Abdullah Abdullah signed the agreement. That task was delegated to an unelected 
official, National Security Advisor Hanif Atmar.  
As 2014 approached and the end of the U.S. combat mission loomed closer, discussions within 
the Obama Administration began to center on ways to try to recover Army Sergeant Bowe 
Bergdahl – the only American soldier in Taliban captivity. With the ongoing counterterrorism 
missions in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the United States was unwilling to refocus more 
resources to find him. I supported the idea of re-opening the detainee exchange provided the 
Taliban agreed to the travel ban and the trade was linked to a larger peace process. The Israelis, 
hardly slouches when it comes to dealing with militant groups, traded over 1000 prisoners for 
Gilad Shalit in 2011, a soldier held by Hamas since 2006.1213 The five Taliban detainees, after 
more than a decade in GTMO, would probably prefer to live with their families in Doha rather 
than try to assume a battlefield leadership role.1214 Besides, the Taliban had capable people in 
those roles already. The Taliban clearly wanted these five out of GTMO, which was leverage 
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the Obama administration could use for a greater return. I also surmised the Qataris valued 
their diplomatic role in the Gulf and that good relations with the United States would be a boost 
for them.1215 They had every reason to uphold their end of the agreement – which we negotiated 
in 2011 and 2012.  
By May 2014, the Taliban finally caved on the travel ban, enabling the Qataris to sign the 
agreement and opening the door for the detainee transfers. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, 
in an act that took political courage, approved the transfers and signed the certification letter. 
He was the only American official to date to take on such risk in the reconciliation sphere. 
Bergdahl was repatriated in an impressive battlefield link-up between the Haqqani network of 
the Taliban and U.S. special operations forces on 4 June 2014. Some Congressional members 
and pundits cried foul that the five were transferred to Qatari custody without warning to 
Congress, in violation of the law, and that the effort was damaging to U.S. interests.1216 As of 
February 2017, all five remain quietly in Doha, following the rules we negotiated with the 
Qataris. The exchange, however, was not linked to any larger process.1217  
Had U.S. and Afghan officials examined the issue dispassionately, they should have arrived at 
some very important conclusions from this about the Taliban. First, the exchange showed that 
the political commission in Doha are representatives of the Taliban leadership. The exchange 
had to be communicated from the Qataris to the political commission, then to the Taliban senior 
leadership in Pakistan, and then to the Haqqani network who was holding Bergdahl. The link-
up of hostile forces in a combat zone to conduct a prisoner hand-over like this one was complex 
and high risk, and the Taliban political commission made it possible. Second, it helped answer 
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a lingering question about the relationship between the Haqqanis and the Taliban senior 
leadership. Despite public statements from Sirajuddin Haqqani that he was Taliban, some U.S. 
intelligence agencies and commands have persisted in believing they were separate.1218 The 
exchange showed that the Haqqanis were responsive to Taliban senior leader orders. Although 
several of their senior leaders were in custody, the Haqqanis did not demand their detainees be 
included in the exchange.1219 Third, it showed the political commission can make commitments 
on behalf of the senior leadership and follow through. These suggest the political commission 
should be considered a legitimate conduit for talks, but it has been largely ignored in 
reconciliation discussions since then.  
The uncertainty over the bi-lateral security agreement, meanwhile, likely prompted more 
aggressive hedging strategies by key actors in Afghanistan and the region. Businesses were 
even more reluctant to invest in Afghanistan. Capital flight continued to be a major problem. 
Real estate prices plummeted. Kleptocratic behavior became more aggressive as officials 
sought to extract all they could and tuck it away overseas in case things fell apart.1220 The worth 
of the Afghan Afghani plummeted. On 1 August 2013, the it traded at 53 to the dollar. Two 
years later it was trading at 64 to the dollar – a 21 percent decline.  The situation may have 
created even greater incentives for electoral fraud in both the Ghani and Abdullah camps.1221 
The impasse over the election results heightened the risk of political violence as Abdullah 
supporters such as the powerful Balkh governor Atta Mohammad Noor threatened civil war.1222 
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Carter Malkasian, Afghanistan expert and former senior political advisor to ISAF Commander 
General Dunford (2013-4), notes that these problems were occurring anyway due to the 
drawdown of international forces.1223 Nonetheless, the anxieties surrounding the BSA 
intensified the toxic environment of 2014 and increased American frustration and fatigue.  
A disputed outcome in the 2014 Presidential election to replace Hamid Karzai resulted, after 
months of wrangling, in a U.S.-brokered Government of National Unity consisting of two rival 
camps led by President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah. The provisions 
of the deal included, within 2 years, electoral reform prior to Parliamentary elections scheduled 
for 2015, district council elections, and a constitutional loya jirga to consider, among other 
issues, whether to institutionalize a Prime Minister position.1224 The lingering animosities and 
competing visions of government guaranteed gridlock and made progress on these sensitive 
issues virtually impossible. Having rebuffed the BSA, Karzai positioned himself as a political 
figure of significant stature and has been agitating against the government since he stepped 
down from power.1225  
The Afghan government continued their refusal to engage the Taliban political office, insisting 
instead that the Pakistanis deliver the Taliban to the table.  In hopes of gaining progress while 
gauging Pakistani intentions, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, in the face of stiff political 
opposition, began efforts toward a rapprochement with Afghanistan’s eastern neighbor which 
even included agreements on intelligence sharing.1226 To show their bona fides, the Pakistanis 
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delivered three un-empowered Taliban interlocutors to talks in Muree, Pakistan, in 2015.1227 A 
second round was cancelled as the death of Mullah Omar was revealed to have occurred in 
2013. The Taliban political commission, however, noted that the Taliban were not engaged in 
any talks because, as the only entity authorized to engage in them, they had not been 
contacted.1228 The Quadrilateral Coordination Group Process (Afghanistan, Pakistan, US, 
China) was formed with the same goal of having Pakistan deliver the Taliban to talks. To date 
it has been a dismal failure.1229   
  
Conclusion  
Bargaining asymmetries undermined the prospects for a negotiated outcome in Afghanistan. 
President Obama’s decision on 1 December 2009 to announce both a surge of forces and a 
timeline for withdrawal limited American leverage during exploratory talks with the Taliban. 
The insurgency aimed to gain concessions that improved their legitimacy while coaxing the 
United States to complete withdrawal, but were not interested in negotiating an end to the 
conflict. As the drawdown continued, American bargaining power declined further. By March 
2012 the Taliban postponed talks with the United States. The persistent and increasingly 
specific withdrawal announcements likely doomed any hopes of a political settlement or peace 
process prior to the withdrawal of American troops. Meanwhile, the military instrument 
continued to enjoy high-levels of White House scrutiny that diplomatic elements never 
underwent. The number of meetings about matters far more important to the war’s outcome 
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such as political transition, regional diplomacy and a reconciliation strategy were 
comparatively few and far between.1230 
Bureaucratic frictions, lack of vision, poor coordination, and sloppy execution damaged the 
reconciliation effort. The lack of agreed conceptual frameworks for war termination inhibited 
clear communication and consensus-building within the U.S. government, making the status 
quo trajectory even more difficult to change.1231 The distributed authorities for the five strategic 
lines of effort and unwillingness of the Obama administration to set priorities reinforced 
bureaucratic silos. Individual actions in one line of effort, like the abortive 18 June 2013 
opening of the Taliban political office, created set-backs in others. In the end, U.S. 
reconciliation efforts further poisoned the relationship with Karzai, undermined American 
credibility in Afghanistan and the region, and heightened political uncertainly and instability 
as Afghanistan approached the 2014 elections and the end of the international combat mission. 
None of these problems were inevitable, nor were they easily preventable.  
The lack of a coordinated strategy with the Afghan government increased the risk that sensitive 
issues such as reconciliation would become major points of friction. These problems 
exacerbated the prisoner’s dilemma challenge within Afghanistan and the region – each party 
recognized the benefits of cooperation toward peace, but no one trusted the others enough to 
take any risk to bring it about. Risk aversion and mutual suspicions created further obstacles. 
These issues made a credible reconciliation strategy even more necessary. The U.S. 
government, however, proved incapable of delivering one.  
                                                                 
1230 Interviewees H, J, L, M, W, X. The White House did hold many meetings about the more tactical aspects of 
reconciliation, particularly in advance of meetings with the Taliban. These, however, mostly focused on 
coordinating talking points and sequencing of confidence-building measures. 
1231 See also, Matt Waldman (July 2013), 829–32. 
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In Iraq, Bush changed strategy when his beliefs in the importance of success were affirmed, 
facts were presented on how the current strategy was failing, and an alternative was offered 
that would achieve his goals. That never occurred for Obama on Afghanistan, in part because 
his definition of success increasingly centered on ending the U.S. role in the war rather than 
achieving certain security and stability outcomes. Withdrawal timelines became rigid. Defense 
and State failed to offer any compelling strategic alternatives that might have addressed 
Obama’s concerns about open-ended commitments, but stood a greater chance of achieving 
stated policy goals. The status quo held obvious risks of leaving Afghanistan largely on its own 
to deal with an industrial-scale insurgency that was still allied with al Qaeda. This situation 
holds the greatest chance of allowing the country to once again become a terror safe-haven – 
an outcome both Bush and Obama said was a vital national interest to prevent. Inadequate 




Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
America’s military, claims General David H. Petraeus and scholar Michael O’Hanlon, is the 
world’s best.1232 If that is so, why have major post-9/11 military interventions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan turned into bloody and expensive quagmires? Even smaller scale interventions in 
places such as Libya, Syria, and Yemen have met with poor results. The Chilcot report, the 
official inquiry into the United Kingdom’s decision to go to war in Iraq, has important 
cautionary implications about following America’s lead.1233 It also reveals stark limits on the 
influence of American allies on U.S. strategic decision-making. 
This thesis fills an important gap in war termination scholarship regarding the unique 
challenges of irregular war for intervening powers. The three hypotheses provide a clear and 
compelling framework for examining such conflicts. 
Hypothesis #1: The failure to consider war termination heightens the risk of selecting a myopic 
strategy that has a low probability of success. 
Hypothesis #2: Cognitive obstacles, political frictions, and patron-client problems can impede 
the ability to recognize and abandon an ineffective or losing strategy. 
Hypothesis #3. When the United States tires of the war and decides to withdraw, bargaining 
asymmetries can undermine the prospects of a favorable outcome.  
A consistent shortfall in Iraq and Afghanistan has been a lack of attention to war termination 
from the outset of policy-making and strategy development. This has induced three major 
problems that have made quagmires more likely. First, the U.S. has undertaken these major 
                                                                 
1232 Petraeus and O’Hanlon (September/October 2016). 
1233 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry (6 July 2016). 
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interventions with a myopic strategy that implicitly assumed decisive military victory. This led 
to an under-appreciation for the importance of critical factors, such as host nation politics and 
insurgent sustainability, and promoted a tendency to ignore or dismiss early negotiating 
opportunities. Second, the U.S. government has been slow to modify a losing or ineffective 
strategy due to cognitive biases, political and bureaucratic frictions, and patron-client 
problems. Third, as the US tired of each war and signaled a desire to withdraw, bargaining 
asymmetries have prevented favorable and durable outcomes. Attempts at negotiations and 
transition have consistently fallen far short of expectations. These problems interacted with 
one another in unique ways to produce different trajectories into intractable conflicts.  
This explanation for why the United States interventions turned into quagmires does not 
necessarily compete with potential alternatives. This thesis provides the argument that these 
conflicts were likely unwinnable with much needed analytic rigor and an empirically-based 
Critical Factors Framework.1234 To date, assessments about the prospects of victory have relied 
largely on qualitative judgments. Lyndon Johnson’s Under Secretary of State George Ball, for 
instance, wrote on 1 July 1965 that the Vietnam war was unwinnable, arguing “No one has 
demonstrated that a white ground force of whatever size can win a guerrilla war.”1235 Those 
believing that the United States could be successful countered with other qualitative arguments, 
which President Johnson accepted. Regarding Iraq, James Dobbins wrote in 2005, “The 
beginning of wisdom is to recognize that the ongoing war in Iraq is not one that the United 
States can win. As a result of its initial miscalculations, misdirected planning, and inadequate 
preparation, Washington has lost the Iraqi people's confidence and consent, and it is unlikely 
                                                                 
1234 See the Critical Factors Framework, p. 30.  
1235 FRUS 1964–1968, VOLUME III, VIETNAM, JUNE–DECEMBER 1965. Document 40. Paper by the Under 
Secretary of State (Ball). 
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to win them back.”1236 The near-term success of the 2007 surge seemed to vindicate those who 
believed the war could still be won. Maliki’s aggressive sectarianism, unconstrained due to the 
absence of American forces, brought about a Sunni Arab backlash in the form of the Islamic 
State. The pro and con arguments around Obama’s Afghanistan surge, this thesis has shown, 
were similarly qualitative and not informed by empirical studies.  
The analysis in Chapter Two leading to the development of the Critical Factors Framework 
and Hypothesis #1 provides a more empirical basis for arguments about the prospects for an 
intervention. In the case of Vietnam both critical factors pointed in the wrong direction: the 
insurgency had tangible internal and external support and the host nation government was 
unable to win the battle of legitimacy in contested and insurgent controlled areas. The empirical 
work in this thesis shows that no counterinsurgency has been successful when the critical 
factors are negative. Iraq and Afghanistan entailed regime-changes. Success relied on 
preventing these two critical factors from materializing. Neglect of the war termination issue 
during strategy development impeded the United States’ ability to recognize these factors and 
take appropriate action. In both cases, the critical factors turned sour. Whether an external 
power from a different culture can have a successful regime change and prevent the factors 
from turning negative requires further research. The Critical Factors Framework and 
Hypothesis #1 give policy-makers and scholars a methodology to evaluate the prospects of a 
successful intervention against an insurgency.   
The presumption of decisive victory and the belief that with enough commitment and goodwill 
the United States can solve any problem across the globe could also be part of an American 
                                                                 
1236 Dobbins (2005). 
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strategic culture.1237 Such belief in exceptionalism could be motivating the United States to 
intervene into conflicts that it cannot possibly win or pursue strategies that have little chances 
of success. Likewise, the notion of strategic distance could be a factor.1238 A longitudinal study 
of counterinsurgency could examine how often an intervening power from a very different 
culture was a successful counterinsurgent. Impossible strategic distance could become an 
important and more nuanced consideration than more categorical statements of American 
capacity for counterinsurgency. To be sure, the quality of insurgent strategy and capabilities, 
as well as that of the host nation, is critical to the larger question of which side wins or loses. 
Those questions are beyond the scope of this thesis, but must be part of the larger explanation 
for why the conflicts turned out as they did.  
 
Iraq and Afghanistan Compared  
Failure to consider war termination has heightened the risk of selecting myopic strategies that 
ignore or underestimate the critical strategic risk factors: an insurgency with sustainable local 
support and external sanctuary, and a host nation government that is unable to win the battle 
of legitimacy. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, military action resulted in overthrow of an existing 
regime, but the United States had not thought through the risks to a favorable and durable 
outcome and the requirements to prevent or mitigate those risks. When those problems 
materialized, the United States was slow to recognize and unable to address them adequately.  
Exclusionary regimes took control in both countries and soon became predatory. Efforts by 
both Sunni Arab leaders in Iraq and Taliban senior leaders in Afghanistan to negotiate some 
                                                                 
1237 Dunn (2006); Walt (2011) Hoffman (1996). For a critique of the notion of a strategic culture see Echevarria 
(2013). 
1238 For a discussion of strategic distance in a different context see Porter (2015), 2-9. 
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form of cessation of hostilities and political inclusion were rebuffed by the United States at the 
encouragement mainly of Shi’a elites on the one hand and Northern Alliance leaders on the 
other. Statistically, as Dobbins notes, politically inclusive governments are more apt to be 
successful when supported by peacekeeping troops than are exclusionary governments 
supported by a peace-enforcement mission. Although Dobbins’ study was published in 2003, 
the data he used was available in 2001.1239  
In both cases, the risk factors became quickly entrenched. The United States, however, was 
slow to recognize the problems and to modify a losing or ineffective approach. The primary 
reasons had subtle differences in each conflict. Problems such as confirmation bias, 
bureaucratic frictions, and patron-client problems were common. In neither case did the United 
States put someone on the ground in charge of coordinating and managing the full range of 
American efforts. Both administrations in both conflicts operated in bureaucratic silos. 
Strategic risks were emerging in the seams and fault-lines between and among these silos in 
the form of problems such as elite capture of milestones and institutions, predation and 
corruption, civilian harm, external sanctuary, inadequate governance, and hollow capacity-
building. Both the Bush and Obama administrations tried to treat the complex task of state-
building as complicated one that could be reduced to several component parts that could be 
managed by individual agencies. Political, diplomatic, military, and economic milestones were 
identified, arrayed along a timeline, and given to a Department to handle. These left the 
milestones vulnerable to being manipulated and exploited by elites in their intense scrimmages 
for power. U.S. officials seemed largely oblivious to these problems. In-silo metrics created a 
misleading narrative of progress. Both administrations simply aggregated the in-silo metrics as 
evidence of success even as the overall situations were obviously deteriorating. These problems 
                                                                 
1239 Dobbins, et al (2003). 
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damaged the credibility of both administrations and public support for the missions. Loss 
aversion was more prevalent for Bush in Iraq than Obama. Audience costs and risk aversion, 
however, seemed more salient to Obama’s decision-making in Afghanistan than Bush for either 
conflict.   
Bargaining asymmetries undermined prospects for a favorable and durable outcome in both 
conflicts, but unfolded in different ways. Bush was unable to secure an open-ended or 
“conditions-based” American military presence in Iraq. He was forced to accept a strict 
timeline. Defense and State efforts to extend the timeline during the Obama Administration 
were unsuccessful. Political reconciliation efforts faltered and were probably doomed as U.S. 
forces drew down, leaving Sunni Arabs increasingly exposed to Maliki’s repression. Even the 
most intensive efforts during the Petraeus-Crocker time could only constrain Maliki’s 
sectarianism, not promote reform. There was no negotiation with an insurgent senior leadership 
or external sponsor, although discussions between U.S. officials in Baghdad and Iranian 
Revolutionary Guards Officials may have played a role in bringing about al-Sadr’s cease-fire. 
U.S. military officials did engage with tribal elders allied with or in charge of Sunni Arab 
resistance forces, and convinced many to join with U.S. forces against AQI. Such agreements 
also served to protect Sunni Arabs from Iraqi government predation. 
The transition from American to Iraqi responsibility for security was badly undermined by the 
government’s continued sectarianism. They proved unable to win the battle of legitimacy 
among Sunni Arab populations. The first transition effort in 2005-6 ended in near-disaster. 
General Casey organized his military campaign plan around building Iraqi units and handing 
over security responsibility to them, but Iraqi Security Force readiness clearly took a back-seat 
to American military efforts to fight insurgents. The training mission was inadequately 
resourced and focused. Meanwhile, little to no American efforts seem to be applied toward 
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good governance and addressing predatory sectarianism – problems that were undermining the 
legitimacy of the government and promoting resistance among Sunni Arabs. Even after the 
initial success of the 2007-8 surge in lowering levels of violence dramatically and convincing 
Sunni Arabs to work with the U.S. military against AQI, the United States failed to make 
political reconciliation a strategic priority. The Bush administration neglected to secure 
credible commitments on reconciliation in exchange for agreeing to a timeline. The Obama 
administration took the path of least resistance toward Maliki while staying focused on the 
withdrawal timeline.  
ISIS was the biggest beneficiary as alienated Sunni Arabs began to resist a new round of 
predation without the presence of U.S. forces to keep sectarianism in check. Meanwhile, 
endemic corruption in the Iraqi Security Forces sapped the readiness of the Army and Police 
in Sunni Arab areas as Maliki sold positions and chose leaders based on personal loyalty and 
political reliability rather than performance. Their disastrous defeats at the hands of ISIS 
showed how even the best resourced and managed capacity building efforts can have feet of 
clay. Obama was forced to deploy American forces back to Iraq to arrest and reverse the ISIS 
onslaught. Governance and political reconciliation remained back-burner issues for the 
remainder of the Obama administration. Warning signs of a post-ISIS Sunni Arab insurgency 
may be materializing.1240  
For Afghanistan, transition was also undermined by severe-patron client problems. The 
disconnect between the strategic intention of transition and the efforts on the ground were even 
starker than Iraq. The military command focused largely on defeating the Taliban through 
kinetic operations, while the ANSF development effort was, in McCaffrey’s words, miserably 
under-resourced. Only a fraction of the required training teams was filled before 2010. The 
                                                                 
1240 Anagnostos (7 February 2017); Anagnostos et al (30 November 2016). 
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ANSF was desperately short of critical equipment. Nearly six years after the overthrow of the 
Taliban, the Afghan Army was a paltry 34,000-strong for a country of roughly 30 million 
people. The formation of a predatory kleptocracy happened beneath the noses of American 
civilian and military officials. Insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan were largely ignored. The 
Obama administration corrected many of the problems with the ANSF development effort, but 
remained unwilling to fully understand or address the problems of predatory corruption and 
the damage it was doing to the hopes for a successful transition. Some efforts were made by 
the military command to deal with corruption, but Afghan elites simply maneuvered around 
them. Instead of holding Pakistan accountable for Taliban sanctuaries, the Obama 
administration continued to provide the Pakistani military funding and assistance. Obama clung 
stubbornly to the timeline, even though the so-called crossover point became impossible to 
reach.  
The attempts to explore negotiations with the Taliban also failed. The announcement of 
withdrawal dates enabled the Taliban to play for time. The insurgency aimed for exploratory 
talks to improve their international legitimacy, to gain concessions, and to speed American 
withdrawal, but not to end the conflict. Their leverage, they calculated, would be higher after 
U.S. forces left. When the United States appeared to them as negotiating in bad faith, the 
Taliban walked away from talks. Failure to build a coordinated approach on reconciliation 
amplified Karzai’s concerns about American intentions and credibility, which led him to 
undermine the effort. Karzai also refused American demands for reform. The Obama 
administration applied conditionality only haphazardly and largely ineffectively. Karzai 
calculated that the risks of reform to internal stability far outweighed any benefits or penalties 
from the United States. He also calculated that military presence in Afghanistan was a critical 
American interest that the United States would not risk. Although his perception of 
Afghanistan’s centrality might have been exaggerated, his assessment that the United States 
 311 
would not enforce conditions or impose penalties was spot on. He used this leverage to avoid 
signing the bi-lateral security agreement, which improved his domestic bona fides.  
As the reconciliation effort met failure after failure, the transition method of war termination 
was being steadily undermined by the kleptocratic nature of the Afghan government and 
growing dependency on international advisors, support, and firepower. Positions in the 
government and security forces often went for sale at exorbitant prices. Leaders tended to be 
selected based on their willingness to pay the rent for their position to a power-broker in Kabul. 
Corruption and poor leadership were undermining readiness in the ANSF faster than capacity 
could be built. By the end of 2014, the military command handed over responsibility for 
defeating a resilient insurgency to a government and security forces that were deeply corrupt 
and unable to win the battle of legitimacy in contested and Taliban-controlled areas. Although 
the ANSF, to date, have not experienced the same widespread collapses as the ISF, they have 
steadily lost ground to the insurgency. By 2015 Obama recognized that he had to slow and 
eventually stop the draw-down lest the Afghan government collapse. The latter has proven 
unable to win the battle of legitimacy in contested and Taliban-controlled areas.   
Failure to include war termination considerations led to myopic strategies in both conflicts that 
presumed decisive military victory and ignored clearly identified risks that were likely to 
materialize in the aftermath. As the critical risk factors materialized and put decisive victory 
out of reach, the United States was slow to modify the strategies in both conflicts due to 
cognitive obstacles, political and bureaucratic frictions, and patron-client problems. In neither 
case was the United States able to address adequately the inability of the host governments to 
win the battle of legitimacy in contested and insurgent-controlled area or the sustainability of 
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the insurgencies.1241 When the United States tired of the wars and decided to withdraw, the 
erosion of leverage undermined efforts to negotiate and transition.  
 
Implications for U.S. foreign policy 
This thesis contains important implications for U.S. foreign policy. I will address these by 
hypothesis – recognizing that most apply to more than one. First, to avoid developing strategies 
that rely upon implicit belief in decisive victory, the United States should develop an 
interagency doctrine that governs the strategic level of war, require policy and strategy options 
in which different elements of national power are the main effort, and include war termination 
in each of those options. To reduce the grip of cognitive bias, political and bureaucratic 
frictions, and toxic patron-client problems, the U.S. government should de-centralize 
management of small wars, develop more effective strategic assessments, and take steps to 
better align interests and expectations with host-nations. The totality of these measures should 
reduce the likelihood of the United States needing to negotiate or transition to an ineffective 
partner while withdrawing and losing leverage. American diplomats should develop a 
professional body of knowledge about wartime negotiations that can help them avoid rushing 
to failure and prolonging conflict.  
 
Avoiding the Decisive Victory Trap  
                                                                 
1241 Sunni Arab resistance re-emerged quickly after the U.S. withdrawal, with many groups eventually either 
supporting ISIS or not standing in their way. 
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Despite periodic efforts to reduce war to scientific certainties, guarantees to “lift the fog of 
war” have fallen well short in delivery.1242 Jomini in the 19th century attempted to codify war 
into immutable rules and principles.1243 The beginning of the so-called information age in the 
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries produced heady assurances about how Dominant 
Battle Space Knowledge and Network Centric Warfare would enable commanders to wage war 
in a prescient and frictionless environment.1244 Ideas promising decisive battlefield outcomes 
at little to no cost in (American) blood were seemingly validated in the early months of 
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. They likely played a role in creating a degree of 
irrational exuberance for the war in Iraq.1245 The Bush administration maintained the uncritical 
belief that military force could achieve political objectives.1246 Expectations of durable political 
outcomes emerging from smart munitions proved elusive. 
The United States needs an interagency doctrine to guide policy and strategy development, and 
to help American political and military leaders understand the differences between waging and 
fighting war. Noted scholars of strategy such as Lawrence Freedman and Colin S. Gray argue 
that there is more to strategy than military strategy.1247 Proper strategy integrates critical 
elements of national power – political, diplomatic, economic, and military, among others. The 
United States government, however, lacks an authoritative set of terms and concepts to develop 
integrated strategies.  
                                                                 
1242 Owens (2001) is titled, “Lifting the Fog of War.” 
1243 Shy (1986), 143-185.  
1244 Johnson and Libicki (1995); Alberts, Garstka, and Stein (2000). 
1245 Toby Dodge, “Iraq,” in Caplan (2012), 242-246. 
1246 For a critique of the conventional view of early 2001 – 2002 battlefield outcomes in Afghanistan see Biddle, 
(March-April 2003). 
1247 Freedman (2013), p. 241-2; Gray (2012), p. 22. 
 314 
America shows a proclivity to think of war primarily as a military activity. The consequences 
of this view are less apparent in conventional war – for which the American national security 
establishment is better suited to wage – than for irregular war. The former has clear 
bureaucratic leads: diplomacy to prevent war or build a coalition to fight it; the clash of military 
forces to win, lose, or draw; diplomatic actions to negotiate peace; and oftentimes economic 
and aid efforts to rebuild the damage afterwards. Individual, agency-centric plans can be made 
for each stage. In irregular warfare, on the other hand, the elements of national power must be 
applied concurrently rather than sequentially. This means a proper strategy must fully integrate 
these elements of national power, rather than seeing non-military efforts as supporting cast. 
Without an interagency doctrine or set of authoritative terms and concepts, officials from 
different agencies and even within agencies will continue to talk past each other about waging 
war and how to achieve the most favorable and durable outcome at the least possible cost in 
blood, treasure, and time.  
To be sure, there are immense bureaucratic challenges toward such a doctrine. Diplomats tend 
to resist doctrine as constraining. The military has a robust array of manuals covering tactical 
and operational levels of war, but very little that qualifies as doctrine at the strategic level. Its 
terms and concepts are mostly tactical in nature, which adds confusion to discussions of 
strategy. The U.S. military’s Joint Doctrine, for instance, lacks definitions for terms such as 
defeat, destroy, and degrade – terms which U.S. presidents have used to describe strategic 
intentions.1248 The U.S. Army defines defeat as: 
A tactical mission task that occurs when an enemy force has temporarily or 
permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight. The defeated force’s 
commander is unwilling or unable to pursue his adopted course of action, thereby 
                                                                 
1248 For a Department of Defense dictionary of military terms, see JP 1-02 (15 February 2016).  
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yielding to the friendly commander’s will, and can no longer interfere to a significant 
degree with the actions of friendly forces. Defeat can result from the use of force or the 
threat of its use.1249 [emphasis added] 
As discussed in the Afghanistan case study, this is the kind of definition that McChrystal used 
when describing the ISAF mission to the Obama Administration – a term that caused 
significant confusion among civilian advisors and was seen by some as part of a larger effort 
to coerce the President into approving a troop surge. Obama elected instead to assign the 
military the mission to “degrade” the Taliban, which is a term with no doctrinal definition at 
all. This created unhelpful ambiguity, inhibited the Obama administration’s ability to govern 
military efforts, and enabled the military to justify doing business-as-usual. A set of commonly 
understood terms is important for clarity of civil-military communications. 
Second, the president and national security advisor should demand policy and strategy options 
that are interagency rather than military only. A persistent problem for the United States in 
waging war has been inadequate consideration of the political and diplomatic dimensions of 
national power – which can be more important than the military in creating a favorable and 
durable outcome. This could stem from a view that the military’s task is to determine military 
objectives that will achieve political outcomes. As Clausewitz noted, “The political object—
the original motive for the war—will thus determine both the military objective to be reached 
and the amount of effort required.”1250 Too often scholars and military leaders have interpreted 
this statement to suggest that achieving military objectives will deliver the political object. In 
                                                                 
1249 ADRP 1-02 (7 December 2015), 1-25. 
1250 Clausewitz (1984), 81 (Book I, Chapter 1, para 11). 
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this spirit Colin S. Gray contended that, “Strategy is, or should be, a purpose-built bridge 
linking military power to political goals.”1251  
That view is too limited for irregular war, which Gray would later recognize.1252 The U.S. 
military’s definition of strategy, “A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments 
of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or 
multinational objectives,” is a step in the right direction.1253 The rest of the government has not 
caught up. When only the military is directed to provide options, these more critical elements 
are left out because the military has no authorities or professional competencies to integrate 
them. The result is military-centric options for waging war with non-military efforts as 
supporting functions. As seen in the Afghanistan case study, a former senior Obama 
administration official noted with frustration that the military presented options only in terms 
of troop and associated risk levels. The administration never sought to ask for options in which 
diplomacy or strengthening of the Afghan state was the main effort with military actions in 
support. War, as Georges Clemenceau remarked, is too important to be left to the military.1254 
This structural flaw in policy and strategy needs to be addressed. 
Third, strategies need to include war termination. Lieutenant General Terry A. Wolff, the Joint 
Staff’s former plan and policy chief, noted that the United States “has no organized way of 
thinking about war termination.”1255 Clausewitz’s advice – do not take the first step before 
considering the last – should animate the development and evaluation of strategic options. For 
                                                                 
1251 Gray (April 2002, p. 13) and (1999, Chapter 1); Betts (Fall 2000), 5-50.  
1252 Gray (2012), 22. 
1253 JP 1-02, 227. 
1254 Jackson (1946), 228. 
1255 Interview with Lieutenant General Terry A. Wolff. 
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interventions, the critical factors framework articulated in this thesis [Figure 1] should inform 
but not constrain decision-making. “You need to decide what outcome is most realistic,” 
McChrystal reflected, “not just what is most desirable.”1256 History can help policy-makers 
avoid the planning fallacy. If the United States aims to rescue a troubled ally or partner, like in 
South Vietnam, it should have compelling reasons to believe that the intervention can reverse 
negative trends – and can succeed when interventions under similar conditions for different 
conflicts have failed. If there is a regime change, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, strategic options 
should be designed to prevent the negative trends from emerging. The deliberate inclusion of 
different war termination methods (as outlined in Chapter 2) can help discipline and integrate 
the policy and strategy development processes. This will also help to ensure better alignment 
within the U.S. government. In both cases, American commanders and diplomats in the field 
failed to prioritize efforts critical to transition and instead maintained business-as-usual. 
If the critical factors suggest that outright victory is unlikely, the United States is probably 
better off aiming for a negotiated outcome early, enforcing strict conditionality for issues such 
as governance, political inclusion, and anti-corruption, or not intervening at all. As each case-
study has shown, the United States pays penalties in public support as interventions drag on. 
Once the United States decides to withdraw the bargaining leverage becomes asymmetric and 
undermine efforts to negotiate or transition. The insurgency and its supporters might extract 
concessions in exchange for easing the U.S. withdrawal, but will probably not negotiate an end 
to the conflict. The host nation will not make painful reforms that risk alienating powerful 
internal rivals without the clear and on-hand backing of the United States. America’s leverage 
is likely to be much higher (both on the insurgency and host government) prior to intervention 
than once it is fully committed. This suggests that diplomatic- and political-centric strategies 
                                                                 
1256 Interview with General Stanley A. McChrystal. 
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that have an eye on war termination could reduce the probability of quagmires.  
 
Avoiding the Failure to Learn, Modify, and Adapt 
The United States has been slow in each case to modify a losing or ineffective strategy. This 
has been due to factors such as cognitive biases, political and bureaucratic frictions, and patron-
client problems. To reduce the grip of these problems, the U.S. government should de-
centralize management of small wars, develop more effective strategic assessments, and take 
steps to better align interests and expectations with the host-nation.  
This thesis has illustrated that America’s tendency to operate in bureaucratic silos undermines 
the prospects of success. No entity below the NSC has the authority and responsibility to direct 
and manage the full range of U.S. government elements of national power deployed to a war 
zone. This results in operations within bureaucratic silos on the ground and cumbersome 
micromanagement from Washington. These problems leave the United States highly 
vulnerable to hypothesis #2 problems. In each conflict addressed in this thesis, the United 
States attempted to apply reductionist, milestone-centric methods to address the complex 
challenges of state-building and reform. These challenges are complex because they involve 
the interaction of competing personalities, parties, and interests.1257 Those interactions create 
feedback loops causing actors to adapt. U.S. officials, focusing myopically on the milestones, 
failed to understand how super-empowered local elites were manipulating them for political 
advantage. These largely successful efforts damaged the legitimacy of the host governments in 
the eyes of the losers and those left out. The tendency to operate in bureaucratic silos created 
gaps that were easily and repeatedly exploited by local elites and fault lines in which efforts in 
                                                                 
1257 For more on complexity, see Waldrop (1992), 11-13. 
 319 
one silo undermined efforts in one or more of the others. The troubling result was that U.S. 
efforts often self-synchronized in damaging ways. Critical risks in Iraq and Afghanistan – 
predatory sectarianism and kleptocracy, bad governance, civilian harm, external support and 
sanctuary, among others – materialized in these seams and fault-lines. No U.S. official had 
responsibility or was held accountable for addressing them.  
The United States can reduce the salience of these problems in irregular wars by de-centralizing 
authorities to officials in theater. One way to do so is to replace senior military commands with 
a strategic headquarters led by presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed official who is 
supported by an interagency staff. That echelon of command should have the authority and 
responsibility to direct and manage all deployed elements of U.S. national power, and be held 
accountable for success. This organization will also help the U.S. government differentiate 
between policy (which the NSC should manage) and strategy (which the strategic headquarters 
could manage).  
Such a structure may help the NSC measure a war’s direction and progress more effectively. 
In both Iraq and Afghanistan, bureaucracies graded their own homework – offering reports of 
progress associated with their efforts.1258 Individual, in-silo metrics were then put together to 
explain that the war was on the right track. This mentality resulted in an incomplete and 
potentially misleading picture of whether the strategy is succeeding. Instead of 1+1+1+1 = 4, 
as U.S. officials expected, the complexity problems noted above meant that 1+1+1+1 resulted 
in far less.1259 Relying on in-silo metrics can create further confusion because the intelligence 
                                                                 
1258 For detailed examinations of ways the U.S. can better assess counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts, 
see Schroden (2009 and September 2013); Schroden, Rosenau, and Warner (February 2016). See also Ellis et al 
(September 2011); Schmid, Singh (2009).  
1259 The 1s symbolize a unit of progress in four silos: military, political, diplomatic, economic. The analogy reflects 
the milestone approach, too: Interim government + Constitution + Elections = Legitimate government. 
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and policy communities tended to assess the direction of the war using very different variables. 
Whereas the intelligence community tended to assess enemy strength and capabilities (and 
sometimes host nation governance) as growing problems, the Defense and State departments 
often used their metrics (numbers of enemy killed, civil servants trained, roads and schools 
built, etc.) to portray intelligence community assessments as “too negative.” The presentation 
of very different pictures of progress to a National Security Council of limited bandwidth can 
strengthen status quo bias.  
The critical factors framework offers a way for the intelligence and policy communities to 
evaluate regularly a consistent set of outcome-related issues to see if trends are moving in the 
right directions. The process, together with the creation of a strategic headquarters, increases 
the potential for the NSC to examine the war’s direction more objectively. Better assessments 
can help the NSC become more agile in modifying or adapting policy, requiring the strategic 
headquarters to make needed changes in strategy, and holding the American leadership on-the-
ground accountable for success.  
The United States needs to develop ways to address chronic patron-client problems that result 
in misaligned interests and poorly coordinated and even counterproductive actions.1260 I do not 
recall these issues and their strategic implications being addressed during any interagency 
deliberations about Afghanistan, and I could find little discussion of such topics regarding Iraq 
or Vietnam. While individual components of the patron-client problem might have been raised 
(such as host nation focus on political dramas over winning the war), there was insufficient 
appreciation of their strategic consequences. The U.S. interagency doctrine proposed above 
                                                                 
1260 As noted in Chapter 2, I am using the term patron-client problems to cover many of the aspects of what 
political scientists call principal-agent problems. Patron-client more clearly describes the relationship between 
the supporting and supported (host-nation) countries. For discussions of principal-agent problems in U.S. 
relationships with host nations in conflict, see Ladwig (Summer 2016), pp. 99–146; Biddle, Baker & Macdonald 
(2016)  
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should address it, as should future intervention strategies. 
Patron-client problems are not easy to disentangle, but the United States can take some 
important steps to limit their downsides. First, the United States should develop a common 
strategy with the host nation. This was done in none of the cases discussed in this thesis. 
Second, the strategy should include conditionality on agreed benchmarks and associated 
incentives and penalties for key political and economic reforms. These incentives could be 
targeted at both institutional and individual levels. Recent studies have shown that reforms are 
more likely when compelling penalties are enforced than when the supporting power provides 
only inducements and encouragement.1261 Making smart choices on conditionality requires 
much more intensive monitoring of how U.S. resources and capabilities are used by the host 
nation, and greater political will to apply sanctions. Third, the United States should begin to 
recognize the pit-falls of a capacity-building approach to developing host nation security 
forces. Host nation militaries do not exist in a political vacuum. The cases discussed in this 
thesis show some of the ways host nation politics affect the incentives of security officials. 
These factors can result in misuse of U.S. resources, shirking, and corrosion of readiness. 
Developing host nation security forces is a complex problem, and needs to be addressed in the 
broader political and diplomatic context. 
 
Developing Expertise on Wartime Negotiations 
In each of the cases discussed here, the United States tired of the war and signaled a desire to 
withdraw. This combination created bargaining asymmetries that prevented favorable and 
durable negotiated outcomes. The steps above can help reduce the risk of quagmires and 
                                                                 
1261 Ladwig (Summer 2016), pp. 99–146; McNerney et al (2014); Biddle, Baker & Macdonald (2016). 
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encourage the United States to place higher priority on political and diplomatic approaches to 
intractable national security problems. For these to be effective, American diplomats need to 
be able to draw upon a more robust body of professional knowledge about wartime negotiations 
and conditionality. As of this writing, U.S. State Department officials tell me that there is no 
professional curriculum on such matters that American Foreign Service Officers must learn 
and no office within the department that specializes in the matter.  
The lack of an expert body of knowledge may be contributing to ineffective conflict resolution 
efforts. Chapter 2 examined scholarship that has shown systematic problems with the tendency 
to seek power-sharing agreements as the primary solution to civil wars and insurgencies. The 
Afghanistan case study showed the consequences of ineffective coordination, misaligned 
interests, and information asymmetries as the United States first avoided possible negotiated 
outcomes and then rushed to failure during reconciliation efforts after 2010. The brief 
discussion of Vietnam shows how the offer to suspend U.S. military actions in exchange for 
agreements to talks by the DRV may have prolonged the conflict. Similarly, 2015 and 2016 
efforts by the U.S. to arrange cease-fires in Syria in the absence of any political agreements on 
the part of the combatants have serially failed and may be adding to cynicism about U.S. 
intentions and credibility.1262 Efforts to encourage political reform failed miserably in each 
case. The U.S. State Department should commission studies that create a body of expert 
knowledge on wartime negotiations and the application of conditionality. These should become 
part of the professional education programs for American diplomats. The following section 
offers potential avenues for such scholarship. 
 
                                                                 
1262 Barnard (9 February 2016); Morello (15 October 2016). 
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Implications for scholarship 
This thesis has examined post-9/11 interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq in detail and provided 
a brief overview of Vietnam. The most obvious implication for scholarship is the extent to 
which it is possible to generalize beyond these cases. This thesis has highlighted the limitations 
of viewing war termination simply as an interval between armed conflict and a peace 
agreement. By bringing the issue into the realm of strategy where it belongs, a wide array of 
opportunities open for further research. I will use the three hypotheses to explore the 
consequences for scholarship in strategy and counterinsurgency; in understanding political, 
bureaucratic, and host nation frictions; wartime negotiations; and civil-military relations.  
 
Implications for strategy and counterinsurgency 
Each of the three hypotheses in this thesis opens avenues to advance scholarship on strategy 
and counterinsurgency. Regarding hypothesis #1 problems, how prevalent is the presumption 
of decisive military victory among intervening powers and to what extent does it limit strategic 
thinking? This was a problem for the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq. For Vietnam, the 
prevailing belief among the Johnson administration was that graduated military pressure would 
compel the DRV to end its support to the National Liberation Front. The Soviets fell into the 
decisive victory trap in Afghanistan from 1979-1989, too. Not all interventions turn out poorly, 
of course. On the positive side of the ledger, the British intervention into Sierra Leone was 
largely successful. NATO used various coercive measures to bring warring parties in Bosnia 
to the 1996 Dayton Accords, and then deployed peacekeeping forces afterwards. The threat of 
NATO military escalation convinced Serbia in 1999 to accede to Kosovo’s secession.  
The consistent war termination problems for the United States in Vietnam, Iraq, and 
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Afghanistan raise questions about the extent to which the three hypotheses are uniquely 
endemic to American strategic culture. Applying the three hypotheses to the Soviet experience 
in Afghanistan and the French war in Algeria could reveal whether the problem applies beyond 
the United States. Analyzing the successful British intervention in Sierra Leone using the three 
hypotheses could illustrate whether the United Kingdom has a better handle on these challenges 
than the United States. The absence of war termination within U.K. defence and interagency 
doctrine, as well as the lack of attention to the matter in discussions about Iraq suggest that the 
lack of thinking about war termination, especially for irregular wars, extends beyond the United 
States. Super-powers, however, could be less susceptible to pressure on these matters from 
their allies. In both case studies examined in this thesis, many allied and partner countries were 
more interested in being perceived by the United States as good allies than in demanding major 
policy and strategy changes as conditions for their support.  
Longitudinal studies produced by RAND offer a wide array of intervention cases to examine 
for hypotheses #1 problems.1263 What the RAND studies have not shown is whether the 
intervening power protected or advanced its interests despite the host nation government 
losing. A negotiated outcome in the current Afghanistan war, for instance, will likely require 
more substantial Afghan government concessions to the Taliban than the reverse. This would 
result in the war being coded as a government loss. A credible commitment by the Taliban to 
eliminate al Qaeda and other international terrorist groups from Afghan soil, however, would 
achieve America’s top war aim while still preventing the violent overthrow of the Afghan 
government. This outcome would be a win for the United States, albeit one that might be 
considered more bloody and expensive than needed. This raises important research questions 
about how well intervening powers develop options and make strategic decisions. Have 
                                                                 
1263Paul et al (2013); Libicki (2008). 
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intervening powers in other conflicts examined the character of the conflict, made 
determinations that decisive victory is unlikely, and employed integrated strategies that gave 
them best possible outcomes at least cost? To use Gideon Rose’s phrase, some countries could 
be more likely than others to “trip across the finish line.”  
As discussed in the U.S. foreign policy section above, the study of strategy should advance 
beyond its fixation with the military instrument of power. There is no war without warfare, in 
Colin S. Gray’s formulation, and there is more to strategy than military strategy.1264  Strategy 
is more properly examined as the purposeful integration of relevant elements of national power 
to achieve policy aims. Scholarship on strategy should thus include examination of how actors 
aimed to bring the war to a favorable and durable conclusion at the least possible cost. 
Lawrence Freedman argued that strategy is governed by start point rather than end-point, but 
also described it as “the best word we have for expressing attempts to think about our actions 
in advance, in light of our goals and capacities.”1265 Strategy must have a discerning eye in 
both places – on the present and on the end-point. War termination provides a useful framework 
to examine this balance. This more robust view has the potential to enrich the study of war at 
the strategic level.  
This thesis has natural implications for the study of counterinsurgency and irregular war. The 
critical factors framework could provide a very useful tool for examining how well intervening 
powers understood the character of the conflict and chose strategies having the best chance for 
success. In Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, the United States ended up supporting 
governments of damaged legitimacy against insurgencies that had durable internal and external 
support. These factors made decisive victory highly unlikely. The problem of adverse selection 
                                                                 
1264 Gray (2012), 22; See also Strachan (2013), 210-234. 
1265 Freedman (2013), ix-x. 
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is a normal one for intervening powers – properly governed states tend not to have insurgencies. 
When U.S. administrations wanted to build the capacity of the host nation to take over 
responsibility for the war, civilian and military officials had difficulty adjusting from a decisive 
victory mentality and prioritizing issues necessary for a successful transition. Studies on how 
and why successful counterinsurgents prevented or reversed negative trends in other conflicts 
will be important to informing a contemporary debate within the United States about the 
efficacy of counterinsurgency.  
Scholarship on counterinsurgency should distinguish more effectively between doctrine and 
strategy. Counterinsurgency does not necessarily require large-scale interventions. A strategy 
can place the political or diplomatic or economic instrument as the top priority, with military 
as a supporting function. A small military footprint, however, does not necessarily mean that 
other instruments are a higher priority. Foreign internal defense missions or partner-capacity-
building missions that rely upon military advisors to help host nations fight an insurgency can 
suffer from an absence of strategy. Such efforts can damage the external power’s credibility if 
it is viewed as providing weapons and training to predatory governments. Most of the countries 
that receive the highest levels of U.S. security force assistance fare poorly on the Transparency 
International Corruption Perceptions Index and several have populations that view the United 
States unfavorably.1266 The causal direction of such un-favorability merits analysis.  
Surprisingly little scholarship has attempted to define and differentiate levels of war in 
counterinsurgency. Most scholarship tends toward the tactical level with heavy emphasis on 
the military.1267 Such works discuss the importance of political legitimacy and economic 
                                                                 
1266 Biddle, Baker & Macdonald (2016), p. 8; Bruce Stokes, “Which countries don’t like America and which do?” 
Pew Research Center, 15 July 2014. 
1267 See for instance, Nagl (2005); Kilcullen (2010); Galula (2006); Kolenda (2012). 
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support alongside the need to conduct military operations against insurgents, but rarely 
examine the dynamic interaction of these factors and how they affect the prospects of success. 
If the tactical level is relatively easy to circumscribe as local and the strategic level as national, 
exactly what constitutes the operational level of war? How do counterinsurgents organize 
campaigns to defeat an insurgency? The U.S. military made some efforts to do this by 
organizing military efforts in various “belts” around Baghdad and with the intention to focus 
military forces first in southern Afghanistan and then shift them to eastern Afghanistan – a 
campaign that ran out of time due to the Obama drawdown.1268  
However, if irregular war requires the proper integration of political, diplomatic economic, and 
military efforts, then campaigns at subnational levels should do so as well. The geographic 
shifting of security forces or the transfer of security responsibilities from foreign 
counterinsurgent to host nation forces seems inadequate conceptually and practically. Similar 
questions apply to the strategic level of war. Inadequate understanding of these levels of war 
in counterinsurgency may be leading to excessive attention on tactics by senior leaders who 
should be setting their sights much higher. A series of tactical successes might not equate to a 
successful campaign, and a series of successful campaigns might not add up to strategic 
success. The challenges, once again, are complex rather than complicated. Factors such as 
governance, institutional integrity, and insurgent sanctuary for instance, might have non-linear 
effects on strategic outcomes. Successful tactical and operational efforts can have limited and 
temporary impact if key factors at the strategic level are problematic. Scholarship on these 
issues can advance our understanding of counterinsurgency and irregular war.     
 
                                                                 
1268 An important effort to define operational art in counterinsurgency is in Dubik (May 2012). He views the 
operational art as a series of geographic and functional transitions (transfers to host nation lead).  
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Understanding and Addressing Political, Bureaucratic, and Patron-Client Frictions 
Hypothesis #2 analyzed factors such as cognitive bias, political and bureaucratic frictions, and 
patron-client problems in preventing needed changes to strategy. Elizabeth Stanley argues that 
changes of government are often necessary to bring about decisions to end a war.1269 How often 
this applies to modifying a losing or ineffective strategy seems equally if not more important. 
The Bush administration modified its strategy for Iraq (which was obviously failing) but not 
for Afghanistan (less perceptibly failing). Changes in administration were needed for major 
changes in strategy in Afghanistan and Vietnam. Strategic paralysis prolonged all three of those 
wars and led to penalties in public support. Why are some sitting governments able to modify 
their strategies while others are not? Do democracies and autocracies differ in strategic 
decision-making agility, and how do the factors in hypothesis affect them?  
Similarly, evaluating the impact of the growth and professionalization of bureaucracies on the 
ability of western powers to wage war effectively seems long overdue. Graham Alison and 
Philip Zelikow show how bureaucratic frictions affected decision-making during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis.1270 Robert Komer discussed this problem in Vietnam.1271 This thesis has shown 
that bureaucratic silos in Afghanistan and Iraq created seams and fault lines that damaged the 
prospects of success and undermined the U.S. government’s ability to learn and adapt. 
Management scholars have discussed the chronic problem of organizational silos in business, 
which could provide useful frameworks for examining and reducing their impact on the 
conduct of war. Similarly, military and management literature have discussed problems with 
micromanagement and over-centralization. The advance of information technology could be 
                                                                 
1269 Stanley (2009b) 
1270 Allison & Zelikow (1999). For a critique of Allison and Zelikow see Bendor & Hammond (1992), 301-322 
1271 Komer (1972). 
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making micromanagement from national capitals more likely. A systemic study of this 
phenomenon and its implications could illuminate ways to adapt national security structures to 
21st century realities.1272  
The patron-client issues discussed in this thesis can help political scientists build upon 
principal-agent theory in addressing national security issues. The latter, as noted in Chapter 2, 
addresses how differences in incentives between principal and agent affect behaviors. 
Differences in strategy and socio-cultural context between supporting country (patron) and 
supported country (client) can add complexity that makes alignment more difficult to achieve. 
Strategies that contain subtle differences in defining the character of the conflict and the nature 
of the enemy can lead to important frictions and divergence of effort. Host nation elites in both 
conflicts sought to use American forces and resources to consolidate their grip on power, while 
the United States wanted to win quickly and leave. The Iraqi government promoted the view 
that Sunni Arab insurgents loyal to tribal sheiks as one and the same with AQI and Ba’athists. 
The Afghan government’s insistence on defining the Taliban as Pakistan-controlled terrorists 
who needed to be killed or induced to defect conflicted with the post-2009 U.S. assessment 
that the Taliban were an insurgent group who could be brought into negotiations. The challenge 
of differing strategies between patron and client and their effects on the war’s outcome should 
be examined more systematically.1273  
Likewise, systemic patron-client problems raise questions about the efficacy of the crossover 
point concept in counterinsurgency. This idea underpinned how the United States tried to limit 
                                                                 
1272 For a recent critique of the growing bureaucracy, cost and complexity of western militaries, see Rasmussen 
(2015). 
1273 Ladwig (2016); Biddle et al (2016). 
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its commitment in each of the cases examined in this thesis.1274 As this thesis has illustrated, 
host nation security forces do not exist in a political vacuum. They tend to reflect the nature of 
the political order. Kleptocratic governments, for instance, are likely to ensure their security 
forces are participants in self-enrichment. This creates major perverse incentives that can have 
corrosive effects on readiness. Rather than linear growth in performance, such forces could hit 
a glass ceiling or even degrade as their size increases. This kind of problem helps to explain 
why increases in resources do not necessarily result in symmetrical improvements in outcomes. 
As these problems reach a certain level of toxicity, it is possible that no feasible amount of 
capacity-building can enable a host nation to reach the crossover point against a sustainable 
insurgency. 
The impacts of socio-cultural and historical context on the development of host nation security 
forces have been under-appreciated. In Afghanistan, for instance, the U.S. military was mirror-
imaging in important ways when designing the Afghan National Army (ANA). The use of 
western-style tactics, personnel, logistics, and command and control systems often grated 
against the capabilities and norms of their Afghan counterparts. Western systems, based on 
well-educated soldiers at the junior enlisted levels and expectations of junior leader initiative 
and autonomy, were being fitted onto a nascent Afghan force that was largely illiterate and led 
by people who expected highly centralized control and discouraged initiative and risk-taking. 
The result has been a high degree of dependency on western forces even after 15 years of 
capacity-building.1275 Studies of what kinds of tactical, logistical, and command and control 
systems work better for developing world militaries could advance our understanding of 
patron-client problems and ways to address them. 
                                                                 
1274 For Vietnam see FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, Document 380 (31 December 1963), 745-6. 
1275 This problem is noted in Grissom (2013), 276. 
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An issue related to the patron-client problem is the relatively small influence of America’s 
allies in U.S. decision-making. Why do problematic host nation partners seem to have more 
influence than longstanding American allies on U.S. wartime decision-making? The Blair 
government placed significant emphasis on the importance of shaping American policy. 
Evidence from both Iraq and Afghanistan suggest that their influence at the policy and strategy 
levels was limited. Despite its misgivings about the legitimacy of the Iraq war and the lack of 
post-Saddam planning, the United Kingdom never wavered in its support. France, on the other 
hand, declined to support the Iraq War – a decision that had no influence on the Bush 
administration.   
Wartime Negotiations and Strategic Bargaining   
Evaluating the prevalence of hypothesis #3 problems could improve our understanding of 
strategic behavior and wartime negotiations. An actor faces clear negotiation challenges if its 
leverage is declining. A key strategic decision therefore involves when to negotiate. Everyone 
wants to do so at the highest possible leverage, but how well can an actor predict when that 
point might occur? As the cases discussed here have shown, and as the literature on ripeness 
argues, unilateral efforts to start a peace process will likely be abortive (unless one side is 
capitulating). This suggests that diplomatic efforts which are episodic or aimed at early high 
profile concessions from the other side may be at high risk of failure. The literature examined 
in Chapter 2 suggests that diplomatic efforts needed to end civil wars and insurgencies could 
be very different than those designed to end a stalemated conventional war. The former might 
need subtle, deliberately-paced, and continuous efforts to be successful.  
Patron-client challenges may also affect wartime negotiations. In each case examined here, the 
host nation government discouraged the United States from outreach and talks with the 
insurgency or pre-insurgency opposition. This could be part of a more systemic pattern for 
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external interventions that may heighten the risk of quagmire. Examining the extent to which 
intervening powers in other conflicts seized upon early opportunities to negotiate and the 
favorability of those outcomes could illuminate whether an external power tends to be better 
off negotiating early – particularly before significant military intervention. Such study could 
also determine if a country’s status as a super-power makes it more vulnerable to quagmires 
because other, more powerful, allies or adversaries lack compelling leverage or enough 
authority to bring about negotiations. Scholarship on these issues will advance our 
understanding of strategic bargaining during irregular wars.  
 
Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary War 
More broadly, this thesis has implications for the future study of civil-military relations. 
Samuel Huntington, in The Soldier and the State, famously outlined the difference between 
subjective control of the military (their co-option by civilian rulers which reduces their 
professionalism) and objective control in which military professionalism can thrive far 
removed from politics.1276 In this model, the military enjoys a significant degree of professional 
autonomy in its unique field of expertise – the art and science of war. This principle of civilian 
control of the military is virtually unquestioned in the United States and NATO countries. That 
autonomy, however, is not absolute. Statesmen must demand that military operations be 
aligned with the political purpose of the war. Eliot Cohen discusses this as part of what he calls 
the unequal dialogue, showing how successful wartime leaders such as Abraham Lincoln, 
Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill and David Ben-Gurion challenged and sometimes 
                                                                 
1276 Huntington (1957).   
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over-rode the generals.1277  
Peter Feaver uses principal-agent theory to challenge Huntington’s notion of the military 
enjoying a privileged level of autonomy.1278 He argues that the military operates under 
incentives like any other “agent” based on the levels of monitoring and expectations of 
punishment for shirking (not fully obeying civilian orders and guidance). In his view, 
uniformed officials have the right to provide advice in their field of special expertise, but not 
the right to question or circumvent even foolish orders from civilian leaders.1279 Feaver even 
questions the right of senior military officials to resign in protest of foolish orders because of 
the potential damage to the institutional civil-military relationship. This formulation reduces 
the role of the military from professionals of special status, expertise, autonomy, and 
relationship to political leaders to that of technicians who do what they are told, even if doing 
so can have catastrophic consequences. This method tightens civilian control of the military 
but removes its moral and ethical dimensions.    
These models are incomplete. The cases discussed in this thesis show examples of military 
leaders interpreting civilian guidance in ways that reinforce their existing views and practices 
but that may have been at odds with the intentions of the president or secretary of defense. The 
Huntington model does not address this kind of problem. The Cohen model falls short as well 
– while he might expect civilian leaders to question more rigorously the military’s execution 
of guidance, an overloaded NSC in the highly-centralized national security structure might not 
have the bandwidth to recognize subtle deviations. Agency theory might describe this as 
evidence of shirking. That characterization could be accurate in some instances, but such 
                                                                 
1277 Cohen (2002), 208-224. 
1278 Feaver (2003). 
1279 Feaver (2003), location 3893-3902 of 5012. 
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behavior could also be a product of cognitive bias by the military or false cognates used by 
political leaders. How can civilians properly control the military instrument in war when there 
is no authoritative language and set of concepts that enable them to articulate objectives, 
develop sound strategies, and govern civil-military integration? In each case presented in this 
thesis, civil-military miscommunication had important strategic effects.  
More profoundly, this study questions the assumption of the military’s special and elevated 
role in war. Each case has illustrated how the military instrument of national power was 
necessary but not sufficient for success. The cases also showed that the political, diplomatic, 
military and economic domains operated concurrently rather than sequentially (as is often the 
norm in conventional war). The conventional wisdom that the military possesses unique 
professional expertise in war and strategy is likely part of the reason that each president relied 
on them for options to prosecute it. In each case the options were inadequate because they 
emphasized only a single instrument of national power. In each case the war turned into a 
quagmire. These problems suggest the scholarship on civil-military relations should 
differentiate the military’s role in the waging versus the fighting of war. For the former, the 
military’s role might be better viewed as a co-equal partner with other elements of national 
power, all subordinate to the president. The military’s professional expertise is more precisely 
in warfare, that is, the fighting of war. Refining the military’s role may put civil-military 
relations on a sounder footing, and could improve America’s ability to successfully develop 
and implement strategies that have a reasonable chance to achieve favorable and durable 
outcomes at acceptable cost. 
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